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I. INTRODUCTION
Drunken driving today is a problem of staggering proportions.I Its cost
to society has been estimated at over twenty-four billion dollars per year, but
the value of human lives lost as a result of accidents caused by drunken
driving remains immeasurable.
2
Who is to pay for the injuries that stem from drunken driving, and how
is drunken driving to be stopped? The drunken driver himself has long been
criminally and civilly responsible for his drunken driving and the injuries it
causes to others.3 Recently, legislatures across the country have enacted
more stringent criminal sanctions for drunken driving in response to outcries
that existing laws were inadequate to dissuade citizens from drinking and
driving.4 In addition, legislatures and the courts have imposed greater civil
liability on the drunken driver as society has become less tolerant of his
transgression. 5 Despite these changes, however, the problem of compensating
the victims remains, because in many instances the drunk is unable to satisfy
1. It has been reported that in 1981, alcohol was involved in 50% of all fatal
traffic accidents and in 20% of accidents involving serious injury to a driver or pas-
senger. See Note, Social Host Liabiity for Injuries Caused by the Ac/s of an IntoxIcated Guest,
59 N.D.L. REV. 445, 445 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Social Host Liabilty]. See
also Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1675 (1981) (arrests for
drunken driving exceed 1.2 million each year, surpassing any other type of arrest).
2. See S.J. Res. 119, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 97 Stat. 725 (1983) (proclaiming Na-
tional Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Week, December 11-17, 1983). The
Joint Resolution of Congress observed that traffic accidents resulted in over 44,000
deaths in 1982 and that in 50% of those fatal incidents, the driver was legally intoxi-
cated. Id.
3. For a general discussion of the criminal liability of the drunk driver, see 7A
AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and HIghway Traffic §§ 296-310 (1980). For a general discus-
sion of the civil liability of the drunk driver, see id. § 775.
4. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West 1984); Act of Dec. 14, 1982, 1982
Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-500 (Baldwin) (codified in various sections ofchs. 29, 37, 45 OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1982)). In 1982, 27 states had enacted more stringent
laws imposing sanctions upon drunk drivers, and legislation was pending in a
number of other states. See Starr, The War Against Drunk Drivers, Newsweek, Sept. 13,
1982, at 34, 35. The New Jersey statute, for example, imposes the following punish-
ments: first offense-fine not less than $250.00 nor more than $400.00, or imprison-
ment for not more than 30 days, or both, and suspension of license for not fewer than
six months nor more than one year; second offense-fine not less than $500.00 nor
more than $1000.00, plus 30 days community service, or imprisonment for no more
than 90 days, and suspension of license for two years; third offense-fine of $1000.00
and imprisonment for not fewer than 180 days and suspension of license for ten years.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1984). For a discussion of the Ohio
drunken driving law, which imposes mandatory imprisonment sanctions, see gener-
ally Note, S 432. Ohio Enacts Stringent Penalties to Deter Driving While Intoxicated, 9 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 147 (1983). For a general discussion of how other countries deter
drunken driving, see Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER (1982).
5. See generally Kraft, The Drive to Stop the Drinker from Driving. Suggested Civil Ap-
proaches, 59 N.D.L. REV. 391 (1983) (suggesting that legislatures adopt a civil ap-
proach to deter the drinking driver). Many plaintiffs injured by drunken drivers also
seek punitive damages from the inebriated tortfeasor. See Note, The Drunken Driver and
Punitive Damages: A Survey of the Case Law and the Feasibiliy of a Punitive Damage Award in
North Dakota, 59 N.D.L. REV. 413, 414 (1983).
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a monetary judgment. This comment will focus on the civil liability of third
parties for the damages caused by drunken drivers.
6
Originally, at common law, a supplier of liquor could not be held liable
in negligence for injuries caused or sustained by an "able-bodied man" to
whom the supplier had furnished intoxicating beverages.7 This view was
founded upon the notion that the consumption of alcohol was a superceding
cause of the drinker's intoxication; the serving of alcohol was an act too re-
mote to be the proximate cause of the drinker's intoxication and the result-
ing injuries.8 However, legislatures and courts have broken with this
common law rule and have imposed civil liability on suppliers and other
third parties. These defendants may be divided into three categories:
(1) vendors who sell intoxicants to the drunken driver;9 (2) social hosts who
gratuitously provide alcoholic beverages to the drunken driver;' 0 and
(3) nonsuppliers of liquor who are held liable either because of some tortious
conduct on their part or because of their relationship to the drunken
6. The "third parties" whose liability is the subject of this comment may be
defined as persons other than the drunken driver who may be held liable for the
driver's torts. They include those who supply alcohol to minors or inebriates, either
in a commercial or social setting, and those who may be secondarily liable even
though they did not furnish the intoxicating beverages.
7. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 1, at 446. See also Cruse v. Aden, 127
II1. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889). As the Cruse court noted:
It was not a tort, at common law, to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to
"a strong and able-bodied man," and it can be said safely that it is not
anywhere laid down in the books that such act was ever held, at common
law, to be culpable negligence, that would impose legal liability for dam-
ages upon the vendor or donor of such liquor.
Id. at 234, 20 N.E. at 74. For a list of jurisdictions that continue to follow this rule,
see note 85 rnfra.
8. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945) ("The
principle is epitomized in the truism that there may be sales without intoxication, but
no intoxication without drinking."); State cx rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254,
78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951) ("Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their
own torts. The law (apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate cause
between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the li-
quor.").
One court explained the policies underlying the rule that serving alcohol is not
the proximate cause of subsequent injuries as follows:
We are convinced that such courts [that allow recovery against vendors
of alcoholic beverages] are basically unable to disenthrall themselves of the
lurking suspicion that liquor in and of itself is evil. This, in spite of the fact
that the legislature here, as in almost every other state, has determined as
public policy that liquor is part and parcel of our social scene. Abused it
may be; evils it may produce; accidents, injury, and death it may cause...
but legitimate the selling and consuming of it is declared. Indeed both state
and federal governments indulge in the taxation and/or wholesaling of it,
from which flow great sums of money into governmental treasuries.
Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 395, 462 P.2d 54, 60 (1969).
9. For a discussion of the liability of vendors under various theories, see notes
12-103 and accompanying text infra.
10. For a discussion of the liability of social hosts (nonvendors), see notes 105-
200 and accompanying text i'fra.
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driver. "
This comment will discuss the civil liability of persons in these three
categories by focusing on the theories under which such liability is im-
posed-dramshop acts granting a civil cause of action, negligence estab-
lished by violation of a criminal statute, and common law negligence. Two
strong but opposing trends will be discerned: the enlargement of liability for
all three groups, especially social hosts (principally by the courts), and the
limitation on liability for vendors and social hosts (principally by the legisla-
tures). These trends are indicative of the many competing interests involved:
deterrence of drunken driving versus reluctance to constrain social and busi-
ness relations, and compensation for injured parties versus the financial bur-
den on the parties held liable. The comment will conclude by examining the
existing approaches to third party liability for drunken driving in light of
these competing interests, and will then suggest a legislative response to the
problem which will accomodate them. This prototypal Alcoholic Beverage
Suppliers' Civil Liability Act is set forth in an appendix.
II. SUPPLIERS OF ALCOHOL LIABLE FOR DRUNKEN DRIVING
A. Vendor Liability
1. Vendor Liability Under Traditional Common Law
Under the traditional common law view, a commercial supplier of li-
quor could not be held liable for injuries caused or suffered by an intoxicated
patron to whom the vendor had furnished alcohol. 12 Nevertheless, courts
occasionally have broken with this view and have imposed liability upon
vendors whose conduct exhibited a degree of culpability greater than negli-
gence. In these situations, courts have imposed liability on the ground that
the vendor's serving of a particular customer constituted willful miscon-
duct.' 3 Willful and wanton misconduct has been defined as the "intentional
11. For a discussion of the liability of persons who have not supplied liquor to
the intoxicated tortfeasor, see notes 295-331 and accompanying text infra.
12. For a discussion of the common law rule barring recovery against a supplier
of alcoholic beverages, see notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
13. In some early cases, courts held vendors liable for serving slaves without
their owners' consent, apparently on a theory that slaves were without any ability to
resist the evils of alcohol. See, e.g., Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1850) (slave owner
has cause of action against sellers of whiskey to her slave when the latter became
intoxicated and froze to death; death was natural consequence since sale was "like
placing noxious food within the reach of domestic animals").
However, most courts holding vendors liable under the common law required
willful misconduct by the vendor in serving a person he knew to be helplessly intoxi-
cated or otherwise as to be without the power to resist drinking. See Hull v. Rund,
150 Colo. 425, 427, 374 P.2d 351, 352 (1962) (supplier liable for injuries if he serves
person in such condition as to be deprived of will power or responsibility for behav-
ior); Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 529, 530 (1882) ("A man who, in violation of law
makes another helplessly drunk, and then places him in a situation where his
drunken condition is likely to bring harm to himself or injury to others, may well be
deemed guilty of an actionable wrong independently of any statute."); McCue v.
Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 169 (1883) (defendants found liable for wrongful death after
1122 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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doing of something . . . with knowledge, express or implied, that serious
injury is a probable, as distinguished from possible, result, or the intentional
doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences."' 4
In invoking this theory, courts have tended to require rather egregious
fact situations before permitting the question of willful and wanton serving
of alcohol to go to the jury. 15 For example, in Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, '6 the
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a vendor alleging willful
misconduct in his serving ten shots of 151-proof rum, two beer chasers, and
one vodka collins in the space of one and one-half hours to someone who he
knew had just turned twenty-one. 17 The court held that a jury could find
that the vendor acted with willful misconduct since (1) he was aware of the
young patron's inexperience; (2) he knew of the customer's continued drink-
ing; and (3) he disregarded the tavern's own practices regarding the serving
of visibly intoxicated patrons and the pouring of certain size shots.' 8
However, in contrast to Ewing, some courts do not agree that a plaintiff
may recover even if he can prove that the vendor engaged in willful miscon-
willfully and recklessly conspiring to induce habitual drunk to swallow large quantity
of whiskey, knowing it was likely to end in his death).
Other cases allowed wives to recover against vendors for loss of consortium when
their intemperate husbands were served in spite of notice having been given to the
vendor not to do so. See Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940)
(tavernkeepers liable for loss of consortium to wife resulting from their repeated sales
of liquor to husband after numerous protests and warnings against serving him);
Riden v. Gremm Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896) (common law liability
imposed on vendors for serving large quantities of alcoholic beverages to plaintiff's
husband after written notice of his habitual drunkenness).
At least one court allowed a jury to determine whether a vendor intentionally
sold liquor to a patron with the purpose of injuring him. See Nally v. Blandford, 291
S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956) (vendor could be liable where he sold quart of whiskey to
patron knowing of his wager that he could drink entire bottle without stopping and
patron died after drinking most of bottle).
14. See Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 402, 572 P.2d 1155, 1161, 143
Cal. Rptr. 13, 20 (1978) (quoting Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 579, 584, 440 P.2d 505,
509, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1968)).
15. See Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338, 340, 253 N.W.2d 757, 758 (1977)
(defendant sold liquor to visibly intoxicated elderly man after being requested by the
plaintiff not to serve him because of weakness for alcohol and after agreeing not to
serve him); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 766, 602 P.2d 605, 607 (1979) (after three
days of initiation activity involving imbibing liquor, initiates in "drinking club" were
given and urged to drink large quantities of liquor, some of it 190 proof, within one-
half hour). Bul cf. Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980) (permittee
could be found wanton and reckless for serving alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxi-
cated person who later drove car negligently and caused accident which killed plain-
tiff's decedent).
16. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
17. Id at 396-98, 572 P.2d at 1157-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17. The plaintiffs
also alleged negligence, but the court noted that, assuming the person served was
found by the jury to be negligent himself, the plaintiffs could only recover against the
defendant on a willful misconduct theory. Id. at 398-404, 572 P.2d at 1158-61, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 17-21.
18. Id at 403-04, 572 P.2d at 1162-63, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
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duct in serving a customer. 19 Moreover, those courts that do recognize the
cause of action often reject particular claims because the conduct alleged is
not exceptional enough.
20
2. Vendor Liabiity Under Dramshop Legislation
States began to impose civil liability on vendors of alcoholic beverages
for the consequences of their patrons' drunkenness through the use of "dram-
shop" or "civil damage" acts in the mid-nineteenth century.2 ' Dean Prosser
describes a dramshop act as one "impos[ing] strict liability, without negli-
gence, upon the seller of intoxicating liquor, when the sale results in harm to
the interests of a third person because of the intoxication of the buyer."
22
At one time or another, thirty-eight states have had some form of dram-
shop act.23 These laws were enacted as a result of the efforts of prohibition-
ists to curtail the availability of alcoholic beverages; 24 these same efforts were
ultimately rewarded in 1919 with the passage of the eighteenth amendment
19. See, e.g., Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 11. App. 3d 404, 407, 449 N.E.2d 209, 211
(1983) (no common law cause of action based upon willful and wanton misconduct
by tavernkeeper, however egregious the underlying facts; dramshop act is exclusive
remedy against vendors).
20. See, e.g., Lucido v. Apollo Lanes & Bar, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 267, 333
N.W.2d 246 (1983) (defendant vendor, without asking for identification, sold alco-
holic beverages to minor who was visibly intoxicated; court held that facts of case did
not state claim for gross negligence); Van Cleave v. Kietz-Mill Minit Mart, 97 Nev.
414, 633 P.2d 1220 (1981) (plaintiff alleged that merchant sold beer to minor without
requesting identification and had regularly sold beer to minors without identification
in the past; court held there was no willful and wanton misconduct as matter of law
since "no suggestion of any special circumstances" surrounded sale to minor in
question).
21. Wisconsin, in 1849, was the first state to pass an act providing for civil liabil-
ity of a tavernkeeper. See McGough, Dramshop Acts, 1966-67 PROCEEDINGS OF A.B.A.
SECTION OF INS., NEG.. & COMPENSATION L. 448, 449. These acts are also known as
"civil damage," "civil damages" or "civil liability" acts. "Dramshop" has always
been a term of purely legal significance, seldom found in nonlegal parlance. Id. at
448. It was originally used to refer to taverns selling alcoholic beverages in amounts
of less than one gallon. Id.
22. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 81, at 581 (W. Keeton 5th
ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON].
23. The author of one study was unable to find a dramshop act in these jurisdic-
tions: Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.
See McGough, supra note 21, at 449. Since that study was published, California and
Utah have passed dramshop acts, so there are a total of twelve states that have never
had a dramshop act. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983).
24. See Johnson, Drunken Driving-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of lntoxicat-
ing Liquor, 37 INn. L.J. 317, 320 (1961-1962); McGough, supra note 21, at 449-50.
Although frequently cited as a judicial response to the harshness of the common law
rule barring compensation for the victims of drunkenness, dramshop acts actually
were enacted to stop the consumption of "demon rum." While legislators could have
been motivated to some extent by a desire to compensate the relatively few persons
injured by drunkenness in the pre-automobile age, their primary concern (or, more
likely, that of their constituents) was to discourage imbibing. See Comment, Liquor,
1124 [Vol. 29: p. It119
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and national prohibition. 25 After prohibition ended in 1933, states began to
repeal their dramshop acts. 26 By 1978, only eighteen states had such acts on
their books, 27 and no state had adopted one in the preceding forty years. 28
In more recent years, however, dramshop legislation has enjoyed a ren-
aissance, with new acts being passed by three state assemblies2 9 and being
introduced in others.30 Moreover, it appears that this trend will continue,
this time sparked not by a conviction that liquor is immoral, but rather by
public pressures to deter drunken driving and to compensate the victims of
those accidents that do occur. 3 1
Dramshop acts in effect today32 are usually described as being either
the Law, and California. One Step Forward- Two Steps Backward, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
355, 356-57 n.8 (1979).
25. See D. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAl. PROHIBITION 5-6 (1979) (prohibition
was result of long temperance campaign, as well as progressive political movement
and period of self-denial resulting from World War I).
26. See McGough, supra note 21, at 455.
27. Comment, supra note 24, at 356 n.8.
28. As of 1967, no state without a pre-existing act had adopted one since 1935.
McGough, supra note 21, at 451. States changing the provisions of their dramshop
acts by adopting a new act are not considered to be states "adopting a dramshop act"
for the purposes of this discussion. The authors know of no state to adopt a dram-
shop act from 1935 until 1978, when California did so. See CAi.. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984).
29. See California, 1978: CAi.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp.
1984); North Carolina, 1983: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1983); Utah,
1981: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983).
30. For example, during the 1983 session of the Texas legislature at least twenty-
two bills relating to drunken driving were introduced in the house of representatives
alone. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 318 n.2 (Tex. 1983) (McGee,
J., dissenting). One of these, House Bill 708, would have imposed civil liability upon
a vendor who knowingly sold liquor to an intoxicated person. Tex. H.B. 708, 68th
Leg. (1983).
In Arizona, two dramshop bills were recently introduced but never passed. See
Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 512, 667 P.2d 200, 212 (1983).
31. For a discussion of the motivations underlying the passage of the original
dramshop acts, see note 24 supra. There is no question that modern dramshop legisla-
tion is being enacted in response to the drunken driving situation. For example, the
recent North Carolina dramshop provisions were passed as part of that state's Safe
Roads Act of 1983, which was the result of the recommendations made by Governor
James B. Hunt's Task Force on Drunken Driving. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120
to -129 (1983); J. DRENNAN, THE SAFE ROADs ACT OF 1983: A SUMMARY AND
COMPILATION OF STATUTES AMENDED OR AFFECTED BY THE ACT (1983). For fur-
ther discussion of the purposes sought to be achieved by the North Carolina act, see
notes 46-47 ihfra.
32. There are eighteen states with dramshop acts in effect at the present time:
Alabama, AI.A. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); California, CAi.. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984); Colorado, Coi.o. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-18 (1982); Illinois, II.i.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West. Supp. 1984-1985); Maine, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); Michigan, MICH. COMI,. LAWS ANN. § 436.22(5)
(West Supp. 1984); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984); New
York, N.Y. GEN. OI.iG. LAW §§ 11-100 to -101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983);
1983-84] 1125
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broad or narrow in form. 33 Currently, eight states have broad dramshop
acts. 34 The language of a broad dramshop act is typified by that of the New
York statute:
Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of sup-
port, or otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the
intoxication of any person, whether resulting in his death or not,
shall have a right of action against any person who shall by unlaw-
fully selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such
intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxica-
tion; and in any such action such person shall have a right to re-
cover actual and exemplary damages.
35
Although these broad statutes appear to grant a cause of action to anyone
who is injured by the intoxicated person or by reason of his own intoxication,
courts have usually barred the intoxicated person himself from invoking the
statute in order to sue a supplier for his own injuries.36 The effect of the
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1983); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page
1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); Wyo-
ming, Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1982).
33. Many commentators have adopted this distinction. See, e.g., Graham, Liabil-
ity of the Social Host for Inurtes Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WnL-
LAMETTE L.J. 561, 564, 568 (1980); Kennan, Liquor Law Liability in Califomia, 14
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 46, 52 (1973); Note, Social Host Liabih'ty, supra note 1, at 450.
34. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); MICH. COMiP. LAWS
ANN. § 436.22(5) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. GEN. OBI.IG. LAW §§ 11-100 to -101 (Mc-
Kinney 1978 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
35. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101(1) (MeKinney 1978). In 1983, the New
York Legislature added a provision providing for civil liability for persons who know-
ingly cause "intoxication by unlawfully serving" a person that the server knows or
has reasonable cause to believe is under nineteen years of age. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 11-100 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). This provision makes the dramshop
act's coverage more broad by including minors as well as intoxicated persons within
its protected class.
36. See, e.g., Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 So. 2d 120, 123-24 (Ala. 1980)
(person served has no cause of action under dramshop act); Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores,
109 Il1. App. 3d 109, 110, 440 N.E.2d 279, 280-81 (1982) (dramshop act restricted to
third parties suffering damages resulting from actions of intoxicated person);
Ciemierek v. Jim's Garage, 90 Mich. App. 565, 569, 282 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1979)
(under dramshop act, intoxicated person has no right of action against bar). For a
discussion of defenses relating to the plaintiff's fault, see notes 207-40 & 253-92 and
accompanying text infra.
Similarly, although the wording of this type of dramshop act would seem to
grant a cause of action against nonvendors, as of this writing there have been only
two cases in which courts have permitted recovery against nonvendor defendants
under a dramshop act. See Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972)
(minor requested that defendant adult procure liquor for him from state liquor store,
and then injured plaintiffs in automobile accident after consuming liquor; plaintiffs
held to have cause of action under dramshop act against defendant not engaged in
1126 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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broad dramshop acts, therefore, has been to hold vendors civilly liable for
damage to person, property or means of support sustained by persons other
than the intoxicated patron.
3 7
Narrow dramshop acts are currently in effect in ten states.38 In contrast
to their broader counterparts, these acts place various limitations on the ven-
dor's liability for the acts of his intoxicated patrons. For example, some stat-
utes restrict the class of plaintiffs to those third persons who have given the
server prior notice of the patron's intemperate habits39 or of the patron's
minority.40 One statute further limits this class to the father, or, if the father
is dead, to the mother, of a minor served without parental permission. 4 1 In
addition, some dramshop acts impose limitations on the amount a plaintiff
may recover. 42 In some states, a shorter statute of limitations is provided for
liquor traffic); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) (defendants who
purchased liquor for minor who became intoxicated and was killed in automobile
accident held liable under civil damage act since legislation found to include
nonvendors). For a more detailed discussion of the Ross case, see notes 130-40 and
accompanying text thfra.
Furthermore, in those two states-Iowa and Minnesota-the legislatures subse-
quently amended their laws specifically to preclude nonvendor liability under a
dramshop act. For a discussion of the legislative reaction to these two cases, see notes
122 & 139-40 and accompanying text znfra.
37. For a general discussion of the types of injuries for which damages are recov-
erable under the dramshop acts, see 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 566-575
(1969).
38. See CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984); CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-1-18 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976);
WVO. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1982).
39. Set, e.g., Coi.o. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973) (husband, wife, child, parent,
guardian or employer must notify defendant in writing not to serve person who is
habitual drunkard, or else defendant will not be liable); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-2
(1976) (in order to recover, husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer must
have notified defendant in writing within past twelve months not to serve excessive
drinker); WYO. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1982) (spouse or dependent may give written no-
tice that spouse or person supporting dependent is habitual drunkard and is neglect-
ing support because of drunkenness; if licensee serves anyway, person giving notice
may bring suit).
Rather than restricting the class of plaintiffs directly, Ohio's statute places a
restriction on the class of intoxicated persons covered by its provisions. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982) (recovery precluded unless the intoxicated
person was served after the department of liquor control had issued an order "black-
listing" him).
40. WYO. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1982) (court, parent or guardian may give written
notice to licensee that child or ward is under 19r; if licensee serves anyway, person
giving notice may bring suit).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-18(a) (1982).
42. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) ($20,000 per person
injured, up to $50,000 per action); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-123 (1983) ($500,000 per
occurrence). Illinois, considered to be a state with a broad statute, also imposes limits
on recovery. See I.i.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984)
($15,000 for injuries to person or property of any person; $20,000 for loss of support).
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dramshop actions than for other personal injury cases, 4 3 and in two states
the action will be barred if the plaintiff does not give notice to the defendant
within a specified period of time of his intention to bring suit. 4 4 With re-
strictions such as these, the traditional narrowly drawn dramshop act is gen-
erally not very helpful to persons seeking compensation from vendors for
injuries resulting from drunken driving. 4 5
Notably, however, North Carolina recently enacted a narrowly drawn
dramshop act 4 6 as part of that state's Safe Roads Act of 1983. 4 7 This act is a
more workable modern approach to the problem of vendor liability. 4 8 The
North Carolina act addresses itself only to the serving of minors, but specifi-
43. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (action must be
brought within one year of act or omission); 1... ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (action barred unless brought within one year after cause
of action accrued); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22(5) (West Supp. 1984) (action
must be brought within two years after injury or death); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126
(1983) (one year statute of limitations).
44. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (requires notice of intent
to bring action within 60 days after injury occurred); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.93
(West Supp. 1984-1985) (six-month written notice required, but time period may be
extended if plaintiff incapacitated or unable through reasonable diligence to discover
defendants' names).
45. One authority has stated that most narrow dramshop acts are "so limited as
to be of little practical consequence" anymore, and that suits are rarely brought
under them. McGough, supra note 21, at 450-51. This same authority has referred to
the dramshop acts in general as "something of an anachronism." Id at 455. Wiscon-
sin recently recognized this, and repealed a dramshop act that granted a cause of
action to persons injured through the intoxication of a minor or habitual drunkard
who was served by a person that had been notified not to serve the minor or habitual
drunkard. See 1981 Wis. Laws 79511 (repealing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West
1974)) ("This provision was deleted because it is not used and appears to be
unworkable.").
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B- 120 to- 129 (1983). This statute is considered "nar-
row" because recovery is limited to situations where a minor has been improperly
served.
47. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 435. The full title of the bill is "An Act to
Provide Safe Roads by Requiring Mandatory Jail Terms for Grossly Aggravated
Drunken Drivers, Providing an Effective Deterrent to Reduce the Incidence of Im-
paired Driving, and Clarifying the Statutes Related to Drinking and Driving." Id.
North Carolina's dramshop act was thus enacted as part of a legislative "package"
aimed at the problem of drunken driving that enlarged both criminal and civil liabil-
ity in the hope of deterring drunken driving. Id.
48. Dramshop acts recently enacted in other states are more in the traditional
mold. California's statute is very narrow, and confines a claim for relief strictly to the
situation where a vendor serves an obviously intoxicated minor. See CAl.. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984). Utah's statute, although broad in form, is
written along the lines of a temperance-era dramshop act, granting a cause of action
to any third person injured as a result of the intoxication of a person furnished alco-
hol by the defendant. See UTAH COE ANN. §§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983). This act
does not address itself to any special compensation or deterrence problems, and
grants immunity to the state for injuries arising from its involvement in the distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983). Never-
theless, the new Utah dramshop act could apply to social hosts. For a discussion of
this possibility, see note 125 infra.
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1984], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss5/3
cally states that it leaves all common law causes of action intact.4 9 The act
imposes civil liability upon a permittee50 and upon local alcoholic beverage
control boards 5 1 if the plaintiff brings suit within one year 52 and proves
three elements. First, the plaintiff must prove that the sale of liquor was
negligent under the circumstances.5 3 The act offers guidelines for proving
this element, 54 stating that proof that a vendor made a sale without request-
ing identification constitutes evidence of negligence. 55 The defendant may
try to rebut the inference of negligence by introducing proof that the vendor
engaged in good practices, 56 evidence that the minor lied about his age, 57 or
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-128 (1983). Thus, the act does not preempt actions
in negligence against vendors for serving intoxicated adults. See, e.g., Hutchens v.
Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983) (cause of action against vendor exists
for person injured in collision with intoxicated adult who had been served by tavern
while in intoxicated condition in violation of statute). Indeed, the act originally ad-
dressed itself to the serving of intoxicated persons as well as minors, but included only
minors in the final form. However, the legislature sought to ensure that no conclu-
sions denying liability be drawn from this intentional omission by including the fol-
lowing provision in the act:
The original inclusion and ultimate deletion in the course of passing this act
of statutory liability for certain persons who sell or furnish alcoholic bever-
ages to intoxicated persons does not reflect any legislative intent one way or
the other with respect to the issue of civil liability for negligence by persons
who sell or furnish those beverages to such persons.
1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 435 § 41.1.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1983). Thus, persons who sell alcoholic bever-
ages without a permit, as well as social hosts who dispense alcoholic beverages with-
out charging, are excluded from being named defendants under the act.
51. Id. Local alcoholic beverage control (ABC) boards operate state liquor stores
in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-800 (1983) (spirits or liquor may be sold
only in ABC stores operated by local boards, except for retail sales by permittees). Cf
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-2 (Supp. 1983) (providing immunity to the state, its agen-
cies, employees, or political subdivisions for their activities in the sale of alcoholic
beverages).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-121, -126 (1983). The one-year period of limita-
tion is short in comparison to that applicable to other dramshop actions. Most dram-
shop acts do not specify any limitation period, and thus carry the same limitation
period that would apply to other personal injury claims under their respective state
laws. For a listing of those states that apply a short limitation period to their dram-
shop acts, see note 43 supra.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(l) (1983).
54. Id. § 18B-122. By adopting this negligence standard North Carolina de-
parted from the traditional strict liability imposed by dramshop acts. See PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 81, at 581.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-122 (1983). In most states that have decided the
question, the serving of alcohol in violation of an alcoholic beverage control act is
negligence per se rather than merely evidence of negligence. See note 93 and accom-
panying text thfra. In any case, it is possible that someone who serves a minor in
North Carolina but exercises due care in that he asks for and is shown credible identi-
fication would not be found to violate North Carolina's alcoholic beverage control
act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302(d) (1983) (allowing for defense in criminal ac-
tion'that purchaser produced identification or otherwise led the server to conclude
reasonably that he was of legal age).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-122 (1983). The statute provides that proof of good
practices shall include but not be limited to "instruction of employees as to laws
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evidence that the sale was made under duress.5 8 Second, the plaintiff must
prove that the consumption of the alcohol furnished by the defendant
"caused or contributed to, in whole or in part" 59 the minor's intoxication at
the time of injury.60 Third, the plaintiff must establish that the minor's neg-
ligent operation of a vehicle while "impaired" was the proximate cause of
the injury.6 1 Recovery under the act is limited to $500,000 per occurrence. 62
If a permittee does not satisfy a judgment against him, his permit will be
revoked.
63
A third legislative response to the question of vendor liability has been
the passage of what might be called "anti-dramshop" acts. Enacted in seven
states,64 anti-dramshop laws seek primarily to exempt vendors from civil lia-
bility except under some very specified-and usually very narrow-set of
regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages, training of employees, enforcement tech-
niques, admonishment to patrons concerning laws regarding the purchase or furnish-
ing of alcoholic beverages, or detention of a person's identification documents in
accordance with G.S. 18B-129 and inquiry about the age or degree of intoxication of
the person." Id. The act authorizes the permittee to retain identification documents
for a "reasonable length of time" to determine if the patron is of legal age as long as
he informs the patron of his reasons for doing so. Id. § 18B-129.
57. Id. § 18B-122. The drinking age in North Carolina is 19 for wine with an
alcohol content between 6% and 17% and for beer, but 21 for stronger wines, liquor
and mixed drinks. Id. § 18B-302(b).
58. Id § 18B-122.
59. Id § 18B-121(2). This language is rather broad, since it would seem that
any serving of alcohol could be shown to "contribute . . . in part" to a person's
intoxication. Similar language appears in other dramshop acts. See Coi.o. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, § 501 (1972). For a criticism of this standard as being too onerous on the defend-
ant server, see Comment, supra note 24, at 356 n.8.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983).
61. Id § 18B-121(3). The act refers to the minor's "being subject to an impair-
ing substance. . . at the time of the injury." Id § 18B-121(2). This is defined in the
state's Motor Vehicles Code as driving "under the influence of an impairing sub-
stance," or having an alcohol concentration in the blood of 0.10% or more. Id § 20-
138.1(a). An "impairing substance" under the Motor Vehicle Code is defined as in-
cluding "/al/coho4 controlled substance under Chapter 90 of the General Statutes,
any other drug or psychoactive substance capable of impairing a person's physical or
mental faculties, or any combination of these substances." Id. § 20-4.01(14a) (em-
phasis added). Thus, it would seem that a person could have less than .10% alcohol
concentration in his blood and still be "subject to an impairing substance ... at the
time of injury." Id. § 18B-121(2).
62. Id. § 18B-123. For a comparison with other dramshop acts having a limita-
tion on damages, see note 42 supra.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1003(d) (1983). Additionally, no new permit will be
issued to the person whose permit was revoked so long as the judgment remains out-
standing. Id. § 18B-900(a)(7).
64. See Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1983); California, CAL.. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 25602-25602.1 (West Supp. 1984); Florida, Fi.A. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.125 (West Supp. 1984); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8 (West Supp.
1984); New Mexico, .N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1984); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 30.950-.960 (1983); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon
1969).
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circumstances. 65 The Pennsylvania 66 and Oregon 67 statutes limit the liabil-
65. The focus of the anti-dramshop acts is on limiting liability rather than pro-
viding compensation, i.e., on protecting defendants rather than plaintiffs. These stat-
utes have resulted primarily from pressure applied by special interest groups, such as
professional associations and the insurance industry, urging legislatures to cut back
on remedies created by the courts for persons injured through their own intoxication
or that of others. See, e.g., Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, __, 672 P.2d 697, 700
(1983) (anti-dramshop legislation was "proposed by Oregon Restaurant and Bever-
age Association and supported by various commercial alcoholic beverage servers,"
who "testified at hearings . . . that they were concerned about the expansion of their
liability" and that it had become "much more difficult and expensive to obtain"
liability insurance).
For the text of the various acts, see notes 66-67, 69-72 & 74 infra.
66. The Pennsylvania statute, passed in 1951, provides as follows:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages in-
flicted upon them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee,
unless the customer who inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given
liquor or malt or brewed beverages by the said licensee or his agent, servant
or employee when the said customer was visibly intoxicated.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1969). The "visibly intoxicated" language
appears to limit only a licensee's liability to a third person. Id. Thus, it would seem
to allow for vendor liability for injuries sustained by an intoxicated minor who was
sober when served but to preclude recovery by third persons injured by that same
minor. See Simon v. Shirley, 269 Pa. Super. 364, 367 n.5, 409 A.2d 1365, 1366 n.5
(1979) (vendor violating alcoholic beverage control act by serving minor not civilly
liable for injuries to third parties resulting therefrom if minor not visibly intoxicated
when served; court implied that result would be different if illegally served patron
had sought recovery).
67. The three Oregon provisions, passed in 1979, provide as follows:
No licensee or permittee is liable for damages incurred or caused by intoxi-
cated patrons off the licensee's or permittee's business premises unless the
licensee or permittee has served or provided the patron alcoholic beverages
when such patron was visibly intoxicated.
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1983).
No private host is liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated
social guest unless the private host has served or provided alcoholic bever-
ages to a social guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated.
Id. § 30.955.
Notwithstanding ORS 30.950, 30.955 and 471.130, no licensee, permit-
tee or social host shall be liable to third persons injured by or through per-
sons not having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic beverages
from the licensee, permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated that a
reasonable person would have determined that identification should have
been requested or that the identification exhibited was altered or did not
accurately describe the person to whom the alcoholic liquor was sold or
served.
Id. § 30.960.
The Supreme Court of Oregon recently had the opportunity to interpret
§ 30.950. See Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, 672 P.2d 697 (1983). In that case the
plaintiff was the personal representative of the decedent who was served while intoxi-
cated by the defendant licensees, and was fatally injured when he fell and struck his
head. Id at -, 672 P.2d at 698. Since Oregon does not recognize a common law
cause of action in favor of the intoxicated patron against the tavernkeeper, the plain-
tiff tried to argue that § 30.950 expressly created one. Id at -, 672 P.2d at 698.
Rather than ruling that the statute only limited existing causes of action without
creating a new one, the court instead determined that the legislature never intended
the phrase "damages incurredor caused by intoxicated persons"' to mean injuries to the
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ity of vendors to suits by injured third parties in situations where the vendor
sold liquor to a patron who was visibly intoxicated when served. 68 The New
Mexico statute limits the liability of licensees to situations in which the licen-
see served an intoxicated person, the intoxication was "reasonably apparent"
to the defendant, and the defendant "knew from the circumstances" that the
person served was intoxicated. 69 Alaska limits the liability of vendors to
intoxicated person himself, but only injuries and damages to others for which the
intoxicated person could be found liable. Id. at -, 672 P.2d at 699-701 (emphasis
added). The court therefore held that § 30.950 did not create a claim in favor of
intoxicated persons against liquor licensees who served them when they were visibly
intoxicated. Id. at __, 672 P.2d at 701.
In explaining why it had construed the statute against the plaintiff, the Oregon
court stated that the "legislative history of ORS § 30.950 indicate[d] that its purpose
was to limit the liability of liquor licensees and permittees to third parties," because
those licensees and permittees were "concerned about the expansion of their liability
from . . . recent decisions of this court." Id. at -, 672 P.2d at 700. It is submitted
that it would have made more sense for the court to have decided the case by empha-
sizing the limiting functions of the statute on existing causes of action than to engage
in a rather tortured construction of statutory language.
68. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon
1969). In jurisdictions that do not recognize this limitation, a party can recover if
injured by a minor who purchases alcohol when sober but then becomes intoxicated
and drives negligently. Compare Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390
Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983) (vendor can be liable for serving minor who is not
visibly intoxicated since it is proscribed by alcoholic beverage act) with Simon v.
Shirley, 269 Pa. Super. 364, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979) (vendor not liable for serving mi-
nor in violation of alcoholic beverage control act; liability limited by statute to situa-
tion where minor also visibly intoxicated when served).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1984). The New Mexico "anti-dram-
shop" act provides:
A. No civil liability shall be predicated upon the breach of Section
60-7A-16 NMSA 1978 by a licensee, except in the case of the licensee who:
(1) sold or served alcohol to a person who was intoxicated; and
(2) it was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the person buying
or apparently receiving service of alcoholic beverages was intoxicated; and
(3) the licensee knew from the circumstances that the person buying
or receiving service of alcoholic beverages is [was] intoxicated [sic].
B. No licensee is chargeable with knowledge of previous acts by
which a person becomes intoxicated at other locations unknown to the li-
censee.
C. As used in this section, "licensee" means a person licensed under
the provisions of the Liquor Control Act and the agents or servants of the
licensee.
D. No person who has gratuitously provided alcoholic beverages to a
guest in a social setting may be held liable in damages to any person for
bodily injury, death or property damage arising from the intoxication of the
social guest unless the alcoholic beverages were provided recklessly in disre-
gard of the rights of others, including the social guest.
E. A licensee may be civilly liable for negligent violation of Sections
60-7B-1 and 60-7B-1.1 NMSA 1978. The fact-finder shall consider all the
circumstances of the sale in determining whether there is negligence such as
the representation used to obtain the alcoholic beverage. It shall not be
negligence per se to violate Sections 60-7B-1 and 60-7B-1.1 NMSA 1978.
Id New Mexico was in the minority of states that would not allow a person injured
as a result of the intoxication of another to have a claim for relief against the server
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licensees or their agents who serve a drunken person, or who serve a minor
without securing a reasonably reliable identification document or statement
from the minor that he is of legal drinking age. 70 California limits the liabil-
ity of vendors to situations where the patron is an intoxicated minor.71 The
until 1982, when the state supreme court removed the bar. See Lopez v. Maez, 98
N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982). For a list of other jurisdictions that maintain such a
bar, see note 87 infra. In Lopez, the defendant licensee sold alcohol to a visibly intoxi-
cated man who later drove his car into that of Lopez, killing Lopez's wife and two of
his children, causing a third child to go into a coma, and injuring two other children
and Lopez himself. Id at 627, 651 P.2d at 1271. The court held:
[A] person may be subject to liability if he or she breaches his or her duty by
violating a statute or regulation which prohibits the selling or serving of
alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person; the breach of which is found to be
the proximate cause of injuries to a third party.
Id. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276. In passing the "anti-dramshop" act, the legislature was
apparently reacting to the Lopez case. Although the plaintiff Lopez would probably
have been able to recover despite the law's limitations, it seems clear that the legisla-
ture wanted to curb further judicial expansion of liability, especially into such areas
as social host liability.
70. ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1983). The Alaska statute states as follows:
A person who provides alcoholic beverages to another person may not
be held civilly liable for injuries resulting from the intoxication of that per-
son unless the person who provides the alcoholic beverages holds a license
authorized under AS 04.11.080-04.11.220, or is an agent or employee of
such a licensee and
(1) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a person under the age of
19 years in violation of AS 04.16.051, unless the licensee, agent, or employee
secures in good faith from the person a signed statement, liquor identifica-
tion card, or driver's license meeting the requirements of AS 04.21.050(a)
and 04.21.050(b), which indicates that the person is 19 years of age or older;
or
(2) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a drunken person in viola-
tion of AS 04.16.030.
71. CA.. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602-25602.1 (West Supp. 1984). The Cali-
fornia statute, passed in 1978, provides as follows:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, fur-
nished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common
drunkardl or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, fur-
nished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of
this section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such
person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the
consumer of such alcoholic beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be inter-
preted so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153),
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court
(_ Cal. 3d -) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding
the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic
beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an
intoxicated person.
CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984).
Although this statute would seem to preclude any civil liability for the serving of
alcoholic beverages, the California dramshop act provides for a very limited cause of
action:
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action
may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or
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Florida statute absolves a vendor of civil liability for the results of his pa-
tron's intoxication unless the vendor "willfully and unlawfully" served a mi-
nor,72 or "knowingly" served a habitual drunkard. 73 Indiana, rather than
limiting the liability of all vendors, limits only the liability of "educational
institutions of higher learning" to situations where they sell or otherwise sup-
ply alcoholic beverages to a minor. 7
4
death against any person licensed pursuant to Section 23300 who sells, fur-
nishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic
beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or
giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal
injury or death sustained by such person.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984).
It would appear that since § 25602.1 only makes an exception to subsection (b)
of § 25602, and not subsection (c), a plaintiff could never succeed under § 25602.1.
This is so because subsection (c) states that the consumption of alcoholic beverages
and not their serving is, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of injuries inflicted
by intoxicated persons. Nevertheless courts have construed § 25602.1 to allow for
recovery for third persons injured by a minor who was obviously intoxicated when
served by a licensee, but have denied recovery to the minor himself. See Alendrino v.
Shakey's Pizza Parlor Co., 151 Cal. App. 3d 370, - Cal. Rptr. - (1984).
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984). The Florida statute, passed
in 1980, provides as follows:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of law-
ful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a
person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to
a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person
habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become
liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of
such minor or person.
Id.
The "willfully" language was recently interpreted by a Florida appellate court.
Ste Willis v. Strickland, 436 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In WKllhz, a third
party injured in an automobile accident caused by an intoxicated minor sued a ven-
dor who had sold alcoholic beverages to the minor without asking for identification,
despite the minor having the "appearance, speech and mannerism of a sixteen year
old." Id. at 1012. The defendant vendor argued that for a sale to be "willful" the
seller must have actual knowledge that the purchaser is not of legal age. Id The
"llts court agreed, but stated that such knowledge may be proved either by direct
evidence of actual knowledge or by circumstantial evidence, including facts relating
to the apparent age of a person. Id The court noted that a person's appearance
"alone can impart knowledge of his or her age within certain ranges and to certain
degree of certainty," and that it is up to the jury to decide whether such knowledge
was imparted in a particular instance. Id. at 1012-13.
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984). The usual "visibly intoxi-
cated" person is absent from this class of persons. Thus it would seem that in Florida
a vendor will not be liable for damage resulting from the drunken driving of any
drunkard he serves who does not happen to be a "habitual" or "minor" one.
74. IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8 (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides:
This section shall not be construed to impose civil liability upon any
educational institution of higher learning, including but not limited to pub-
lic and private universities and colleges, business schools, vocational schools,
and schools for continuing education, or its agents for injury to any person
or property sustained in consequence of a violation of this section unless
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3. Vendor's Civil Liabit'ty for Violaion of Statute
Until 1959, courts generally followed the view that a vendor could only
be held liable for damages caused by a patron's drunken driving under a
dramshop act. 75 In 1959, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued
the landmark opinion of Rappaport v. Ni-hos. 7 6 The resolution of this case
marked the first time a state supreme court broke with this tradition and
allowed a cause of action against a vendor in the absence of a dramshop
act. 77 In Rappaport, the court considered whether a vendor could be held
liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated minor who had been served by
the defendant in violation of the New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act, which prohibited the serving of minors and intoxicated persons. 78 Ini-
tially, the Rappaport court determined that the Act was intended to protect
the general public rather than merely minors or intoxicated persons. 79 The
such institution or its agent sells, barters, exchanges, provides, or furnishes
an alcoholic beverage to a minor.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949) (no
recovery against vendor who served person he knew to be minor under the influence
of alcohol); State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) (no recov-
ery against vendor who sold alcohol to minor in violation of alcoholic beverage con-
trol act). For a discussion of the traditional common law approach, see notes 7-8
supra.
76. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
77. Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 10. It was necessary for the court to take this route to
afford relief because New Jersey had repealed its dramshop act in 1934, 25 years
before the Rappaport decision. Id at 200, 156 A.2d at 8.
Just prior to Rappaport, two other courts had broken with the traditional com-
mon law proximate cause analysis. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269
F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (in absence of dramshop act, tavernkeepers who sold alco-
holic beverages to visibly intoxicated persons are liable to third persons injured or
killed in collision caused by drunken driving), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Schelin
v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958) (even in absence of dramshop
act, patron served while visibly intoxicated has cause of action against tavernkeeper
for injuries received in altercation caused by patron's drunkenness). Both of these
cases were cited with approval in the Rappaport opinion itself. See Rappaport, 31 N.J.
at 197-98, 156 A.2d at 6-7.
78. 31 N.J. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3. The New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act prohibits sales to minors. Id. at 201-02, 156 A.2d at 8. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.1-77 (West Supp. 1984). Although the act itself does not prohibit sales to visibly
intoxicated persons, it authorizes the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control to make rules and regulations governing the manufacture, sale and distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages. Id § 33.1-30. The serving in Rappaport was in violation of
the section of the act prohibiting sales to minors and also was in violation of a regula-
tion prohibiting the serving of visibly intoxicated persons. 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at
8.
79. 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8-9. For a court to adopt a criminal statute as
the standard of care in a negligence action, the plaintiff usually must be a member of
the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, and the harm suffered must
be of the kind the statute was intended to prevent. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 22, § 36, at 220-27. The Rappaport court was thus deciding that the plaintiff was
in the class of persons sought to be protected by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
The court then further determined that injuries resulting from accidents caused by
drunken driving were the harm sought to be prevented by the statute, and thus that
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court then stated that the statute provided the minimum standard of care for
the tavernkeeper, and that its violation constituted evidence of negligence.
80
Although the issue of proximate cause traditionally had proven fatal to a
plaintiff's cause of action,8 ' the Rappaport court observed that a person ought
to be held liable for injuries if his negligence was a substantial factor in cre-
ating them, and if those injuries followed in the ordinary course of events
from his negligence. 82 Accordingly, the court concluded that a vendor could
be held accountable for injuries resulting from drunken driving if the vendor
sold alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of a state statute and the sale
resulted in the minor's intoxication and in turn caused the minor's negligent
driving.
8 3
the harm suffered by the plaintiff was also within the purview of the act. 31 N.J. at
202-03, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
80. 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. In holding that a violation of the statute or
regulation was evidence of negligence, the Rappaport court said that the plaintiff
could introduce further evidence that the vendor knew or should have known that
the patron was a minor or was intoxicated when served. Id at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
On the other hand, the court found that the vendor could claim that it "did not
know or have reason to believe that its patron was a minor, or intoxicated when
served, and that it acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted at the time
and under the circumstances." Id
The Rappaport court's treatment of the violation of a statute as evidence of negli-
gence is that of a minority of courts today: the majority view is that once a statute is
adopted as the standard of care, its violation is negligence per se. See PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 29-30.
81. For a discussion of the traditional common law rule that the consumption
and not the serving of alcohol is the proximate cause of injuries resulting from the
intoxication, see note 7 and accompanying text supra. To analyze the question of
proximate cause, once cause in fact has been established, Prosser and Keeton suggest
asking whether the defendant was "under a duty to protect the plaintiff against the
event which did in fact occur." PROSSER AN) KEETON, supra note 22, § 42, at 274
(footnote omitted). They note that this is essentially a matter of public policy. Id
The New Jersey court decided that, in view of the high frequency of accidents
from drunken driving, the harm was foreseeable and that it was therefore proper to
impose a duty. 31 N.J. at 204, 156 A.2d at 8-9. The Rappaport court reasoned that its
decision would do justice to innocent third parties injured through drunken driving,
would fortify the statutory and regulatory program to prevent improper sales, and
would not be unduly burdensome on defendants who could always avoid liability by
exercising due care. Id at 205, 156 A.2d at 10. In conclusion, the court stated:
Liquor licensees, who operate their businesses by way of privilege rather
than as of right, have long been under strict obligation not to serve minors
and intoxicated persons and if, as is likely, the result we have reached in the
conscientious exercise of our traditional judicial function substantially in-
creases their diligence in honoring that obligation then the public interest
will indeed be very well served.
Id at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
82. 31 N.J. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9. The Rappaport court further stated that an
intervening cause, such as the patron's negligent operation of a vehicle while intoxi-
cated, would only cut off liability to the tavernkeeper if it was unforeseeable or was
not a formal incident of the risk created by the tavernkeeper's negligence. Id.
83. Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9. The court held that, under these circumstances, "a
jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff's injuries resulted in the ordinary course
of events from the defendant's negligence and that such negligence was, in fact, a
substantial factor in bringing them about." Id at 204, 156 A.2d at 9. For a discus-
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All fifty states as well as the District of Columbia have alcoholic bever-
age control acts such as the one at issue in Rappaport.84 Although some states
continue to adhere to the old common law rule,8 5 most states now hold that
a vendor's violation of such an act constitutes either negligence per se or
sion of the defenses available in a negligence action based upon the violation of an
alcoholic beverage control statute, see notes 253-92 and accompanying text 1hfra.
Furthermore, the Rappaport court held that a jury could reasonably find that
negligent driving on the part of a minor is a foreseeable or "normal incident of the
risk" created by the defendant servers, and not a superceding cause that would cut off
the server's liability for the plaintiff's injuries. See 31 N.J. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9.
84. See ALA. CODE § 28-3A-25 (Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.16.030,
.16.051-.052 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, -244 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 48-529 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West Supp. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West 1975);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 711, 713 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.11 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-3-22 to -23
(1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-78(2) (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, -929 (1979);
IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1.-5-
7-8, -14 to -15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.47, .49 (West
Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-261, -2704 (1973); Ky. REV'. STAT. §§ 244.070,
.080 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91 (West 1974), 26:88, :285 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 303, 1058, 1058-A (Supp. 1983); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 119 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, §§ 34, 69
(West 1974 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.29, (West 1978 & Supp.
1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-1-81, -1-83, -3-53 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1978); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 202.055 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33:1-39, -77 (West 1940 & Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-16, -4B-
1.1 (1981); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-302, -305 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4301.22, .69 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 537 (West
Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493
(Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-1 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 61-5-30, -3-990 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 35-4-78 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 57-4-203, -5-301 (Supp. 1983); TEX. ALCO.
BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 101.63, 106.03 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 32-7-14 to -15, -24 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (1972); VA. CODE § 4-62
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.200, .270, .310, .320 (1962 & Supp. 1983);
W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22 (1977 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp.
1983); Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1981).
85. The following five states still take the position that there can be no civil
liability for serving alcoholic beverages in the absence of a dramshop act: Arkansas,
Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Maryland, Fisher v.
O'Connor's, Inc., 53 Md. App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982); Nebraska, Holmes v.
Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Nevada, Yoscovitch v. Wasson, 98 Nev.
250, 645 P.2d 975 (1982); Wisconsin, Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d
178 (1979).
The following six states hold that the only theory under which a vendor may be
found liable is for violation of a dramshop act: California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 25602-25602.1 (West Supp. 1984); Connecticut, Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432,
226 A.2d 383 (1967); Georgia, Nunn v. Comidas Exquisitos, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 796,
305 S.E.2d 487 (1983); Illinois, Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112
(1982); Iowa, Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1982); Michigan, Lucido
v. Apollo Lanes & Bar, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 267, 333 N.W.2d 246 (1983).
Courts denying a cause of action against the vendor often emphasize the undue
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evidence of negligence. 8 6 They then allow the jury to decide whether the
hardship that such liability would impose. For a discussion of this viewpoint, see
notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
86. The following jurisdictions recognize a negligence cause of action against a
vendor based on the violation of an alcoholic beverage control act: Alaska, Morris v.
Farley Enters., Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983); Arizona, Ontiveros v. Borak, 136
Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Delaware, Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1978); District of Columbia, Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Florida, Davis v. Schiapacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) (limited by
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984)); Hawaii, Ono v. Applegate, 62 Ha-
waii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Indiana, Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847
(1966); Kentucky, Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Louisana, Chausse v.
Southland Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Massachusetts, Michnik-
Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983); Minnesota,
Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Mississippi, Munford, Inc.
v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Missouri, Sampson v. W.F. Enters., 611
S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); New Hampshire, Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375,
211 A.2d 900 (1965); New Jersey, Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218
A.2d 630 (1966); New Mexico, Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982);
New York, Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965);
North Carolina, Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983); Ohio,
Taggart v. Bitzenhofer, 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901 (1972), af'd, 33 Ohio St.
2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973) (per curiam); Oregon, Davis v. Billy's Con-Teena, Inc.,
284 Or. 351, 587 P.2d 75 (1978) (limited by OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950, .955, .960
(1983)); Pennsylvania, Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626,
198 A.2d 550 (1964); South Dakota, Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.
1982); Tennessee, Brookins v. Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. 1981);
Utah, Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) (but note that new broad form dram-
shop act may be exclusive remedy); Washington, Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.
2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, modifwd, 100 Wash. 2d 567, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983); Wyoming,
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
Montana has implicitly recognized a negligence cause of action in favor of in-
jured third parties against one who sells liquor in violation of an alcoholic beverage
control act. In two 1978 cases, plaintiffs who were injured after being served illegally
brought suit for damages against the vendors. See Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor
Temple Ass'n, 179 Mont. 145, 586 P.2d 712 (1978); Folda v. City of Bozeman, 177
Mont. 537, 582 P.2d 767 (1978). The Swartzenberger and Folda courts denied recovery
because of the plaintiffs' contributory negligence rather than because no cause of
action existed. One could infer from these cases that an injured third person free of
contributory negligence would have been allowed to proceed. See also Deeds v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969) (illegal sale and serving of liquor
was proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries). But see Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91,
589 P.2d 145 (1979) (Supreme Court of Montana refused to apply Deeds to social host
case, and held that there could be no cause of action so long as person to whom
liquor was furnished was not so helpless as to be deprived of willpower or responsibil-
ity for his behavior).
Idaho has recognized a negligence cause of action in favor of a third person
injured in an accident caused by the intoxication of a minor negligently served by the
defendant vendor. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). However,
liability was not based on violation of an alcoholic beverage control statute, but
rather on common law negligence principles. Id at 621, 619 P.2d at 139. For a
discussion of a vendor's civil liability in common law negligence, see notes 96-103 and
accompanying text infra.
There have been decisions by courts sitting in California, Illinois and Iowa that
have allowed causes of action against vendors for the negligent serving of alcoholic
beverages on the ground that the vendors violated the state's alcoholic beverage con-
trol act. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
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negligent serving was the proximate cause of the injuries that resulted from
the patron's drunken driving.
8 7
denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1971); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). In Vesely, an injured
third party sued a tavernkeeper for damages suffered in an accident caused by a
drunken driver who was allegedly served by the tavernkeeper in violation of the
state's alcoholic beverage control statute. 5 Cal. 3d at 157-58, 486 P.2d at 154, 95
Cal. Rptr. at 626. The Supreme Court of California stated that the statute defined
the tavernkeeper's duty, that negligent serving of alcohol could be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries if ajury were to find that the serving was a substantial
factor in causing the injury, and that the intoxicated patron's negligent driving was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the serving. Id. at 163-65, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95
Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. Thus, the Vesely court overcame the traditional proximate
cause barrier to an injured party's recovery against a supplier of alcohol and held
that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to try his case. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at
153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625. However, this decision was specifically abrogated by the
California legislature. See CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1984);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West Supp. 1984) (consumption of alcoholic beverages is
proximate cause of injuries resulting from person's intoxication).
In Waynick, the Seventh Circuit allowed a cause of action based on an illegal sale
in violation of the Illinois alcoholic beverage control act. The plaintiffs sued three
Illinois vendors for damages resulting from an accident that occurred in Michigan as
a result of the drunken driving of persons served liquor by the defendants while those
persons were visibly intoxicated. 269 F.2d at 323-24. The court recognized that in
Illinois, the dramshop act was the exclusive remedy, but stated that since the acci-
dent occurred outside Illinois the case could be decided on common law principles.
Id at 324. The court then held that, under common law principles, the defendant
tavernkeepers were liable for the plaintiffs' injuries since they resulted from the serv-
ing of alcohol in violation of Illinois' alcoholic beverage control act. Id. at 325-26. In
Illinois, however, the dramshop act is still the exclusive remedy. See Gora v. 7-11
Food Stores, 109 III. App. 3d 109, 440 N.E.2d 279 (1982).
In Lewis, the plaintiffs sued the state of Iowa for injuries resulting from a car
accident in which their automobile was hit by one operated by an intoxicated person.
256 N.W.2d at 184. The plaintiffs alleged that the drunken driver was sold liquor by
the state liquor store in violation of the state's alcoholic beverage control statute
prohibiting sales to minors. Id at 184-85. Although the trial court found that the
state's existing dramshop act did not apply to the state since it only granted a cause
of action against a "person," the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the plaintiffs could
have a cause of action in negligence based upon the state's violation of the alcoholic
beverage control statute if the trier of fact found the violation to be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Id at 191-92. Since Lewis, however, Iowa's dramshop
act has been revised. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984). The
Supreme Court of Iowa recently held that the revised statute is the exclusive remedy
against tavernkeepers. See Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982).
87. The courts allowing recovery against a vendor in the absence of a dramshop
act have emphasized the problems associated with drunken driving. See Walz v. City
of Hudson, 327 S.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982) (overruling Griffin v. Sebek, 90 S.D. 692, 245
N.W.2d 481 (1976)). Overruling an earlier reaffirmation of the common law rule of
nonliability, the Supreme Court of South Dakota said:
We take judicial notice that since Griffin was decided, alcohol has been in-
volved in 50.8% of this state's traffic fatalities from 1976 to 1981; in 1981
alone, 62% of South Dakota's traffic fatalities were alcohol related. This
tragic waste of life prompts us to review our conclusions in Griffin. If the
Legislature does not concur with our application of [the alcoholic beverage
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Courts that have applied the Rappaport approach have done so by find-
ing that the applicable alcoholic beverage control statute was enacted to
protect the general public,88 or persons who could foreseeably be injured by
the drunkenness of the high-risk individual served.8 9 Since alcoholic bever-
age control acts generally prohibit the serving of alcoholic beverages to mi-
nors and visibly intoxicated persons,90 most states allow a cause of action if a
member of either class is served.91 Other states, however, require that mi-
nors be visibly intoxicated at the time they are served.92 The majority of
states recognizing the cause of action consider the violation of an alcoholic
beverage control act to be negligence per se,93 while the minority deem it to
be merely evidence of negligence.94 Once a duty to the plaintiff is estab-
Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
In a special concurrence, Justice Wollman added:
I believe that those of us who were in the majority in Grffin v. Sebek took too
narrow a view of the responsibility of the judiciary to fill a void by common
law adjudication in the face of legislative in action [sic]. . . . What may
not have been perceived of as a remedial void requiring judicial action at
the time [earlier cases] were decided has mushroomed into a societal prob-
lem of deadly, both in the literal and figurative senses of that word, propor-
tions ... .
Id. at 123 (Wollman, J., concurring specially).
Other courts have been more blunt:
Our highway safety problems have greatly increased. Death and de-
struction stalk our roads. The peaceful Sunday afternoon family drive
through the hills has been abandoned by many as the result of brushes with
near death at the hands of half-baked morons drunkenly weaving in and
out of traffic at 80 or 90 miles per hour.
Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Crull v. Gleb,
382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964)).
88. See, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968);
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
89. See, e.g., Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Lopez v.
Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982). See also Morris v. Farley Enters., Inc., 661
P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983) (drinker himself included among those persons who could
foreseeably be injured by the drunkenness of the high-risk individual served).
90. Some states' acts relate only to minors. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 202.055
(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (1972). Many statutes also prohibit the serving
of habitual drunkards. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.22 (Page 1982).
91. See, e.g., Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 453
N.E.2d 430 (1983) (court rejected defendant's argument that there could be no civil
liability for serving of minor unless minor also was visibly intoxicated when served).
92. See, e.g., Simon v. Shirley, 269 Pa. Super. 364, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979) (defend-
ant tavernkeeper not liable for serving minor in violation of alcoholic beverage con-
trol act; minor must be visibly intoxicated when served for civil liability to be
imposed).
93. See, e.g., Munford v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Walz v. City of
Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655,
663 P.2d 834, modified, 100 Wash. 2d 567, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983). See also PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 229-31.
94. See, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1967);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666
P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
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lished, it becomes a question for the jury as to whether the breach of the act
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 95
4. Vendor Liabdi/q Under Modern Common Law
Some courts finally have allowed a cause of action against a vendor
based on the vendor's negligence in serving alcoholic beverages irrespective
of dramshop acts and alcoholic beverage control laws. 96 The duty breached
in such cases is defined by common law negligence principles rather than by
statute. In Rappaport v. Ni~hols, in addition to holding that a vendor's viola-
tion of the alcoholic beverage control act was evidence of negligence, 9 7 the
New Jersey Supreme Court opined that "if the circumstances are such that
the tavernkeeper knows or should know that the patron is a minor or is in-
toxicated, his service to him may also constitute common law negligence." 98
The Rappaport court described the serving vendor's negligence in terms of the
95. For a discussion of the jury's considerations in the Rappaport case in deciding
whether the vendor's serving of alcohol was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, see note 83 and accompanying text supra. Once a court has decided as a
matter of public policy to allow the serving of alcohol, rather than merely its con-
sumption, to be the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, the analysis set forth by
the Rappaport court in determining the issue in a particular case is a typical one. See
31 N.J. at 202-04, 156 A.2d at 9. Cause in fact is determined by deciding whether the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries.
Id at 204, 156 A.2d at 9. Then, proximate cause is found to exist if the plaintiff's
injury resulted in the ordinary course of events from the defendant's negligence. 1.
If the subsequent negligence by the intoxicated person-or anyone else, for that mat-
ter-is foreseeable, it will not cut off the defendant's liability as an intervening cause
of the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
96. The following courts have recognized a cause of action against vendors
based at least in part on common law negligence: Alaska, Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d
671 (Alaska 1981); Arizona, Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983);
Idaho, Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Indiana, Elder v.
Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Massachusetts, Cimino v. Milford Keg,
Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982); Minnesota, Blarney v. Brown, 270
N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980); Missouri, Carver v. Scha-
fer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); New Jersey, Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J.
188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); New York, Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d
290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Oregon, Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893
(1977); Pennsylvania, Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 909 (1980); Tennessee, Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d
755 (1964); Utah, Rees v. Albertson's Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978); Washington,
Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, modified, 672 P.2d 1267
(Wash. 1983); Wisconsin, Sorensen v. Jarvis, No. 83-1821 (Wis. June 28, 1984); Wyo-
ming, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
97. See Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. For a further discussion of the
Rappaport case, see notes 76-83 and accompanying text supra.
98. Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. The Rappaport court stated that in
these circumstances, an unreasonable risk of harm is readily foreseeable since "travel-
ing by car to and from the tavern is so commonplace and accidents resulting from
drinking are so frequent." Id at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. As Wisconsin's Chief Justice
Hallows wrote, the "shift from commingling alcohol and horses to commingling alco-
hol and horsepower" necessitates the recognition of a common law negligence cause
of action against vendors. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 737, 176 N.W.2d 566,
572 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
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"creation of a situation which involves unreasonable risk [to the public] be-
cause of the expectable action of another."99 Thus, under Rappaport, it ap-
pears that the vendor has a duty to refuse to serve a patron if "the
reasonably prudent person at the time and place should recognize and fore-
see an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to others" as a
result of serving that patron.100
Similarly, in Campbell v. Carpenter,i1i the Supreme Court of Oregon em-
braced a common law negligence theory in holding a vendor liable for inju-
ries caused by his intoxicated patron. 10 2 Relying on Rappaport's reasoning,
the Campbell court stated that a tavernkeeper breaches his common law duty
of care "if, at the time of serving drinks to a customer, that customer is 'visi-
bly' intoxicated" and "it is reasonably foreseeable that when such a customer
leaves the tavern he or she will drive an automobile."' 10 3
99. Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also expressed this idea as follows:
The first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because of alcohol,
lost control over his reflexes, judgment and sense of responsibility to others,
is to stop pouring alcohol into him. This is a duty which everyone owes to
society and to law entirely apart from any statute. . . . An intoxicated
person behind the wheel of an automobile can be as dangerous as an insane
person with a firearm. He is as much a hazard to the safety of the commu-
nity as a stick of dynamite that must be de-fused in order to be rendered
harmless. To serve an intoxicated person more liquor is to light the fuse.
Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 631-32, 198 A.2d 550, 553
(1964).
100. Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
101. 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977).
102. Id. at 243-44, 566 P.2d at 897. In Campbell, the plaintiffs represented two
persons killed by an automobile that was driven by an intoxicated woman who had
been served by the defendant tavernkeeper while visibly intoxicated. Id at 239, 566
P.2d at 894.
103. Id. at 243, 566 P.2d at 897. See also Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass.
323, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982). In Cimmho, the plaintiff sued a tavernkeeper for the
wrongful death of his son, for his son's pain and suffering, and for negligent infliction
of emotional distress upon himself after a patron of the defendant's tavern hit and
killed the son as the latter walked on a sidewalk with his father. Id at -, 431 N.E.2d
at 922. The essence of the plaintiff's claim was that the tavernkeeper negligently
served the patron even though he knew or should have known that he was intoxi-
cated, under circumstances such that it was reasonably foreseeable that the patron
would drive upon leaving. Id. at -, 431 N.E.2d at 922-23. The court held that a
jury could find that the service of liquor by the defendant was a failure to exercise
that degree of care for the safety of travelers that ought to be exercised by a
tavernkeeper of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. Id. at -, 431 N.E.2d at
926. The court also elaborated on the common law negligence cause of action:
The views we express make it clear that the cause of action for negli-
gence in a case such as this is essentially composed of the same elements as
any other tort for negligence for which the tavern owner and bartender are
liable and they are (1) a patron of premises (2) who is served intoxicating
liquors (3) while he is intoxicated (4) and under circumstances from which
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that he was intoxi-
cated when served (5) operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated (6) such
operation was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant (7) and a person of
ordinary prudence would have refrained from serving liquor to that patron
1142 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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B. Social Host Liabi'ty
Although historically most efforts to impose liability on those furnishing
alcohol have been directed against tavernkeepers, numerous attempts have
also been made to hold social hosts accountable for the intoxication of their
guests. Social hosts are broadly defined as noncommercial suppliers of intox-
icating beverages and include hosts ranging from private homeowners enter-
taining friends to employers sponsoring holiday parties for their
employees. 104
1. Social Host Liabilh'y Under Traditional Common Law
Like their commercial counterparts, social hosts traditionally have been
protected by the common law rule that those who furnish liquor to ordinary,
able-bodied men are not liable for injuries caused or incurred by their intoxi-
cated guests. 10 5 This principle was premised on the view that it was the
consumption of the liquor that proximately caused any injuries, not its
service. 106
Attempts to erode the common law rule of nonliability have met with
only limited success; 10 7 the common law rule still controls in many jurisdic-
tions.108 Given the historical foundation of this approach, courts often defer
in the same or similar circumstances (8) and such operation causes the
plaintiff's death or injury within the scope of the foreseeable risk.
Id at - n.9, 431 N.E.2d at 926 n.9.
104. See, e.g., Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677
(1983) (hosts at wedding reception); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984) (private homeowners entertaining a friend); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (college fraternity);
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., - Pa. -. , 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (employer hosting
company Christmas party).
105. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 1, at 446.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978) (recognizing a common law cause of action where host served obvi-
ously intoxicated guest when it was foreseeable that the guest would drive); Linn v.
Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976) (recognizing negligence
cause of action against social host who served minor); Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J.
Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1982) (recognizing cause of action in negligence
against social host who served intoxicated adult); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (recognizing common
law negligence action against host who served minor with knowledge that minor
would later drive). For a discussion of Wtener, see notes 186-93 and accompanying
text infra. See also Garcia v. Jennings, 427 So. 2d 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (recogniz-
ing common law duty of adults not to purchase liquor for and furnish liquor to
minors).
108. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979);
Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965) (dictum); Slicer v. Quigley, 180
Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980); Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981); United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Butler, 359 So. 2d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lowe v.
Rubin, 98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d 710 (1981); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91,
589 P.2d 145 (1979); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct.
1975), affid, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Johnson v. Paige, 47 Or. App.
1177,615 P.2d 1185 (1980); Klein v. Raysinger, - Pa. -_, 470 A.2d 507 (1983); Cecil
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to the legislature to adopt a rule imposing liability on furnishers of alco-
hol. 10 9 This sentiment was well articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Olsen v. Copeland. 1"0
A change in the law which has the power to so deeply affect
social and business relationships should only be made after a thor-
ough analysis of all the relevant considerations. . . . The type of
analysis required is best conducted by the legislature using all of
the methods it has available to it to invite public participation.I'
Notwithstanding the apparent absoluteness of the common law rule,
certain exceptions have been recognized under which noncommercial fur-
nishers of alcohol may be subject to tort liability. The most notable excep-
tion to the common law rule arises when the service of liquor is wanton and
reckless.' 12 In Kowal v. Hoher,' 13 the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated
that this exception applied not only to vendors but also to social hosts.'
Although Connecticut generally followed the common law view that the fur-
nishing of the liquor was not the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an
intoxicated person,' 15 the Kowal court questioned whether the same princi-
ples of causation applied when the host's misconduct was wanton and reck-
v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1978). See also CAI,. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7415(b)-(c) (West 1984) (statu-
tory adoption of common law view that it is the consumption, not the furnishing of
the alcohol, which proximately causes the harm).
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981). In
Miller, plaintiff brought an action based on common law negligence against the social
hosts who served their guest who became intoxicated and subsequently was involved
in an automobile accident with the plaintiff, causing severe damages. Id. at 597, 424
N.E.2d at 1046. The Miler court declined to recognize such a cause of action, ac-
knowledging the historical fact that Illinois had never before allowed such an action.
Id. at 597-98, 421 N.E.2d at 1047. The court also felt that it should exercise judicial
restraint because any common law liability imposed upon social hosts would neces-
sarily be unlimited, while tavernkeepers had a statutorily imposed maximum expo-
sure of only $35,000.00. Id. at 601, 424 N.E.2d at 1049 (citing I1.1. REV. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984)).
110. 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979). In Olsen, a wrongful death action
was brought against a tavernkeeper who had served a patron who was obviously
intoxicated, with the knowledge that the patron would be driving. Soon after leaving
the tavern by car, the patron collided with decedent's vehicle, causing decedent's
death. Id at 485, 280 N.W.2d at 179.
111. Id at 491, 280 N.W.2d at 181. The Olsen court refused to recognize a com-
mon law cause of action against the vendor, and ordered that summary judgment be
granted in the defendant's favor. Id. at 494, 280 N.W.2d at 183.
112. For a discussion of the liability of vendors who act recklessly or wantonly,
see notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
113. 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). In Kowal, an action was brought against
a vendor to recover for the death of a motorist killed in a collision with a car driven
by a patron whom the defendant had served although the patron was intoxicated.
d at 356, 436 A.2d at 2-3.
114. Id. at 360-61, 436 A.2d at 3.
115. See Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980); Nelson v. Stef-
fens, 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976).
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less.' 16 Answering this question in the negative, the Kowal court held that
"one ought to be required, as matter of policy, to bear a greater responsibil-
ity for consequences resulting from his act when his conduct is reckless or
wanton than when his conduct is merely negligent."' 17
2. Social Host Li'abihty Under Dramshop Legislation
An early legislative response to the common law rule shielding suppliers
of alcohol from civil liability was the enactment of dramshop or civil damage
acts."18 Currently, eighteen states have dramshop legislation.' 19 Plaintiffs
have made numerous attempts to use these statutes against social hosts who
have furnished alcohol, but have met with little success.120 Only Iowa and
116. 181 Conn. at 359, 436 A.2d at 3. The court determined that the policy
considerations that justify protecting a social host who was merely negligent in serv-
ing an intoxicated person do not yield the same proclivity to protect the host who
acts recklessly. 181 Conn. at 360-61, 436 A.2d at 3. As Prosser and Keeton have
observed, recklessness "is still at essence negligent, rather than actually intended to
do harm, but . . .is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many
respects as if it were so intended. Thus it .. .may justify a broader duty, and more
extended liability for consequences ....... PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22,
§ 34, at 213 (footnotes omitted).
117. 181 Conn. at 361, 436 A.2d at 3. The result reached by the Connecticut
court in Kowal regarding the causal parameters of reckless conduct parallels that sug-
gested by the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 501(2) (1965). The Restatement provides in relevant part as follows:
The fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's
safety rather than merely negligent is a matter to be taken into account in
determining whether a jury may reasonably find that the actor's conduct
bears a sufficient causal relation to another's harm to make the actor liable
therefor.
Id.
Under subsequent sections, the Restatement notes that an actor guilty of reckless
or wanton misconduct is precluded from asserting as a defense any negligence of the
plaintiff. See id § 503(1).
For a further discussion of contributory/comparative negligence as a defense to
claims against furnishers of alcohol, see notes 207-10 & 253-67 and accompanying
text thfra.
118. For a general discussion of the history of dramshop legislation, see notes 21-
31 and accompanying text supra. These statutes impose civil liability upon
tavernkeepers for damages resulting from the unlawful furnishing of liquor. See Note,
supra note 1, at 450-51. For a discussion of the provisions of current dramshop acts,
see notes 32-63 and accompanying text supra.
119. For a list of those jurisdictions that currently have dramshop or civil dam-
age acts, see note 32 supra.
120. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979)
(dramshop act inapplicable where no sale was made to intoxicated person); Cruse v.
Aden, 127 I11. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (dramshop act inapplicable where social host
gratuitously provided drinks for friend); Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455
N.E.2d 842 (1983) (dramshop act inapplicable even though social host sold alcohol to
intoxicated guest); Richardson v. Ansco, Inc., 75 I11. App. 3d 731, 394 N.E.2d 801
(1979) (dramshop act inapplicable where plaintiff alleged that employer had allowed
his employee to become drunk); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 III. App. 2d
412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964) (dramshop act inapplicable where employer unlawfully
served minor employee); Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982) (dramshop
27
Lang and McGrath: Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When One for the Road
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Minnesota courts have recognized social host liability based upon violation
of a dramshop act, 12 1 and in each of these instances the state legislatures
effectively overruled the decisions through subsequent amendments to their
respective dramshop acts.122
The language employed by legislatures in drafting dramshop acts al-
lows these acts to be classified in one of two categories.123 Narrowly drawn
acts clearly limit their application to licensees or permittees.' 24 Broadly
drawn statutes, on the other hand, do not so specifically define those subject
to their provisions. 125 In spite of the broad language of these acts, however,
act inapplicable even though plaintiff argued that defendant's serving of intoxicated
driver was a barter in exchange for future business); Cole v. City of Spring Lake
Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982) (dramshop act inapplicable to social host);
Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1980) (dramshop act must be
narrowly construed to exclude the social host); Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (dramshop act inapplicable to social host in a non-
commercial setting).
121. See Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) (dramshop act
imposes liability on social host who purchased liquor for minor); Ross v. Ross, 294
Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) (civil damage act imposes liability on defendant
who purchased alcohol for minor). For a discussion of Ross, see notes 130-40 and
accompanying text ihfra.
122. See Graham, supra note 33, at 567-68. The Iowa statute construed by the
court in Williams v. Klemesrud provided as follows:
Every . . . person who shall be injured in person or property . . . by
any intoxicated person . . . shall have a right of action . . . against any
person who shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of
this title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for
all damages actually sustained ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949) (repealed 1971) (emphasis added). In 1971,
the Iowa legislature repealed its dramshop act and enacted a new act restricting lia-
bility to licensees and permittees. See IowA CODF ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984).
The new provision reads in pertinent part as follows: "Every... person. . . injured
• . . by any intoxicated person . . . shall have a right of action . . . against any
licensee or permittee, who shall sell or give any beer or intoxicating liquor to any
such person while he or she is intoxicated .... ." d.
For a discussion of the amendments to the Minnesota civil damage act following
Ross, see notes 139-40 and accompanying text infra.
123. For a discussion of broadly worded dramshop acts in effect today, see notes
32-37 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of narrowly worded dramshop
acts in effect today, see notes 38-63 and accompanying text supra. There are currently
twelve dramshop acts whose terms create the possibility of finding a cause of action
against a social host. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); Coi.o. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103
(1973); GA. CODE § 51-1-18 (1982); 11.1.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 6-21 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
124. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984-85). For the relevant
text of the Iowa statute, see note 122 supra.
125. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1(1) (Supp. 1983). The Utah statute
provides as follows:
Anyperson who gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to an-
other contrary to subsection 16-1-13.1 (8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), sec-
tion 32-7-14 or subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby causes the
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the general rule is that dramshop legislation does not apply to suits against
noncommercial suppliers of alcohol. 12 6 Because dramshop acts are primar-
ily penal in nature, courts are frequently unwilling to construe them liber-
ally.1 2'7 Thus, their application is usually limited to those who profit from
the sale of alcohol,' 28 or to those who are at least indirectly engaged in the
liquor business. 
2 9
Nevertheless, in Ross v. Ross, 130 the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that Minnesota's Civil Damage Act did impose liability on social
hosts. 13 1 Plaintiffs in Ross were the survivors of a minor who was killed in an
automobile accident while intoxicated. 32 The defendants in the suit were
two persons who had purchased the liquor for the minor. 133 Minnesota's
Civil Damage Act created a cause of action against "any person" who un-
intoxication of the other person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or
means of support to any third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of that
third person, resulting from the intoxication.
Id. (emphasis added). By its own language, this dramshop act, and others similarly
worded, appear to apply not just to commercial vendors, but to any person.
126. See Graham, supra note 33, at 568; Note, Socal Host Liabdi'ty, supra note 1, at
452. For a listing of cases following the general rule denying application of dramshop
acts to social hosts, see note 120 supra.
127. See, e.g., Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983) (due to
the penal nature of the act, any enlargement of its scope to persons not engaged in
the liquor business is left to the discretion of the legislature).
128. See, e.g., Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct.
1982) (dramshop act is intended to prohibit certain commercial activity that is ac-
companied by an expectation of pecuniary gain). One justification for restricting the
scope of dramshop acts to those who benefit financially from the service of alcohol is
that, unlike the social host, the vendor can insure against liability and spread the risk
to all customers as a cost of doing business. Graham, supra note 33, at 568.
129. See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 164 Ill. App. 509 (1911) (dramshop act held
applicable to nonlicensee indirectly engaged in the liquor business, i.e., owner of
premises leased to licensee). One suggested reason for exposing one engaged in the
liquor industry to the higher, strict liability standard of the dramshop act is that "the
vendor is able to check those served more carefully and determine how much a par-
ticular vendee drinks." Graham, supra note 33, at 568.
130. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
131. Id at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53. The Minnesota Civil Damage Act cited
in Ross provided as follows:
Every . . . person who is injured in person or property, or means of
support, by an intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has
a right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally sell-
ing, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such
person, for all damages, sustained . ...
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972) (amended 1977) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the subsequent amendments to this act, see notes 139-40 and accompa-
nying text infra.
132. 294 Minn. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at 150. Because the plaintiffs were the sur-
vivors of the minor rather than the minor himself and were suing for loss of support
rather than wrongful death, the court noted that the voluntary intoxication of the
decedent would not bar the suit. Id. at 116 n.2, 200 N.W.2d at 150 n.2. For a general
discussion of defenses available in dramshop actions, see notes 207-52 and accompa-
nying text infra.
133. 294 Minn. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at 150.
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lawfully sold or gave liquor to another causing his intoxication when that
intoxication resulted in injury to the plaintiff.134 Focusing on the legislative
history of the act, the Ross court noted that at the time of its enactment in
1911, the problem of drunken driving was not particularly serious.135 In all
likelihood, the court reasoned, the Minnesota legislature had not foreseen
extensive application of the statute to social hosts. 136 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the legislature's choice of the words "any person" was suffi-
ciently broad to find that the Civil Damage Act imposed liability on every-
one who violated its provisions.13 7 Finally, the Ross court stated that anyone
who furnished alcohol, whether vendor or social host, should be "responsible
for protecting innocent third persons from the potential dangers of indis-
criminately furnishing such hospitality."'' 38
Five years later, however, the Minnesota legislature amended its Civil
Damage Act. 139 The legislature removed from the list of prohibited acts the
"giving" of alcohol and limited violations to the illegal sale or barter of alco-
holic beverages, thereby precluding the use of the act in suits against non-
commercial social hosts.
140
134. Id For'ihe text of the applicable civil damage act, see note 131 supra.
135. 294 Minn. at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 151.
136. Id.
137. Id at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53. The Minnesota Supreme Court had pre-
viously ruled that legislation making it illegal to sell alcohol to minors applied to
those not in liquor business. Id at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 151-52 (citing State v. McGin-
nis, 30 Minn. 48, 14 N.W. 256 (1882) (nonlicensee criminally liable for furnishing
alcohol to minor)).
The Ross court further noted that at the legislative session at which the Civil
Damage Act was adopted, the legislature had sought to strengthen and tighten the
then existing liquor laws, "using throughout . . . the words 'any person' and making
no mention anywhere of persons in the liquor business." 294 Minn. at 121, 200
N.W.2d at 153. Moreover, the Ross court reasoned that "[s]ince the act applies only
to illegal transactions, it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended
to include persons other than licensed vendors." Id
138. Id at 121-22, 200 N.W.2d at 153.
139. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984) (amending MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972)). The act now imposes civil liability only on any
person who illegally sells or barters intoxicating liquors. Id
140. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982); Cole v. City of Spring
Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982). In examining the legislative purpose be-
hind the 1977 amendment, the Cole court stated that
[tihe transcript of the floor debate in the State Senate on the proposed
amendment to delete "giving" from the Civil Damages Act clearly shows
that the legislators knew of the Ross decision, knew what results its applica-
tion would produce, and purposefully proposed the amendment to change
the law so that this court's interpretation of the Civil Damages Act would
no longer be correct.
Cole, 314 N.W.2d at 839.
It is submitted that the fact that the Minnesota legislature opted to remove only
the term "giving" from its statute, while leaving in the broad "any person" term,
suggests an intent that the "any person" term refers to persons other than social hosts.
For example, the term could refer to nonlicensees who are nonetheless involved in the
liquor industry. See note 129 supra. It may also include "social hosts" who sell drinks
to their guests. Cf Heldt v. Brei, 118 Il. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
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3. Specific Legislation Directed Toward Social Host Liability
Recently, a number of state legislatures have considered specifically
whether a social host who furnishes alcohol to his guests may be held liable
for subsequent injuries.' 4 1 The predominant trend has been to preclude so-
cial host liability.
The first state to enact legislation specifically curtailing a social host's
civil responsibility was California. 142 In 1978, following a series of judicial
decisions that had extended liability for the torts of intoxicated persons to
social hosts, 143 the California legislature amended its statutes to abolish lia-
bility for furnishers of alcohol.' 44 This anti-dramshop law expressly states
that no person who supplies liquor to another, either by gift or by sale, shall be
liable to any person injured by the intoxicated consumer. 145
Several other states have followed California's lead, including Alaska,
which revised its alcoholic beverage control statute in 1980 to shield non-
licensees from civil liability. 146 Similarly, the New Mexico state legislature
141. See ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1980); CAl.. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983). See also A.43, - Sess., LXXI N.J. Legis. Ind. A2 (Oct.
22, 1984). Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. GEN. OBI.IG. LAW
§ I 1-100 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983) (each of these statutes potentially applicable to
issue of social host liability, though not expressly so). For a discussion of these stat-
utes, see notes 142-50 and accompanying text infra.
142. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1984) (enacted
1978); CAl.. CIV. CODE § 1714(b)-(c) (West 1984) (enacted 1978). In addition, in
1971 and 1977 the Iowa and Minnesota legislatures passed amendments to their re-
spective dramshop acts which limited the liability of social hosts. See note 122 supra
and notes 139-40 and accompanying text supra. Because these amendments clarified
the legislative intent underlying each state's dramshop act specifically in order to
overrule judicial extensions of the statutes to social hosts, the Iowa and Minnesota
responses might also be included among those statutes specifically enacted and di-
rected toward noncommercial suppliers of alcohol.
143. SeeCoulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1978) (under negligence theories, social host liable for serving an obviously in-
toxicated person); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1972) (employer liable for serving a minor contrary to the state alcoholic
beverage control laws). For a discussion of Coulter, see note 185 infra.
144. See CAI.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714(b)-(c) (West 1984). For a discussion of these statutes, see note 185 tnfra.
145. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b) (West Supp. 1984). The statute
reads in pertinent part as follows:
No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this sec-
tion [prohibiting the furnishing of alcohol to any habitual or common
drunkard, or to any obviously intoxicated person] shall be civilly liable to
any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that
person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic
beverage.
Id (emphasis added). For a discussion of"anti-dramshop" legislation, see notes 64-74
and accompanying text supra.
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1980). This section provides as follows: "A
person who provides alcoholic beverages to another person may not be held civilly
1983-84] COMMENT 1149
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recently enacted legislation providing that a person who gratuitously serves
alcohol to a guest in a social setting may not be held liable for any subse-
quent injuries.147
At least one jurisdiction, however, has chosen to take the opposite tack.
In Oregon, the legislature enacted a bill providing that a social host who
serves a guest who is visibly intoxicated may be liable for damages incurred
or caused by that guest. 148 Several other states have also adopted broad-
scoped legislation which on its face may be construed to impose liability on
noncommercial suppliers of alcohol. ' 49 Absent judicial interpretation or fur-
liable for injuries resulting from the intoxication of that person unless the person who
provides the alcoholic beverages holds a license authorized under [the act], or is an
agent or employee of such a licensee ....... Id
147. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1984). Social hosts may be liable
under this statute, however, if "the alcoholic beverages were provided recklessl in
disregard of the rights of others, including the social guest." Id § 41-11-I(D) (empha-
sis added). For a discussion of the common law rule that persons who recklessly or
wantonly serve alcohol to their guests may be liable, see notes 112-17 and accompa-
nying text infra.
148. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983). This statute provides: "No private
host is liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the
private host has served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such
guest was visibly intoxicated" Id (emphasis added). See also id. § 30.960 (liability for
serving minor who the host knew or ought to have known was underaged).
149. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 11-100 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983).
The Florida statute, for example, provides as follows:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of law-
ful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a
person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to
a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person
habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become
liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of
such minor or person.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1984) (emphasis added). Because of the
Florida legislature's choice of the terms "a person" and "furnishes," it is possible to
construe this statute to impose liability on social hosts who willfully and unlawfully
serve minors or habitual alcoholics.
For the text of the Utah statute, which employs equally broad language, see note
125 supra.
It has been argued that the North Dakota dramshop act is also sufficiently brcad
to include social hosts and that North Dakota case law would support such an exten-
sion. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 1, at 476. The dramshop act states that
"[e]very. . . person who is injured by any intoxicated person . . . shall have a right
of action against any person who caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bar-
tering, or giving away alcoholic beverages ...... N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp.
1983) (emphasis added). The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that this act "is
remedial in character and should be construed to suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy." Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957). Accordingly, one
author concluded that the dramshop act should be interpreted liberally to impose
liability upon social hosts. See Note, Social Host Liability, supra note 1, at 476-77.
Recent amendments to the New York legislation provide in pertinent part as
follows:
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ther legislative clarification, however, it remains unclear whether these
broadly worded statutes will affect the liability of social hosts.150
4. Social Host Civil Liability for Violation of Statute
Some courts have imposed liability upon social hosts based upon the
host's violation of a particular statute, although the statute itself did not
expressly provide for civil liability.' Most often, courts rely on state alco-
holic beverage control acts which typically make it unlawful to sell or furnish
intoxicating beverages to minors, habitual drunkards, or obviously intoxi-
cated persons. 152 A violation of these acts generally constitutes a criminal
offense, subjecting the actor to a fine or imprisonment. 153 In the civil con-
Any person who shall be injured. . . by reason of the intoxication or
impairment of ability of any person under the age of nineteen years . . .
shall have a right of action . . . against any person who knowingly causes
such intoxication or impairment of ability by unlawfullyfurnlshing to or un-
lawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such person was under the
age of nineteen years.
N.Y. GEN. OBIIG. LAW § 11-100(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). This
statute became effective in October, 1983. Although New York courts had previously
construed the state's dramshop act to exclude social hosts, they reached this result on
the ground that the dramshop act required an illegal "sale." See Kohler v. Wray, 114
Misc. 2d 856, 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1982) (dramshop act not applicable to
social host even when he asks his guest to "chip in" for beer); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 11-101(1) (McKinney 1978). It is submitted that this construction was consistent
with the language of § 11-101(1) of the act, which created a cause of action against
one who caused the intoxication of another "by unlawful [sic] selling to or unlawfully
assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person ....... N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 11-101(1) (McKinney 1978) (emphasis added). By using the term "furnish-
ing" in the new § 11-100(1), therefore, it is arguable that the legislature intended to
create a cause of action against both commercial and noncommercial suppliers of
alcohol. But cf Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 87 (1980)
("give away" language of state alcoholic beverage control act construed to refer to
those instances in which the licensed vendor provides the traditional "drink on the
house").
150. See Graham, supra note 33, at 568 (broad scoped dramshop acts are not
appropriate vehicles for creating social host liability). For a discussion of the limited
applicability of broad scoped dramshop acts to social host litigation, see notes 125-29
and accompanying text supra.
151. Social Host Liabiliy, supra note 1, at 459. For a list of cases imposing civil
liability upon social hosts for violation of such statutes, see note 158 injfa. For a
discussion of vendor liability premised on violation of statute, see notes 75-95 and
accompanying text supra.
152. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (Purdon 1969). The Penn-
sylvania law provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful-(1) For any licensee . . . to sell, furnish or give any
liquor or malt or brewed beverages. . . to any person visibly intoxicated,
or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or per-
sons of known intemperate habits.
Id
153. See Note, Social Host Liabiliy, supra note 1, at 459. For example, the Penn-
sylvania alcoholic beverage control laws provide:
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this article . . .
1983-84] 1151
33
Lang and McGrath: Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When One for the Road
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29: p. 1119
text, however, courts have construed these statutes to create a minimum,
statutory standard of care, 154 and have held that their violation is evidence
of negligence 155 or even negligence per se. 156
In order for a plaintiff to succeed against a social host on this theory of
liability, the court must find that the alcoholic beverage control act in ques-
tion was designed: (a) to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff;
(b) to protect the interest of the plaintiff that has been invaded; (c) to protect
against the particular type of harm that has been inflicted; and (d) to protect
the plaintiff's interest against the particular cause of that harm. 157 Follow-
ing this implied cause of action analysis, courts have imposed civil liability
upon social hosts for violations of criminal statutes in an attempt to further
the ultimate policies and goals of the legislature.
158
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sen-
tenced to pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more
than five hundred dollars ($500), and on failure to pay such fine, to impris-
onment for not less than one month, nor more than three months ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-494(a) (Purdon 1969).
154. See generally Note, Social Host Liabtlity, supra note 1, at 459-60; Graham, supra
note 33, at 569-71. Liability premised on violation of an alcoholic beverage control
act should be distinguished from statutory liability imposed by state dramshop or
civil damage acts. For a discussion of social host liability under dramshop legislation,
see notes 118-40 and accompanying text supra.
155. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978) (violation of statute gives rise to presumption of negligence); Long-
streth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983) (violation of statute
constitutes prima facie case of negligence). Cf Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Li-
quor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983) (violation of statute by vendor is
evidence of negligence). For a discussion of Longstreth, see notes 160-67 and accompa-
nying text ihfra.
156. See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974);
Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Lover v. Sampson, 44
Mich. App. 173, 205 N.W.2d 69 (1972). See also Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.,_
Pa. -, 470 A.2d 517 (1983) (violation of criminal code by social host constitutes
negligence per se). For a discussion of Congint, see notes 172-78 and accompanying
text infra.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). Prosser and Keeton
explain the use of criminal statutes to impose civil liability as follows:
[Tihe courts are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial legislation,
to further the ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they
find underlying the statute, and which they believe the legislature must
have had in mind. The statutory standard of conduct is simply adopted
voluntarily, out of deference and respect for the legislature.
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 222 (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of the use of criminal statutes in negligence actions, see gener-
ally Morris, The Role of Crt'mnal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoI.uM. L. REv. 21
(1949).
158. See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974)
(purpose of Indiana liquor control laws, to protect citizenry from dangers posed by
intoxicated minors, is furthered by imposing civil liability upon those who furnish
alcohol to minors); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973) (stat-
utes forbidding furnishing of alcohol to minors and consuming alcoholic beverages on
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In the vast majority of those cases imposing liability on this theory, the
social host served intoxicating beverages to a minor.' 59 For example, in
Longstreth v. Fizgtbbon,160 the parents of a minor brought a wrongful death
action against the hosts of a wedding reception at which the minor had been
a guest. 16 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had furnished, or al-
lowed to be furnished, intoxicating liquor to the minor in violation of Michi-
gan law.162 As a result, they alleged, the minor was killed in an automobile
collision following the affair.
16 3
The Michigan alcohol law expressly stated that it was a misdemeanor
for any person to provide liquor to a minor. 164 Noting that the legislature
had chosen the term "person" rather than retailer, vendor or licensee, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the liquor control act's prohibition
applied to all persons who violated its terms, including the social hosts of a
wedding reception. 165 Accordingly, the Longstre/h court stated that in a civil
suit against a social host, violation of the act created a prima facie case of
negligence. 166 Therefore, under Longstreth, a cause of action exists in Michi-
159. See, e.g., Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1972); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974);
Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983); Thaut v.
Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App.
173, 205 N.W.2d 69 (1972). See also Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.,__ Pa. __, 470
A.2d 515 (1983) (violation of criminal code provision).
160. 125 Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983).
161. Id. at 262, 335 N.W.2d at 678.
162. Id. at 263, 335 N.W.2d at 678. The Michigan alcoholic beverage control
law provides in relevant part: "A person who knowingly sells or furnishes alcoholic
liquor to a person who is less than 21 years of age. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 436.33(1) (Supp. 1984). This statute is an amended form of an
earlier Michigan law which stated as follows: "Any person, who knowingly gives or
furnishes any alcoholic beverage to a minor . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
.... MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 750.141a (1968) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
Under this earlier provision, a civil cause of action existed for damages sustained as a
result of a person furnishing alcohol to a minor. Christensen v. Parrish, 82 Mich.
App. 409, 266 N.W.2d 826, Iv. denied mem., 403 Mich. 845 (1978) (violation of
§ 750.141a constitutes prima facie case of negligence); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich.
App. 173, 205 N.W.2d 69 (1972) (violation of statute constitutes negligence per se).
163. 125 Mich. App. at 262, 335 N.W.2d at 678.
164. For the relevant text of the Michigan alcoholic beverage control law, see
note 162 supra.
165. 125 Mich. App. at 266, 335 N.W.2d at 679. Interpreting legislative amend-
ments, the Longstreth court stated that the legislature had not intended to make the
prohibition against serving minors applicable only to vendors. Id. The Longstrelh
court's conclusion was based on the legislature's use of the word "person," where the
words retailer, vendor or licensee could have been used. Id. Moreover, the court
noted that the legislature had not restricted other provisions of the liquor laws to
licensees. Id. at 266, 335 N.W.2d at 679-80 (citing MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 436.33a
(1978) (making it a misdemeanor to transport or possess alcoholic beverages in a
motor vehicle)). For a comparison of the current and former Michigan statutes, see
note 162 supra.
166. 125 Mich. App. at 267, 335 N.W.2d at 679-80. Cases under the former
statute had been split as to whether a violation constituted negligence per se or gave
rise to a prima facie case of negligence. Compare Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611,
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gan against one who furnishes alcohol to a minor, even though that person is
not a licensee or commercial vendor. '
6 7
Notwithstanding the fact that a number of state alcoholic beverage con-
trol acts prohibit the service of alcohol to any person obviously intoxicated,
only one court has found a social host liable for serving an adult in violation
of such an act. 168 That decision has since been superseded by legislative
amendment. 1
69
Although most courts look to the relevant state's alcoholic beverage con-
trol act to find the applicable minimum standard of care, violations of other
statutes may also lead to tort liability against the social host.' 70 For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania, the liquor control laws do not impose civil liability on
nonlicensees.171 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Congrnl v.
213 N.W.2d 820 (1973) (negligence per se) andLover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App. 173,
205 N.W.2d 69 (1972) (negligence per se) with Christensen v. Parrish, 82 Mich. App.
409, 266 N.W.2d 826 (1978) (prima facie negligence), Iv. denitd mem., 403 Mich. 845
(1978). The Longstreth court explained that while "[it is true that a number of
passages in cases speak of negligence per se almost in terms of strict liability, . . .
closer examination of the application of the rule reveals that Michigan does not sub-
scribe to such a harsh dogma." 125 Mich. App. at 265 n.8, 335 N.W.2d at 679 n.8
(quoting Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 128-29, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (1976)).
Violation of a statute under Michigan law therefore "creates only a prima facie case
from which the jury may draw an inference of negligence." Id. at 265, 335 N.W.2d at
679 (quoting Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 128-29, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (1976)).
For a discussion of other jurisdictions that hold that a social host's violation of a
statute creates only a prima facie case or evidence of negligence, see note 155 supra.
167. 125 Mich. App. at 266, 335 N.W.2d at 680. The plaintiffs in Longstreth
failed to allege that the defendants had "knowingly sold or furnished alcoholic liquor
to a person who is less than 21 years of age, or. . . fail[edl to make diligent inquiry as
to whether the person is less than 21 years of age." 1d. (quoting MICH. COMi'. LAWS
§ 436.33(1) (Supp. 1984)). Absent such an averment, plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a cause of action under the Michigan alcoholic beverage control statute. 1d. at
267, 335 N.W.2d at 680. The court therefore remanded the action to the trial court,
giving plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to satisfy the statutory requirements.
Id.
168. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1978). In Coulter, defendants served alcoholic beverages to one Williams, an
obviously intoxicated person, in violation of the state statute. Id. at 148-49, 577 P.2d
at 671-72, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536-37. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West
1964) (amended 1978) (misdemeanor to furnish alcohol to an obviously intoxicated
person). The California court ruled that the statute could properly be used to hold
social hosts civilly liable. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 673-74, 145 Cal. Rptr. at
538-39.
169. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714(b) (West Supp. 1984). For a discussion of these amendments, see note 185
injra. Cf Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (recognizing negli-
gence of social host who serves an obviously intoxicated adult).
170. See, e.g., De More v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1983) (defendant's
negligence may be based on violation of contributing-to-delinquency statute); Con-
gini v. Portersville Valve Co., - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (defendant's negligence
founded on violation of criminal accomplice liability statute). For a discussion of
Congi n: see notes 172-78 and accompanying text infra.
171. Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (nonlicensee who fur-
nished intoxicants to intoxicated person for no remuneration cannot be held liable
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Portersoille Valve Co., 17 2 had to rely on other legislation in order to impose
liability upon a social host who served alcohol to a minor.173 Utilizing a
rather unique approach, the Congnti court began by noting that under the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 174 a minor commits a summary offense if he "at-
tempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or transports any alcohol,
liquor or malt or brewed beverage."' 75 From this, the court reasoned that
an adult who furnishes liquor to a minor is criminally liable as an accom-
plice to the minor's violation of the law. 176 As a result, the Congini court held
under Pennsylvania Liquor Code for injuries to a third party allegedly caused by the
intoxicated person); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa. Super. 135, 421 A.2d 1184 (1980) (nonli-
censee soft drink distributor could not be held liable under Pennsylvania Liquor
Code for wrongful death of visibly intoxicated motorist on ground that distributor
served him alcoholic beverages). For the text of the applicable section of the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Code, see note 152 supra.
For other jurisdictions refusing to apply alcoholic beverage control acts to the
conduct of social hosts, see notes 182-84 infira.
172. - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). In Conginht plaintiff, a minor, had attended
a holiday party hosted by his employer. Id. at -, 470 A.2d at 516. Although intoxi-
cated, the minor attempted to drive home. Id. at -, 470 A.2d at 516. En route,
plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident suffering serious permanent injuries.
Id.
173. Id. at -, 470 A.2d at 517.
174. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-9183 (Purdon 1983). The Pennsylvania
Liquor Code is found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 796 (Purdon 1983).
Unlike the Liquor Code, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code applies to all citizens of the
Commonwealth. Congint, - Pa. at - n.3, 470 A.2d at 518 n.3. For the applicable
language of the Liquor Code, see note 152 supra.
175. - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 517 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308
(Purdon 1983)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that this provision, making
it illegal for a minor to purchase, consume or possess alcohol, reflected a legislative
judgment that persons under 21 years of age are incompetent to handle the effects of
alcohol. - Pa. at __, 470 A.2d at 517.
Next, the Congni'court acknowledged that in the case of an ordinary able-bodied
man, the common law provides that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the
furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of any subsequent damage, Id. See Klein v.
Raysinger, - Pa. __, 470 A.2d 507 (1983) (companion case to Congihi holding that a
social host who serves liquor to an adult guest is not liable for the subsequent negli-
gent acts of that guest). However, because of the legislative determination that per-
sons under 21 are not like ordinary able-bodied men in their ability to handle
alcohol, the Congit' court concluded that the common law rule does not apply where
the guest is a minor. - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 517.
176. - Pa. at __, 470 A.2d at 517 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Pur-
don 1983)). The Pennsylvania accomplice liability statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his
own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally
accountable, or both.
(c) Accomplice defined.-A person is an accomplice of another person in
the commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or com-
mting it; or
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that the defendant host could be held liable for injuries to the minor proxi-
mately resulting from the minor's intoxication.' 77 Thus, in Pennsylvania, it
is the adult's violation of the accomplice liability statute, rather than viola-
tion of the liquor control laws, which constitutes negligence per se in a civil
action against a social host who serves alcohol to his minor guest. 178
A finding that the host's violation of either an alcoholic beverage con-
trol act or another statutory provision constitutes negligence per se merely
satisfies the plaintiffs burden of proving that the host breached the requisite
duty of care.' 7 9 In order to recover, the plaintiff must still prove that the
social host's violation of the law proximately caused the damages suffered by
the plaintiff. '8 0 Thus, it is possible that the common law view that the con-
sumption of the alcohol is the proximate cause may preclude recovery under
this theory of liability even though the defendant is negligent per se.' 8 '
Many courts have been unwilling to extend tort liability to social hosts
for their violation of alcoholic beverage control laws. A number of jurisdic-
tions have concluded that since the liquor control laws are primarily penal
statutes, they should be given no civil or remedial application.' 8 2 Other
(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added). An accomplice is
thus held liable to the same extent as one who commits the offense. See Congtin - Pa.
at __, 470 A.2d at 517.
177. - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 518-19. The Pennsylvania court noted, however,
that a finding of negligence per se only satisfies the requirement of showing that the
defendant was negligent. id. at - n.4, 470 A.2d at 518 n.4 (citing Kaplan v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 404 Pa. 147, 171 A.2d 166 (1961)).
178. See - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 517. In holding the social host negligent per
se, the Congini court followed the analysis set forth in the Restatement. Id. at __, 470
A.2d at 517-18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). For Dean
Prosser's explanation of § 286, see text accompanying note 157 supra. Specifically,
the court noted that the decision to make it an offense for minors to purchase or
consume alcohol reflected the legislature's attempt "to protect both minors and the
public at large from the perceived deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons
under twenty-one years of age." - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 518 (interpreting 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (Purdon 1983)).
179. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 230. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965).
180. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 230. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B comment b (1965).
181. See, e.g., Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980). In Slicer,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant host was negligent per se as a result of violat-
ing a statute which forbade the furnishing of alcohol to minors. Id. at 256, 429 A.2d
at 857. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West 1975). In spite of this alleged
violation, the Connecticut court ruled that it was the minor's consumption, rather
than the serving of alcohol, which proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. 180 Conn. at
256, 429 A.2d at 857. As summarized by the Slicer court, "[t]he common-law rule as
to proximate cause applies in any common-law action of negligence, even though
that action includes one or more alleged statutory violations . . . ." Id. at 256-57,
429 A.2d at 858 (citing Moore v. Bunk, 154 Conn. 644, 647, 228 A.2d 510, 512
(1967)).
182. See, e.g., Bell v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 98 Nev. 109, 642 P.2d 161
(1982) (purpose of liquor control laws is not to enlarge civil remedies). For cases
1156
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courts have focused on the language and legislative intent underlying the
alcoholic beverage control acts and have ruled that they are not designed to
regulate the activities of nonlicensees.18 3 Still other courts, analyzing the
purpose of these statutes, have found that they are not designed to protect
particular classes of plaintiffs and therefore do not necessarily give rise to a
civil cause of action.
184
5. Social Host Liabilit Under Modern Common Law." Abrogation of /he Rule of
Non/'ability
A select number of courts have abrogated the traditional common law
rule and have imposed liability on social hosts for injuries suffered by third
persons as a result of the negligence of an intoxicated guest.' 85 The
refusing to hold vendors civilly liable for violations of alcoholic beverage control laws,
see note 85 supra.
183. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
North Carolina law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v.
Butler, 359 So. 2d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100,
375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aft, 44 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976);
Johnson v. Paige, 47 Or. App. 1177,615 P.2d 1185 (1980); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa.
237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa. Super. 135, 421 A.2d 1184 (1980).
For a discussion of cases where courts determined that holding nonlicensees liable for
violation of alcoholic beverage control acts was consonant with legislative intent, see
note 158 and accompanying text supra.
184. See, e.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (no cause of action in favor of third persons injured
by intoxicated minor); Johnson v. Paige, 47 Or. App. 1177, 615 P.2d 1185 (1980) (no
cause of action in favor of minor who had been sold intoxicating beverages).
185. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Figuly v.
Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1982); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J.
Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). Even when a court decides
to abandon the common law rule of nonliability for social hosts, there is no guarantee
that the legislature will not reinstate it. In Coulter v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court
of California permitted a common law negligence claim against a social host for in-
juries caused by a guest's drunken driving. See Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). In the same year, however, the California legislature
amended its statutes to overrule expressly the court's holding in Coulter. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West
Supp. 1984). These sections also expressly overruled two other cases which had judi-
cially imposed civil liability on commercial suppliers of alcohol. See Bernhard v. Har-
rah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859
(1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
The relevant statute now provides that no social host can be held liable for fur-
nishing alcoholic beverages to one who subsequently injures a third person. See CAL.
Civ. CoDE § 1714(c) (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides as follows:
No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be
held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury
to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from
the consumption of such beverages.
Id.
Similarly, the California Business and Professions Code now provides that no
one may be held civilly liable for injuries suffered as a result of furnishing alcohol to
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landmark decision in this area is Wiener o. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity,18 6 decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1971. The
plaintiff in Wiener was a passenger in a car driven by an intoxicated mi-
nor.1 8 7 The minor negligently drove the vehicle into a building, causing
injuries to the plaintiff.138 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraternity
was negligent in serving alcohol to the minor because it was foreseeable that
he would later drive.
189
In its discussion, the Wiener court acknowledged that ordinarily a host
who makes intoxicating beverages available to adult guests is not liable for
subsequent injuries to third persons.' 9° However, the court went on to note
that there may be circumstances in which a social host has a duty to refuse to
serve certain guests, as where the host "has reason to know that he is dealing
with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will do
unreasonable things."' 19 In the case before it, the Oregon court concluded
that a jury might properly find that the fraternity's serving of the minor was
unreasonable because he was a minor and the defendant fraternity ought to
have known that he would be driving following the party.' 92 The Wiener
any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person. See CAl..
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b) (West Supp. 1984). Liability may be imposed, how-
ever, on licensees who furnish alcohol to any obviously intoxicated minor. See 1d.
§ 25602.1.
These legislative amendments also restore California to the common law view
that the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person is the drinking
of the liquor rather than the furnishing of it. See id § 25602(c); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714(b) (West Supp. 1984). These sections have been construed to apply only pro-
spectively, such that causes of action existing at the time of the 1978 amendments are
governed by the Vesely and Coulter principles of duty and proximate cause. See Fos-
gate v. Gonzales, 107 Cal. App. 3d 951, 166 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1980).
186. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
187. Id at 637, 485 P.2d at 20.
188. Id
189. Id at 637, 485 P.2d at 20-21. The party was held at the Country Squire
Recreation Ranch, located approximately ten miles north of Eugene, Oregon. Id. at
635, 485 P.2d at 20. The owners and operators of the Ranch were also named as
defendants in the suit. d. at 636, 485 P.2d at 20. These defendants were charged
with negligence in allowing minors to drink on the premises in violation of Oregon
liquor control laws and in failing to supervise adequately the activities on the prop-
erty. Id at 641, 485 P.2d at 23.
Plaintiff Wiener also brought suit against Kienow, a member of the fraternity
who had purchased and delivered the alcoholic beverages to the party knowing that
minors would be present. Id at 636, 485 P.2d at 20.
190. Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21 (citing Le Gault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152
N.W.2d 712 (1967)).
191. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 175
(3d ed. 1962)). Persons identified by the Wiener court as putting the host on notice of
a potential duty include persons "already severely intoxicated," those whose conduct
the host knows to be unusually affected by alcohol, and minors. Id. at 639-40, 485
P.2d at 21.
192. Id. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23. The court ruled that the fraternity's role as host
and its direct involvement in serving alcohol to the minor gave rise to a duty to refuse
to serve intoxicating beverages to its guest "when it would be unreasonable under the
circumstances to permit him to drink." Id.
1158 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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court therefore ruled that plaintiff had adequately stated a cause of action in
negligence against the defendant host. 193
More recently, in Kely v. Gwthnell,194 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that a common law negligence cause of action would lie against a social
host. The plaintiff in Kelly was injured in an automobile collision with a
drunken driver who had been furnished alcohol by the defendant social
host. 195
The Kelly court initially observed that, on the facts before it, a reason-
able person in the position of the defendant host should have foreseen that
the continued furnishing of alcohol to a guest would make it highly likely
that the guest would be unable to drive safely, and would thereby pose a risk
of harm to others. 196 Having thus determined that the usual elements of a
negligence claim existed, the court turned to the remaining question of
whether the social host had a duty to prevent the foreseeable risk of harm. 1 97
The Kelly court stated that the existence of a duty is a function of public
policy. 198 The court then concluded that "here the imposition of a duty is
both consistent with and supportive of a social goal-the reduction of
drunken driving-that is practically unanimously accepted by society."' 99
193. Id. With respect to the defendant owner-operators of the party premises,
the Wienercourt found that they owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from the negli-
gence of Blair. Id. at 641, 485 P.2d at 22. The court reasoned that the host fraternity
should bear the responsibility for supervising its guests and their consumption of al-
cohol, not the owners of the property. Id.
The court similarly found no liability against defendant Kienow, the purchaser
of the alcohol. Id. at 640, 485 P.2d at 22. In dismissing plaintiff's claim that Kie-
now's negligence could be based on a violation of an Oregon law which directed that
no person make alcoholic beverages available to minors, the court ruled that the
purpose of the statute was not to protect third persons from injury. Id. at 638, 485
P.2d at 21. See OR. REv. STAT. § 471.410(2) (1983). Since the purpose of the law
was to protect minors from the vices of drinking, no cause of action would be implied
in favor of the plaintiff. 258 Or. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21. The court also ruled that
since Kienow was merely a conduit in providing the alcohol, and had not in fact
served alcoholic beverages to the minor involved, he could not be held liable under
prinicples of common law negligence. Id. at 640, 485 P.2d at 22.
194. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
195. Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. The plaintiff, Kelly, originally had sued the
drunken driver of the other vehicle, Gwinnell. Id. The drunken driver thereupon
brought a third party claim against Mr. and Mrs. Zak, the hosts who had served him
alcohol, seeking contribution. Id. Kelly then amended her complaint to assert a
claim against the Zaks. Id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220.
196. Id at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
197. Id. Specifically, the Kelly court found the negligence elements satisfied by
"an action by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, a risk that
was clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury equally foreseeable." Id.
198. Id The Kelly court observed that in the ordinary instance, a duty is pre-
sumed to exist merely on the basis of the actor's creation of an unreasonable risk of
harm. Id. However, the imposition of a duty also reflects a value judgment in con-
sideration of the relationship between the parties, the nature of the risk, and the
public's concern with the solution. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J.
578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)).
199. Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222. The court explained:
1983-841 COMMENT 1159
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Accordingly, the Kelly court held that a social host who provides liquor to an
intoxicated guest, knowing that the guest will drive shortly thereafter, is lia-
ble for the foreseeable injuries suffered by third parties as a result of the
guest's drunken driving.
200
C. Afirmali'e Defenses for Vendors and Social Hosts
In those jurisdictions in which the legislature or the judiciary has recog-
nized civil liability for alcohol vendors or social hosts, 20° the issue of defenses
becomes particularly significant. Essentially, there are four categories of af-
firmative defenses20 2 that are available to defendants who have served alco-
hol to their patrons or guests: 1) contributory or comparative negligence; 20 3
In a society where thousands of deaths are caused each year by drunken
drivers, where the damage caused by such deaths is regarded increasingly as
intolerable, where liquor licensees are prohibited from serving intoxicated
adults, and where long-standing criminal sanctions against drunken driving
have recently been significantly strengthened to the point where the Gover-
nor notes that they are regarded as the toughest in the nation, . . . the
imposition of such a duty by the judiciary seems both fair and fully in ac-
cord with the State's policy.
Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. (footnote and citation omitted). The court acknowl-
edged that imposing a duty on social hosts went beyond prior decisions of the court,
but opined that public policy compelled such a result. Id. at 544-48, 476 A.2d at
1222-24.
The Kelly court also cited with approval a lower court decision imposing liability
upon a social host who served an intoxicated minor. Id. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223
(citing Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976)). The court
reflected the Linn court's reasoning: " It makes little sense to say that the licensee
• . . is under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who may be
guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because his is unlicensed." Id. at 547,
476 A.2d at 1223-24 (quoting Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18). See
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) (imposing civil liability upon a
licensed vendor).
Additionally, the Kelly court responded to the argument that the liability of
licensees is justified because unlike social hosts, they profit from serving liquor. 96
N.J. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224. The court stated that the liability of both licensees
and social hosts derives from the duty of care that accompanies control of the liquor
supply, regardless of the motive for furnishing it. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
200. 96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. The court further ruled that the social
host and the guest-drunk driver are liable to the third party as joint tortfeasors. Id.
(citing Melone v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 113 A.2d 13 (1955);
Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 102 A.2d 614 (1954); Matthews v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 56 N.J.L. 34, 27 A. 919 (Sup. Ct. 1893)).
201. For a discussion of the liability of commercial suppliers of alcohol, see notes
12-103 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the liability of social hosts
who furnish alcohol, see notes 105-200 and accompanying text supra.
202. Of course, a defendant supplier of alcohol may always defend by showing
the plaintiff's failure to prove a requisite element of the asserted cause of action.
203. For a discussion of contributory or comparative negligence as a defense to
an action brought under a dramshop act, see notes 207-10 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of this defense in an action based upon violation of an alco-
holic beverage control act, see notes 253-67 and accompanying text infra.
Also included in this category are defenses based upon the plaintiffs wanton or
1160 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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2) participation or complicity; 20 4 3) assumption of the risk;20 5 and 4) statu-
tory defenses, including the statute of limitations. 20 6 The propriety of each
type of defense seems to hinge upon the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action
rather than upon the status of the defendant as vendor or social host.
1. Defenses to Actions Based Upon a Dramshop Act
a. Contributory/Comparative Negligence
It is generally accepted that contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is not a defense to an action based upon a state's dramshop act.2 0 7
The basis for this rule is simply that the plaintiffs cause of action is not
grounded in negligence, 20 8 but rather stems from a legislative judgment that
a vendor who violates the act's terms is strictly liable. 20 9  Furthermore,
courts have reasoned that if contributory negligence were permitted as a de-
fense, the purpose of the dramshop legislation would be frustrated. 2 10
b. Participation or Complicity
In a number of dramshop jurisdictions, courts have created a doctrine
of complicity that may bar a plaintiff's recovery. 2 11 Complicity, unlike con-
willful misconduct. For a discussion of cases where the plaintiff is barred by virtue of
wanton or willful misconduct, see notes 268-75 and accompanying text infra..
204. For a discussion of participation or complicity as a defense to an action
brought under a dramshop act, see notes 211-27 and accompanying text nfra. For a
discussion of this defense in an action based upon violation of an alcoholic beverage
control act, see notes 276-84 and accompanying text infra.
205. For a discussion of assumption of the risk as a defense to an action brought
under a dramshop act, see notes 228-40 and accompanying text infra.
206. For a discussion of statutory defenses in actions brought under dramshop
acts, see notes 241-52 and accompanying text nfra. In actions based upon violation
of an alcoholic beverage control act, defendants may be able to assert an excuse or
justification for the law's violation. For a discussion of excuse, see notes 285-89 and
accompanying text infra. Some states have codified the excuses that are available to
these defendants. See notes 290-92 and accompanying text nfra.
207. See McGough, supra note 21, at 454. For cases holding that contributory
negligence is not available as a defense to actions based on violations of a dramshop
act, see, e.g., Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct.
1962); Quatrano v. Marrocco, 61 Ill. App. 2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 632 (1965); Berge v.
Harris, 170 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1969); Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Bour-
rie, 375 Mich. 383, 134 N.W.2d 713 (1965).
Liability of furnishers of alcohol based on violation of a dramshop act is cur-
rently restricted to actions against commercial suppliers of liquor. For a discussion of
cases attempting to impose dramshop act liability on social hosts, see notes 118-40
and accompanying text supra.
208. See Berge v. Harris, 170 N.W.2d 621 (IJbwa 1969) (contributory negligence
is no defense to dramshop action founded on breach of a statutory duty).
209. For a discussion of the strict liability imposed by dramshop acts, see text
accompanying note 22 supra.
210. For a discussion of this argument in the context of participation or com-
plicity, see notes 220-27 and accompanying text tnfra.
211. See, e.g., Parsons v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6372, 86 Ill. App. 3d 515,
408 N.E.2d 68 (1980); Dahn v. Sheets, 104 Mich. App. 584, 305 N.W.2d 547 (1981);
COMMENT 11611983-84]
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tributory negligence, relates to the plaintiff's role in causing the patron's in-
toxication, 2 12 not the plaintiff's role in causing his own intoxication. Thus,
courts have held that "a person who participate[d] in procuring the intoxication
of the person who committed the act about which complaint is made, cannot
recover under the [Dramshop] Act."213
For example, in Parsons v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6372,214 an Illinois
appellate court considered whether the trial judge had properly instructed
the jury on the defense of complicity.2 15 Examining state law,2 Iti the Parsons
court declared that a plaintiff will be barred from recovery under the doc-
Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 209 N.W.2d 902 (1973);
Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338, 227 N.E.2d 21, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1967). For
a discussion of Parsons, see notes 214-19 and accompanying text 1hfra.
212. See Parsons, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 408 N.E.2d at 71. The Parsons court
explained:
Complicity cannot be based upon a variant of the inapplicable contribu-
tory negligence concept; nor upon an "assumption of risk" theory; nor upon
a theory that plaintiff contributed to his injury by provoking the inebriate
to attack him. . . .The only relevant issue is whether the plaintiff contrib-
uted to the inebriate's intoxication.
Id. at 517, 408 N.E.2d at 71 (citation omitted).
One commentator has proposed that complicity is actually contributory negli-
gence masquerading under another name. See McGough, supra note 21, at 454.
213. See Parsons, 86 111. App. 3d at 521, 408 N.E.2d at 74 (quoting Baker v. Han-
nan, 44 Ill. App. 2d 157, 159, 194 N.E.2d 563, 564 (1963)) (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 515, 408 N.E.2d 68 (1980). The plaintiff in Parsons was a widow who
sought to recover for the loss of means of support resulting from the death of her
husband. Id. at 515, 408 N.E.2d at 70. The decedent, Edgar Parsons, and his wife,
Margaret, had stopped at defendant's establishment after riding about on their mo-
torcycle. Id After joining a friend at a table, the Parsons and their friend drank
together, with Margaret getting all of the drinks from the bar while Edgar and his
friend shared the costs. Id. at 515-16, 408 N.E.2d at 70. About four and one-half
hours later, Edgar attempted to ride the motorcycle despite his obvious intoxication.
Id. at 516, 408 N.E.2d at 70. Edgar subsequently lost control of the vehicle and fell,
suffering fatal injuries. Id. At trial, thejury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant vendor. Id.
215. Id. The trial court had instructed the jury on complicity as follows:
If you find that the plaintiff did any of the following things then the plain-
tiff cannot recover damages in this case from [the defendant]:
Willingly encouraged the drinking which caused the intoxication of
Edgar Parsons. Voluntarily participated to a material and substantial
extent in the drinking which led to the intoxication of Edgar Parsons.
The law does not state what is participation to a material and substan-
tial extent. This is for you to decide.
Id (quoting Illinois Pattern Instruction 150.17).
216. Id. at 516-21, 408 N.E.2d at 70-74. The leading case in Illinois at the time
Parsons was decided was Nelson v. Araiza, 69 Ill. 2d 534, 372 N.E.2d 637 (1977). In
Nelson, the plaintiff consumed alcohol with the defendant in a bar. Id. at 537, 372
N.E.2d at 638. Although he was in an intoxicated condition, the defendant at-
tempted to drive with the plaintiff as a passenger. Id. at 538, 372 N.E.2d at 638.
However, due to the driver's intoxication, the car was involved in an accident, injur-
ing the plaintiff-passenger. Id On these facts, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
under the doctrine of complicity, "only one who actively contributes to or procures
the intoxication of the inebriate is precluded from recovery." Id. at 543, 372 N.E.2d
at 641 (citation omitted). As further stated by the court, unless complicity can be
1162 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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trine of complicity if he or she "contribute[s] to the inebriate's intoxica-
tion."'2 17 Accordingly, the court determined that "one who provides liquor
which does not significantly contribute to intoxication may not be attributed
with complicity, whereas one who has encouraged drinking or provided sig-
nificant companionship in drinking which causes intoxication, may be, re-
gardless of whether that person has actually supplied the liquor."'2t 8 Thus,
the Parsons court held that the plaintiff was barred from recovery because of
her participation in her husband's drinking even though she did not
purchase the intoxicating alcohol.
219
Not all courts, however, have been willing to allow complicity as a de-
fense to an action brought under a dramshop act. In Passini v. Decker,220 on
plaintiff's motion to strike a proferred defense of participation, 22 1 the Supe-
established by the evidence as a matter of law, the issue is properly left to the discre-
tion of the jury. Id.
The Parsons court cited cases in which the plaintiff was found to have "actively
contributed" to the inebriate's condition. 86 Il1. App. 3d at 15, 408 N.E.2d at 73
(citing Ness v. Bilbob Inn, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 2d 340, 146 N.E.2d 234 (1957); Hays v.
Waite, 36 11. App. 397 (1890)). In Hays, the plaintiff had purchased drinks for and
drunk with the intoxicated person throughout the evening. 36 Ill. App. at 398. In
Ness, although the plaintiff did not purchase any drinks for the inebriate, the fact
that the plaintiff drank with the inebriate was found to constitute active participa-
tion. 15 Ill. App. 2d at 340, 146 N.E.2d at 238. See also Baker v. Hannan, 44 111. App.
2d 157, 194 N.E.2d 563 (1963) (complicity established as a matter of law where plain-
tiffs drank beer with the intoxicated person who had purchased the alcohol, since this
conduct constituted "procuring the intoxication" of the inebriate).
217. 86 Il1. App. 3d at 518, 408 N.E.2d at 72. For definitions of "contributes"
under Illinois law prior to Parsons, see note 216 supra.
218. Id. at 518, 408 N.E.2d at 72. But see Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y. 2d
338, 227 N.E.2d 21, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1967) (defense of complicity not applicable
where, although plaintiff drank with the inebriate, he neither purchased drinks nor
encouraged inebriate to drink to excess; plaintiff's conduct therefore did not amount
to guilty participation in the other's intoxication).
219. 86 Il1. App. 3d at 521, 408 N.E.2d at 74.
220. 39 Conn. Supp. 20, 467 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. 1983). The plaintiff, Passini,
who had been injured while a passenger in a car driven by Decker, brought suit
against the owner of the tavern who had served alcohol to Decker and also against
Decker herself. Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 442. The liability of the vendor was predicated
upon the Connecticut Dramshop Act. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 442. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). For the relevant text of the act, see
note 223 infra.
As the Passbzicourt noted, the Connecticut Dramshop Act has been held to im-
pose strict liability upon the seller with proof "that there was (1) a sale of intoxicating
liquor (2) to an intoxicated person (3) who, in consequence of such intoxication,
causes injury to the person or property of another." 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d
at 443 (quoting Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 360, 365 A.2d 1174, 1176 (1976);
Sanders v. Officers' Club of Conn., Inc., 35 Conn. Supp. 91, 93, 397 A.2d 122, 124
(Super. Ct. 1978)).
221. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 443. Defendant seller had asserted in
her defense that "[a]ny alcohol consumed by Debra Decker . . . at the premises of
Yesterday's Cafe was done in the company of Debra Passini [plaintiff] who contrib-
uted to the supplying of alcoholic beverages, or who encouraged, facilitated or partic-
ipated in the consumption of said beverages with Debra Decker. . . ." Id. at __, 467
A.2d at 442-43. The defendant argued that plaintiffs conduct barred her from re-
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rior Court of Connecticut considered whether such a defense was viable
under state law.2 2 2 Focusing on the Connecticut Dramshop Act, 223 the Pas-
si nicourt noted that the law's purpose was "to protect the public at large
from tortious conduct committed by an intoxicated person who was served
intoxicating liquor by a tavern owner while in an intoxicated state."' 224 The
Passziicourt then reasoned that the act reflected a legislative determination
that a vendor of alcohol should bear the loss for damages to others as a result
of unlawful sales 2 25 Accordingly, in light of the purposes of the statute and
under a plain reading of its provisions,226 the Connecticut court concluded
that the participation or complicity of the plaintiff was not a viable
defense.2
2 7
covery since the Connecticut Dramshop Act was intended to protect only innocent
third parties, not those who participated in the consumption of alcohol by intoxi-
cated persons. Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 443.
222. Id at __, 467 A.2d at 443. The Passini court acknowledged that no Con-
necticut Supreme Court decisions had determined whether participation was a de-
fense to a dramshop action; however, it noted that a majority of superior court
decisions had allowed the defense. Id. (citing Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp.
193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1962) (one who actively procures the intoxication of
another who commits a tortious act may not recover from the bar owner)).
223. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). The Connecticut Dram-
shop Act states in part as follows: "If any person, by himself or his agent, sells any
alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person, and such purchaser, in consequence of such
intoxication, thereafter injures the person or property of another, such seller shall pay
just damages to the person injured . . . ." Id.
224. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 443 (citing Sanders v. Officers' Club of
Conn., Inc., 35 Conn. Supp. 91, 397 A.2d 122 (Super. Ct. 1978); Cookinham v. Sulli-
van, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1962)). The Passinicourt declared
that third persons who accompany an intoxicated patron in his consumption of alco-
hol are members of the public at large and are thus protected parties within the
meaning of the statute. Id at -, 467 A.2d at 444.
225. Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 444. To achieve this goal, strict liability is imposed
on vendors who violate the provisions of the dramshop act. Id. See note 220 supra.
The Passim" court, finding that the legislature had made such a determination in or-
der to deter vendors from selling liquor to those who are intoxicated, stated that "[t]o
allow a defense of 'participation' by a vendor would defeat by judicial amendment
this legislative purpose in enacting the statute." 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at
444.
226. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 444. The Connecticut Supreme Court
stated that a plain reading of the dramshop act indicated no intention to limit recov-
ery to "innocent" third parties. Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 445. Accordingly, the Passini
court ruled that under Connecticut law the judiciary is not vested with the discretion
to substitute its preferences for those expressed in the legislation. Id. at -, 467 A.2d
at 444 (citing Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 410 A.2d 475 (1979); Galullo v.
Waterbury, 175 Conn. 182, 397 A.2d 103 (1978)).
227. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 445. The Passinicourt noted that those
jurisdictions that recognize a participation defense base their conclusion on the ra-
tionale that the participant is partially responsible for the intoxication of the other
and therefore should not be entitled to relief. Id. at __, 467 A.2d at 444. The Passhi
court responded to this contention by arguing that
[tjhis rationale fails to recognize that the participant would not be able to
"participate" in the consumption of alcohol with the intoxicated person
without the vendor selling him or her the alcohol being consumed. The
1164 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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c. Assumption of the Risk
The third defense available to a vendor being sued under a dramshop
act is assumption of the risk. Under general tort principles, assumption of
the risk is asserted where the plaintiff has voluntarily encountered a known
hazard. 228 Where available, its effect is to bar any recovery by the plain-
tiff.229 Because of its harsh impact on plaintiffs, however, the doctrine has
generally been abrogated, though the reasonableness of the plaintiff's con-
duct in assuming a risk may alter the recovery in jurisdictions with compara-
tive fault principles. 230 Nevertheless, in those jurisdictions that continue to
recognize assumption of the risk as a viable defense, it may be available to
defendants in a dramshop action.
In Berge v. Harrs,23 ' the Iowa Supreme Court noted that where the par-
ticular facts of the case might support a finding of assumption of the risk, the
question should be submitted to the jury.2 32 Although the Iowa Dramshop
Act imposed strict liability on vendors, the Berge court determined that it did
not thereby preclude a defendant from raising plaintiff's assumption of the
risk as a defense.23 3 The court found that the application of the defense
legislature has placed the onus on the vendor for selling alcohol to intoxi-
cated persons, not on any participant in the consumption of the alcohol.
Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 444-45. As a result, the court found that the defense of complic-
ity would defeat the public policy determination of the state legislature and the clear
expression of legislative intent reflected in the express language of the dramshop act.
Id. at __, 467 A.2d at 445.
228. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 68, at 480-92. As Prosser and
Keeton articulate, "assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given
his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him,
and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant
is to do or leave undone." Id. § 68, at 480 (footnote omitted).
229. Id. When one assumes a known risk, he relieves the defendant of all legal
duty. Id.
230. Id. § 68, at 493-98. Other arguments against allowing assumption of the
risk as a defense are that it accomplishes no purpose not served by other defenses and
that it "adds only duplication leading to confusion." Id.
231. 170 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1969). In Berge, the plaintiff sued for injuries that
she suffered while riding as a passenger in a car driven by the defendant Harris. Id.
at 622. At the time of the accident, Harris was intoxicated; he had been drinking at a
dance at the codefendant University Athletic Club, an establishment licensed to sell
liquor. d. at 623. The plaintiffs claim against the licensee-club was based on the
Iowa Dramshop Act. 170 N.W.2d at 622. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949)
(current version as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984)). For
the text of § 129.2, see note 122 supra. Evidence adduced at trial showed that the
plaintiff was aware that Harris had been drinking and that, in spite of her hesitation
to do so, she consented to ride in his car. 170 N.W.2d at 624. On these facts, the trial
judge directed a verdict in favor of defendants maintaining that plaintiff had as-
sumed the risk as a matter of law. Id. at 622.
232. 170 N.W.2d at 625. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the trial court's
finding of assumption of the risk as a matter of law. Id.
233. Id. at 627 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.5, at
804 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1965)). The Berge court
adopted the reasoning of Dean Prosser that assumption of the risk is a form of con-
tributory negligence that is governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff him-
1983-84] COMMENT 1165
47
Lang and McGrath: Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When One for the Road
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
would not interfere with the purpose of the act, which was "to fulfill a need
for discipline in the traffic of liquor and to provide a remedy for evils and
dangers which flow from such traffic,"'234 but rather would serve this pur-
pose. Accordingly, the Berge court permitted the dramshop defendant to
raise assumption of the risk as a defense.
235
In contrast to Berge, some courts have refused to allow defendants to
raise the plaintiff's assumption of the risk as a bar to recovery. 236 As the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in Passiniv. Decker,2 37 such a defense "is
not applicable to a statutory violation when the statute was enacted to create
an obligation to the public at large."'238 In the words of Dean Prosser, dram-
shop acts are frequently enacted for the protection of the general public such
that "the obligation and the right so created are public ones, which it is not
within the power of any private individual to waive."'239 Essentially, then,
courts disallowing the defense of assumption of the risk have determined that
the fundamental purpose of the dramshop acts would be defeated if plain-
tiffs were permitted to assume the risk and to waive the statutory cause of
action.2
40
self. Id. at 627 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 67, at 454
(4th ed. 1971)). Thus, assumption of the risk will bar recovery in an action in strict
liability even though plaintiff's ordinary negligence will not. d. at 627 (citing W.
PROSSER, supra, § 67, at 454).
234. Id. at 626 (quoting Osinger v. Christian, 43 Ill. App. 2d 480, 485, 193
N.E.2d 872, 875 (1963)). The Bergecourt stated that one of the goals of the dramshop
act was to protect against injuries caused by an intoxicated person. Id. at 626. In
conclusion, the Berge court reasoned that if the defense were unavailable, the result
would be to enhance the evils sought to be avoided since the plaintiff would effec-
tively not be responsible for her own actions. Id. The Iowa court argued that the
purposes of the act would not be fulfilled if the plaintiff could maintain a cause of
action in spite of her voluntary submission to the danger of riding with an intoxi-
cated person. Id. Such conduct would expose the plaintiff to the very hazard against
which the dramshop act sought to protect. Id.
235. Id at 627.
236. See, e.g., Passini v. Decker, 39 Conn. Supp. 20, 467 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct.
1983). Cf Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983) (questions of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are left to the discretion of the
jury). For a discussion of Passini see notes 220-27 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of Brannigan, see notes 287-89 and accompanying text 1hfra (discussing
defense of excuse in an action based upon violation of the liquor laws).
237. 39 Conn. Supp. 20, 467 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. 1983). For the facts of Passini,
see note 220 supra.
238. 39 Conn. Supp. at __, 467 A.2d at 445 (citing L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117
Conn. 347, 168 A. 8 (1933); Casey v. Atwater, 22 Conn. Supp. 225, 167 A.2d 250
(Super. Ct. 1960)). The Passini'court ruled that the Connecticut Dramshop Act was
exactly that type of statute which was enacted for the protection of the public at
large. 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 445.
239. W. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 68, at 493. Assumption of the
risk is usually not a defense in actions based upon violation of such public protection
statutes. Id. § 68, at 492.
240. d. § 68, at 492. Cf Passith' 39 Conn. Supp. at -, 467 A.2d at 444 (assert-
ing a similar argument in precluding the defense of contributory negligence). For a
discussion of this aspect of Passini, see notes 223-27 and accompanying text supra.
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d. Statutory Defenses
Frequently, the strongest protection for vendors in an action based upon
the violation of a dramshop act lies within the particular act itself. As noted
earlier, dramshop acts often narrowly define the class or classes of plaintiffs
entitled to recovery, usually excluding the intoxicated patron. 24 1 A number
of these acts also restrict the conduct of the vendor that may lead to liability,
providing a cause of action only if the seller served alcohol to a minor, an
obviously intoxicated person or a "blacklisted" drunkard.
242
In addition to these prerequisites, some legislatures have established
statutory defenses to a vendor's dramshop act liability. For example, five
states, Connecticut, 24 3 Illinois,244 Iowa,245 Michigan 246 and North Caro-
lina, 247 have set forth particular limitation periods or notice requirements
applicable to dramshop suits. 248 Under the Connecticut Dramshop Act,
plaintiffs
shall give written notice to [defendant] seller within sixty days of
the occurrence of such injury to person or property of his or their
intention to bring an action under this section . . . . Such notice
shall specify the time, the date and the person to whom such sale
was made, the name and address of the person injured . . . , and
the time, date and place where the injury to person or property
occurred. 2
49
The purpose of this notice requirement, and others like it, is to enable a
prospective defendant to preserve and acquire his evidence. 2 50 Failure to
241. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (creating cause of
action in favor of "another" injured by an intoxicated person). For the relevant text
of § 30-102, see note 223 supra. For a general discussion of the classes of persons
protected by dramshop legislation, see notes 32-45 & 123-29 and accompanying text
supra.
242. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (liability imposed
only upon vendor who serves intoxicated person); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1983)
(liability imposed only upon vendor who serves an underaged person); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982) (liability imposed only upon vendor who serves
"black-listed" person).
243. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). For the relevant text of
the Connecticut act, see text accompanying note 223 supra.
244. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (one-year
statute of limitations).
245. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.92-.93 (West Supp. 1984) (six-month written
notice of claim required).
246. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22(5) (West Supp. 1984) (two-year stat-
ute of limitations).
247. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126 (1983) (one-year statute of limitations).
248. For further discussion of these time requirements in dramshop actions, see
notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
249. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975).
250. See Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964) (purpose of notice require-
ment is to enable a prospective defendant to begin marshalling his evidence while
memories are still fresh); Thompson v. Bristol Lodge No. 712, 31 Conn. Supp. 405,
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notify the vendor under these provisions bars the plaintiffs right to sue.2 5 1
Furthermore, the Connecticut, Illinois and North Carolina statutes each
provide for a special one-year limitation period within which a plaintiff must
institute an action for violation of the respective dramshop acts.
252
2. Defenses to Actions Based Upon Kiolation of an Alcohohc Beverage Control Act
a. Contributory/Comparative Negligence
Jurisdictions that have allowed a civil cause of action based upon the
violation of a state alcoholic beverage control act have held that such an
offense constitutes either evidence of negligence or negligence per se.253 Be-
cause the cause of action is grounded in negligence, the common law de-
fenses to a negligence claim are available, including contributory
negligence.
254
Ohio, for example, has followed the general rule that contributory neg-
ligence may be a defense to a cause of action based upon violation of an
alcoholic beverage control act.2 55 In Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc.,2 56 the
372 A.2d 985 (C.P. 1974) (the interests of the defendant in own self-defense are not
reasonably protected if plaintiff fails to satisfy notice requirement).
251. See, e.g., Saur v. Tobin, 23 Conn. Supp. 104, 177 A.2d 225 (Super. Ct. 1961)
(satisfaction of notice requirement is condition precedent to maintaining a cause of
action under the Connecticut Dramshop Act).
252. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); 11.1.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 135-6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126 (1983) (each pro-
viding one-year statute of limitations for actions brought under dramshop act).
253. For cases holding that violations of an alcoholic beverage control act con-
stitute evidence of negligence in a civil action, see note 155 supra. For cases holding
that violations of an alcoholic beverage control act constitute negligence per se, see
note 156 supra.
254. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 36, at 229-31.
255. See Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 4 Ohio App. 3d 98, 446 N.E.2d 848
(1982). For a discussion of Tome, see notes 256-61 and accompanying text 1nfra. For
other cases following the general rule that the court may consider the negligence of
plaintiff in an action based on defendant's violation of an alcoholic beverage control
act, see, e.g., Parett v. Lebamoff, 408 N.E.2d 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Munford v.
Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Sampson v. W.F. Enters., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor Temple Ass'n, 179 Mont. 145, 586
P.2d 712 (1978); Kemock v. Mark II, 62 Ohio App. 2d 103, 404 N.E.2d 766 (1978);
Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99
Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, modi[ied, - Wash. 2d -, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983).
See also Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., - Pa. __, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (com-
parative negligence per se for violation of criminal code). For a discussion of defend-
ant's liability in Congini, see notes 177-78 and accompanying text supra.
256. 4 Ohio App. 3d 98, 446 N.E.2d 848 (1982). In Tome, a tavernkeeper was
sued by two patrons, including Tome, who were injured while Tome was driving in
an intoxicated condition. Id. at 99-100, 446 N.E.2d at 849-50. At the time of the
incident, Tome was two and one-half months short of being twenty-one years of age.
Id. at 99, 446 N.E.2d at 850. The defendant was therefore found negligent per se for
serving an underaged person in violation of the Ohio Alcoholic Beverage Act. Id. at
103, 446 N.E.2d at 853. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.22(A), (B), (E) (Page
1982) (making it unlawful to serve persons under twenty-one). Defendant moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' action was barred by their
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Ohio Court of Appeals acknowledged that contributory negligence normally
can be invoked even though the defendant is negligent per se.25 7 Referring
to the Second Restatement of Torts258 for further guidance, the Tome court
concluded that since the alcoholic beverage control act was not designed to
place the entire responsibility on vendors for the harm that may result from
a patron's intoxication, 259 the defendant could assert the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence as a defense.26 The Tome court further noted, however, that
where the vendor is willful and wanton in his violation of the act, the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a bar.
261
An exception to the appropriateness of the contributory negligence de-
fense arises where the purpose of the statute is to protect a class of persons
who otherwise would be unable to protect themselves.2 62 For example, in
Chausse v. Southland Corp. ,263 the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. 4 Ohio App. 3d at 99, 446
N.E.2d at 850. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed. Id.
257. 4 Ohio App. 3d at 103, 446 N.E.3d at 853.
258. Id. at 104, 446 N.E.2d at 854 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 483 (1965)). The Restatement provides: "The plaintiffs contributory negligence
bars his recovery for the negligence of the defendant consisting of the violation of a
statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such
harm as has occurred upon the defendant." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 483 (1965).
259. 4 Ohio App. 3d at 104, 446 N.E.2d at 854. The court found evidence of the
legislative intent not to place the full responsibility on the vendor in § 4301.63 and
§ 4301.632 of the Ohio Liquor Control Law, which make it unlawful for persons
under twenty-one to order, purchase or consume liquor. 4 Ohio App. 3d at 104, 446
N.E.2d at 854 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.63, .632 (Page 1982)). The
court stated that by violating these provisions, Tome was negligent per se. Id. The
court also noted that the Ohio legislature had provided by statute that vendors are
civilly liable only for serving persons "blacklisted" by the Department of Liquor Con-
trol, and Tome had not been blacklisted. Id. (citing OHiO REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4399.01 (Page 1982)). Based on these considerations, the Tome court concluded
that the legislature had not intended that sellers be liable for sales to any and all
intoxicated persons. Id.
260. Id. at 98-99, 446 N.E.2d at 849 (syllabus by the court).
261. Id. at 104, 446 N.E.2d at 854 (citing Kellerman v. J.S. Durig Co., 176 Ohio
St. 320, 199 N.E.2d 562 (1964)). However, such behavior by the defendant does not
preclude a defense of assumption of the risk. Id. (citing Wever v. Hicks, 11 Ohio St.
2d 230, 228 N.E.2d 315 (1967)).
262. As Prosser and Keeton have pointed out, there are certain types of statutes,
"such as child labor acts, those prohibiting the sale of dangerous articles such as
firearms to minors, . . . which have been construed as intended to place the entire
responsibility upon the defendant, and to protect the particular class of plaintiffs
against their own negligence." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 65, at 461
(footnotes omitted). In these cases, the purpose of the statute itself would be defeated
if contributory negligence were available as a defense. Id. at 461-62. For an example
of this rationale, see notes 263-67 and accompanying text infra.
263. 400 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 404 So. 2d 278, cert. denied, 404
So. 2d 497, cert. denied, 404 So. 2d 498 (La. 1981). Plaintiffs in Chausse were minor
passengers injured in a car driven by an intoxicated youth. Id. at 1201. The defend-
ant seller had been found liable for selling alcohol to minors in violation of the Loui-
siana liquor control laws. Id. at 1201-02. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91,
26:88(1), :285(1) (West 1975). The trial court denied recovery to the plaintiffs, how-
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contributory negligence of the plaintiff could not be asserted to bar the
plaintiff's claim. 264 In reaching this result, the court accepted the plaintiff's
argument that "where the purpose of a statute is to protect the minor against
the risk of his own negligence . ..the general rule is that the minor's con-
tributory negligence . . . will not defeat recovery for his injury or death, the
very risk and harm the statute was designed to prevent. '265 In light of the
legislature's determination that minors should be protected from the poten-
tial harm of their own intoxication,266 the Chausse court concluded that any
contributory negligence of the minor should not be permitted as a
defense.
2 6 7
b. Willful and Wanton Misconduct of Plaintiff
Although many states have abrogated the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence in favor of some form of comparative negligence, 268 some still hold
that a plaintiff's conduct will bar recovery completely if it rises to a level of
willful and wanton misconduct.269 This theory has been applied by the Cal-
ever, because of their own affirmative acts of negligence in drinking and driving with
one known to be intoxicated. 400 So. 2d at 1202.
264. 400 So. 2d at 1203. For other cases holding that contributory negligence is
not a defense for violation of an alcoholic beverage control act, see, e.g., Soronen v.
Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Rhyner v. Madden, 188
N.J. Super. 544, 457 A.2d 1243 (Law Div. 1982); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa.
265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648
(1958).
265. 400 So. 2d at 1202 (citing Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978)).
266. Id. at 1203. The Chausse court held that the alcoholic beverage control laws
reflected a legislative intent to keep alcohol out of the hands of minors because of
their perceived inability to handle it safely. Id. The act was designed to protect
against death and injury that could foreseeably arise as a result of a minor's intoxica-
tion. Id.
267. Id. The Chausse court quoted Dean Prosser's statement that "the object of
the statute itself would be defeated if the plaintiff's fault were a defense . . . ." Id.
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 65, at 426 (4th ed.
1971)). Defendant seller therefore was held liable for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1203.
According to the dissent, recovery should have been precluded since the plaintiff
knowingly rode with a group of young people who had drunk excessive amounts of
alcohol and since Louisiana did not have a dramshop statute. Id at 1204-05 (Ed-
wards, J., dissenting).
268. For a thorough analysis of the development of comparative negligence in
the United States, see Comment, Comparative Neghgence and Strict Products Liabi't,:
Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Go?, 29 Vim._ L. REv. 695 (1984).
269. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975). In Li the California court stated:
Finally there is the problem of the treatment of willful misconduct
under a system of comparative negligence. . . . The thought is that the
difference between willful and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence
is one of kind rather than degree in that the former involves conduct of an
entirely different order, and under this conception it might well be urged
that comparative negligence concepts should have no application when one
of the parties has been guilty of willful and wanton misconduct.
Id. at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (citation and footnotes omitted).
Prosser and Keeton have defined willful and wanton misconduct to include con-
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ifornia courts on several occasions.
2 70
For example, in Kind v. Kauffman,2 7 1 an intermediate California court
ruled that a patron who knowingly drinks to a point of intoxication is guilty
of willful and wanton misconduct. 27 2 Even though the plaintiff may be
within the class of persons sought to be protected by the California liquor
laws,2 7 3 the Kindl court stated that administrative, moral and socioeconomic
factors militate against allowing the voluntarily intoxicated patron to re-
cover for his own injuries. 2 7 4 The Kind court thus concluded that a civil
duct of an unreasonable character done in disregard of a known or obvious risk,
usually accompanied by an indifference to highly probable consequences. PROSSER
ANI) KEETON, supra note 22, § 34 at 213.
270. See Trenier v, California Inv. & Dev. Corp., 105 Cal. App. 3d 44, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (1980) (plaintiff who imbibed 27 ounces of Jack Daniels bourbon and 4
ounces of tequila in less than two hours, and thereafter attempted to drive, was found
to have engaged in willful and wanton misconduct and was therefore denied recovery
in suit against commercial and noncommercial suppliers of alcohol); Sissle v. Stefe-
noni, 88 Cal. App. 3d 633, 152 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1979) (decedent's violation of state law
prohibiting drunken driving constituted willful and wanton misconduct barring ac-
tion against bartender); Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1976) (patron who injured himself in automobile accident after becoming intoxi-
cated guilty of willful and wanton misconduct barring recovery). For a discussion of
Kind, see notes 271-75 and accompanying text infra.
271. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976). In Kind, the plaintiff sued
the tavern owner, who had served him alcohol while the plaintiff was obviously in-
toxicated, for injuries he subsequently incurred in an automobile collision. Id. at 847,
129 Cal. Rptr. at 604. Defendant's conduct was in violation of a California statute.
Id. at 847, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 604. See CA.. Bus. & PROF. ConE § 25602 (West Supp.
1978) (as amended).
272. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The Kdl court argued that
before a patron begins drinking, he is aware of the intoxicating effects of alcohol. Id.
The Ktnd court maintained that when a patron continues to drink even though he
knows that excessive drinking may render him a danger to others, he is guilty of
wanton and willful misconduct. Id. The court noted parenthetically, however, that
minors and alcoholics may not be guilty of such willful and wanton misconduct given
their respective incompetencies. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
273. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The Ktidt court noted that the California
Supreme Court had construed the statutory prohibition against serving intoxicated
persons as designed to protect "members of the general public from injuries . . .
resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor." Id. (quoting Vesely v. Sager,
5 Cal. 3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971)). Although
himself intoxicated, plaintiff as a customer in defendant's bar was a member of the
protected general public. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
274. Id. at 855-59, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609-12. Although maintaining that the
jury's difficulty in finding causation was not sufficient to bar plaintiff's recovery, the
Ktndt court did voice its apprehension with allowing the jury to speculate as to which
drink served by the bartender proximately caused plaintiffis injuries, particularly in
light of the fact that violation of the statute required that the plaintiff already be
intoxicated. Id. at 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10. From a moral standpoint, the Kd
court asserted that an individual's intoxication reflected a conscious, self-indulgent
act that the law should not reward through monetary recovery in a civil action. Id. at
855-56, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610. Finally, the court felt that socioeconomic considera-
tions militated against a successful cause of action. Id. at 858, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
Recognizing the large quantity of statistical evidence of injuries caused by drunken
driving, the Kind court stated that everything reasonably conceivable should be done
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cause of action for a vendor's breach of the state's liquor control laws did not
lie on behalf of the drunken party.27
5
c. Participation or Complicity
Although the defense of participation or complicity by the plaintiff has
been recognized in an action based upon a dramshop act, 276 the question of
whether the defense is available in an action based upon the violation of an
alcoholic beverage control act is still open to debate.
2 77
In Morris v. Farley Enterprises,278 the Alaska Supreme Court was
presented with the issue of whether the plaintiffs' decedents' participation in
the intoxication of another minor would bar their recovery in an action for
wrongful death.2 79 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was negligent
per se for serving a minor in violation of Alaska statute.280 The Morris court
stated that its pupose in adopting the liquor laws as a standard of care was to
advance the laws' underlying policies. 28 1 According to the court, one of
these policies was to protect minors from the effects of alcohol since minors
to discourage such activity, including holding persons responsible for their own intox-
ication. Id.
275. Id. at 860, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court distinguished between plain-
tiffs who are merely negligent and those who engage in wanton and willful miscon-
duct. Id. at 859-60, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13. In the former instance, the court stated
that the patron may be able to recover. Id. at 859, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (citing Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adopting
comparative negligence in place of contributory negligence)).
276. See McGough, supra note 21, at 454 (courts pay "verbal tribute" to the rule
that contributory negligence is not a defense to a dramshop action, while at the same
time allowing participation to bar recovery). For a discussion of participation as a
defense to a dramshop action, see notes 211-27 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of contributory negligence as a defense to a dramshop action, see notes
207-10 and accompanying text supra.
277. Compare Morris v. Farley Enters., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983) (complicity of
minor plaintiff is not a bar to minor's recovery in light of legislative intent underlying
alcoholic beverage control law) and Brookins v. Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547
(Tenn. 1981) (where minor plaintiff is involved, capacity and judgment to contribute
to another's intoxication is issue for the jury) with Miller v. City of Portland, 288 Or.
271, 604 P.2d 1261 (1980) (denying minor a cause of action based upon his own
conduct in purchasing alcohol).
278. 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983).
279. Id. at 170. In Moms', a seventeen-year-old minor had purchased a bottle of
tequila from the defendant's liquor store, sharing the alcohol with four minor com-
panions. Id. at 168. Subsequently the five youths were involved in an automobile
accident that killed two of them, including the plaintiffs' decedents who were passen-
gers in the car driven by one of the intoxicated minors. Id.
280. Id. Plaintiffs had based their action on defendant's violation of Alaska's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 04.15.020(a) (1980) (re-
pealed 1980) (prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors). The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. 661 P.2d at 168.
281. 661 P.2d at 171. For a general discussion of the use of statutory provisions
as establishing standards of conduct regarding the furnishing of alcohol, see notes 75-
95 & 151-84 and accompanying text supra.
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were presumptively unable to protect themselves. 282 Reasoning that to bar
recovery because of one of the minors' role in acquiring the liquor for an-
other would be contrary to the purpose of the statute,'2 8 3 the court held that
the plaintiffs' decedents' participation did not constitute a defense.
28 4
d. Excuse or Justification
Where the defendant's liability for furnishing alcohol is premised upon
his violation of an alcoholic beverage control act, he may also seek to defend
on the grounds of excuse or justification. 28 5 If available, this defense oper-
ates when the actor's conduct, although contrary to the liquor control law, is
reasonable under the circumstances.
28 6
For example, in Branngan v. Raybuck,28 7 the Arizona Supreme Court
found that "where a violation of the statutes pertaining to furnishing liquor
to those who are underage or already intoxicated is shown, negligence exists
as a matter of law, but under proper facts the jury may be allowed to find
that the violation was excusable. '288 The Brannigan court suggested that in-
stances of an excusable violation might exist where the minor appeared to be
of age and had presented identification to that effect, albeit false, or where
the conduct or demeanor of the patron was such that there was no reason to
believe him to be intoxicated.
2 9
282. 661 P.2d at 171.
283. Id. The Morris court noted further that as between the seller and the mi-
nor, it is the seller who bears responsibility for the transaction. Id. The fact that the
minor himself may have violated a statute in acquiring the alcohol is of no relevance
since the purpose of both laws was to prevent minors from acquiring liquor, not to
protect vendors. Id.
284. Id. The Morris court, however, expressly left open the issue of whether the
plaintiff's conduct could be considered as a partial defense under comparative negli-
gence principles. Id. at 171 n.7.
285. These defenses are not available in dramshop actions since vendors are
held strictly liable when they serve a customer in violation of the act's provisions. See
text accompanying note 22 supra.
286. See, e.g., Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983). For a
discussion of Brannzgan, see notes 287-89 and accompanying text supra.
287. 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983). In Brannigan, parents of minors killed
in an automobile accident brought suit against the operators of a tavern who had
unlawfully served the decedents. Id. at 514, 667 P.2d at 214. Plaintiffs asserted that
defendants were guilty of negligence per se for serving intoxicating beverages to mi-
nors contrary to state law. Id. at 517, 667 P.2d at 217. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-244(9) (West 1974).
288. 136 Ariz. at 518, 667 P.2d at 218. In response to defendants' argument that
unjust results would be reached if vendors in the future would be held liable even
when they exercised reasonable diligence, the Brannigan court noted that the prohibi-
tion against serving minors did not impose an absolute duty upon sellers. Id. at 517-
18, 667 P.2d at 217-18. Even if the legislature had imposed strict criminal liability on
vendors for improper serving of alcoholic beverages, the Arizona court stated that it
was free to excuse certain violations when the statute was used to define the standard
of care in a civil case. Id. at 518, 667 P.2d at 218.
289. Id. at 518, 667 P.2d at 218. The Brannigan court stated that unexcused
violations would continue to constitute negligence per se. Id. at 518 n. 1, 667 P.2d at
218 n.l. Since the trial court had granted summary judgment based upon the over-
1983-841 COMMENT 1173
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Some states have provided similar defenses by statute.290 Under the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code, 29 1 for instance, a defendant in a civil or criminal
proceeding may offer in his or her defense a statement signed by the pur-
chaser at the time of the sale attesting to his or her majority.292
3. Defenses to Actions Based Upon Common Law Negligence
In those jurisdictions that acknowledge a common law action against
suppliers of alcohol, 293 it would appear that there is no justification for cur-
tailing the defenses usually available at common law.294 Therefore, defend-
ants should be protected to some degree by allegations of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. Additionally, the defend-
ant may invoke the applicable statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's suit.
III. NONSUPPLIERS OF ALCOHOL LIABLE FOR DRUNKEN DRIVING
In addition to holding furnishers of alcohol liable for injuries inflicted as
a result of the guest's intoxication, courts have also held other persons civilly
accountable. The liability of nonsuppliers of liquor has generally been
founded on one of three theories: negligent entrustment; respondeat supe-
rior; or breach of a duty to control the drunken driver's conduct.
A. Negligent Entrustment
Under the theory of negligent entrustment, a plaintiff may recover
against the owner or person in control of an automobile for damages result-
ruled notion that the consumption of liquor rather than its serving could be the prox-
imate cause of injuries resulting from drunken driving, the court remanded the case
for trial on the merits. Id. at 521, 667 P.2d at 221 (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136
Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) (old common law rule abolished in Arizona)).
290. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-495(e) (Purdon 1969).
291. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 796 (Purdon 1969).
292. Id. § 4-495(e). The provision states as follows:
The signed statement in the possession of a licensee or an employe [sic]
of a State Liquor Store may be offered as a defense in all civil and criminal
prosecutions for serving a minor, and no penalty shall be imposed if the
Liquor Control Board or the courts are satisfied that the licensee or State
Liquor Store employe [sic] acted in good faith.
Id. The signed statement referenced in this subsection is required to be obtained
from any person whose age may be in question. Id. § 4-495(c).
293. For a discussion of cases imposing liability on vendors for willful and wan-
ton misconduct in the serving of alcoholic beverages, see notes 13-20 and accompany-
ing text supra. For a discussion of cases imposing liability on vendors for the negligent
serving of alcoholic beverages, see notes 96-103 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of cases imposing liability on social hosts for wanton and reck-
less conduct in the serving of alcoholic beverages, see notes 112-17 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of cases imposing liability on social hosts for the negligent
serving of alcoholic beverages, see notes 185-200 and accompanying text supra.
294. Those state appellate courts that have recognized a negligence-based cause
of action generally have not addressed the issue of available defenses. Because these
courts have merely applied traditional tort concepts rather than creating a "new"
tort, there is no reason to doubt that equally traditional defenses remain viable.
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ing from the drunken driving of a third person based on the former's negli-
gence in relinquishing control of the automobile to someone incompetent to
drive.29 5 Liability may be imposed on the defendant either for entrusting
the automobile to a person who is intoxicated at the time of entrustment, or
for entrusting it to someone who may reasonably be expected to become
intoxicated. 296 The entrustment under these circumstances is itself negligent
since a reasonable person exercising ordinary care would foresee the risk of
harm to the motoring public presented by the suspect driver and thus would
refuse to let that person drive the car.
2 97
In order to bring a cause of action under a negligent entrustment the-
ory, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the automobile was entrusted
by the owner or person in control;298 (2) the entrustee was an incompetent
295. The general rule at common law is that an owner of an automobile is not
liable when he gives his permission for another individual to use his car and that
individual is subsequently negligent. Stafford v. Far-Go Van Lines, 485 S.W.2d 481,
485 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (citing 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 573
(1980)). There are two situations where exceptions to this rule are recognized: where
the automobile has been negligently entrusted to an unsuitable driver, and where the
circumstances are such that the principles of respondeat superior apply. Id. at 486.
Prosser and Keeton describe liability under a negligent entrustment theory as
follows: "Where the owner of the car entrusts it to an unsuitable driver, he is held
liable for the negligence of the driver, upon the basis of his own negligence in not
preventing it." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 73, at 523 (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the respondeat superior doctrine in holding nonsuppliers of
alcohol liable for the drunken driving of others, see notes 304-15 and accompanying
text zhfra.
296. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 104, at 717. Negligent entrust-
ment need not be based on the entrustee's intoxication. As summarized by the Second
Restatement of Torts:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the
use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely
because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner in-
volving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the
supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to
liability for physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
297. The risk of harm from negligent entrustment is similar to that which arises
when one serves alcoholic beverages negligently. The Supreme Court of Idaho recog-
nized this connection, in Alegria v. Payonk, in justifying its recognition of the latter
tort. See Alegria, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). In Alegria, two vendors were
sued for negligently serving beer to a minor. The court stated:
The "negligent entrustment" tort approved in Kinney is a recognition of
the risk of injury which exists when two ingredients are combined; the auto-
mobile and an incompetent or incapacitated driver. In Ktney, we said that
a party may be liable for providing an intoxicated individual with an auto-
mobile. The issue in this case is the converse, i.e., should a party ever be
held liable for providing the driver of an automobile with intoxicants.
Id. at 620, 619 P.2d at 138 (citing Kinny v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 408 P.2d 1234
(1973)).
298. See Hendershott v. Rhein, 61 Mich. App. 83, 232 N.W.2d 312 (1975) (in
negligent entrustment case, plaintiff must prove that motor vehicle driven with per-
mission and authority of owner); Gier v. Gleason, 189 Neb. 156, 201 N.W.2d 388
(1972) (defendant not liable for entrusting vehicle to farm hand who took vehicle
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driver; 299 (3) the owner or person in control had actual or constructive
knowledge at the time of the entrustment that the entrustee was or was to
become incompetent or unqualified to operate the vehicle;300 and (4) the
entrustment was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.30'
This theory is a useful device to provide the plaintiff with the opportu-
nity to recover in situations where the drunken driver himself cannot com-
pensate his victim but the owner of the car can. 30 2 The negligent
entrustment theory has been used, for example, to impose liability on an
employer who had reason to know of an employee's propensity to drive while
intoxicated, but nevertheless permitted the employee to use the employer's
vehicle. 30
3
from pasture where he was working and drove it while intoxicated). But see Alspach
v. McLaughlin, 144 Ind. App. 592, 247 N.E.2d 840 (1969) (jury could find that leav-
ing intoxicated person in automobile that could be started without key would
foreseeably result in his driving it).
299. See Hendershoit, 61 Mich. App. at 89, 232 N.W.2d at 315 (1975). Incompe-
tency due to consumption of alcoholic beverages is defined by state statutes, which
may proscribe driving "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" or "while in
an intoxicated condition" or may use other language. See 7A AM. JUR. 2DAutomobiles
andHighway Traffic § 302 (1980). The driver's intoxication will most likely be proved
through the chemical analysis of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine. Id. § 305.
300. See Hendershott v. Rhein, 61 Mich. App. 83, 232 N.W.2d 312 (1975)
(plaintiff must show that defendant knew that entrustee was incompetent or that he
had knowledge of facts and circumstances as would imply knowledge of incompe-
tency); Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922) (plaintiff must show
defendant knew or had reason to believe entrustees were incompetent or reckless per-
sons to drive car). But see Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969)
(knowledge of entrustee's incompetency must be actual rather than constructive, but
actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence); Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert,
- Ind. App. -, 431 N.E.2d 534 (1982) (defendant must have actual knowledge of
entrustee's incompetency).
301. In a successful negligent entrustment case, the plaintiff's injury is found to
be caused by the combined negligence of the owner and the driver; the owner in
allowing an unsuitable driver to operate the automobile, and the driver in operating
it negligently. See Mitchell, 119 Wash. at 552, 206 P. at 9. The establishment of
proximate cause in such a situation requires a finding that the owner's entrustment
was a substantial factor in causing the injury complained of, as well as a determina-
tion that the harm was foreseeable. See Connolly v. Bressler, 283 Or. 265, 268, 583
P.2d 540, 542 (1978). "Foreseeability" of harm refers to whether the actual harm
caused was of the general kind to be anticipated from the negligent act. Id. See also
Alspach v. McLaughlin, 247 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (test of proximate
cause is probability of injurious consequences fairly to be anticipated from negligent
conduct). However, the particular manner of the injury in a given case need not be
anticipated. In Connolly, the court held that turning over a vehicle to a group of
intoxicated youths can be the proximate cause of injuries received in a wreck, even if
no one could have anticipated the bizarre manner in which the accident actually
occurred. 283 Or. at 268, 583 P.2d at 542.
302. For a discussion of the reasons for seeking recovery from the owner of an
automobile in addition to the driver, see note 304 ihfra.
303. See Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969) (jury could
reasonably find that employer was negligent in entrusting vehicle to employee if it
found that employer knew of employee's excessive use of intoxicants); Winzer v.
Lewis, 251 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App.) (employer liable for negligent entrustment for
1176 [Vol. 29: p. 1119
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A second theory under which nonsuppliers of alcohol can be held liable
for the consequences of the drunken driving of others is the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. 30 4 Under this doctrine the defendant, because of his rela-
tionship with the tortfeasor, is liable for that person's negligence even though
the defendant himself was not necessarily negligent. 30 5 For example, in Har-
allowing employee to use vehicle knowing that employee had no driver's license and
that it had been revoked for drunken driving; in addition, violation of statute prohib-
iting employers from hiring as drivers persons without driver's licenses could be prox-
imate cause of injuries resulting from employee's drunken driving), cert. denied, 259
La. 934, 253 So. 2d 379 (1971). Cf Gier v. Gleason, 189 Neb. 156, 201 N.W.2d 388
(1972) (employer not liable under negligent entrustment theory since employee not
authorized to drive employer's vehicle on public highways for any purpose).
Another situation in which corporate defendants could be liable for negligent
entrustment is in the rental of automobiles and other vehicles. Seegenerall Annot., 78
A.L.R. 3D 1170, §§ 6, 8(a) (1977) (discussing liability of rental agencies for entrusting
vehicles to intoxicated persons).
304. The automobile has been responsible for an enlargement of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 73, at 525. The need
for expanding the doctrine came from the frequency of traffic accidents and the in-
ability of the driver to compensate the injured person. Id.
The owners of vehicles are one group whose liability has been enlarged under
respondeat superior, and Prosser and Keeton give three reasons for this increased
liability in the absence of fault: (1) since automobiles are expensive, it is likely that
one who can afford to buy one has more financial resources than a driver; (2) since
owners are the persons most likely to carry insurance on the automobile, they can
spread the cost of accidents among themselves through insurance; and (3) since own-
ers of automobiles enjoy the privilege of using the public highways constructed at
great expense to the taxpayer, they should be accountable for damages resulting from
the use of their vehicles. Id.
The above reasoning also supports holding an owner liable for negligently en-
trusting his automobile to an unsuitable driver, with the owner's own negligence as
an additional justification for imposing liability on him. For a discussion of negligent
entrustment as it relates to drunken driving, see notes 295-303 and accompanying
text supra.
305. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 69, at 499. Respondeat superior is
the only theory discussed in this comment whereby a defendant who has committed
no tortious conduct is held liable for the consequences of the drunken driving of
another. Relationships sufficient to make the doctrine relevant in a drunken driving
case fall into five general categories. The first is the master/servant relationship,
whereby an employer is responsible for the torts committed by his employee within
the scope of his employment. See id. § 70, at 501. The test used in the majority of
jurisdictions to determine if an employee is acting in the scope of his employment is
(1) whether his conduct is "benefitting" the employer's business, and (2) whether the
employer has the "right to control" his conduct. See Comment, Employer Liabiltlyfor a
Drunken Employee's Actons Following an Offce Party. A Cause of Aclion Under Respondeat
Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 107, 122-23 (1982). A minority of jurisdictions has
adopted an "enterprise" approach in lieu of the "right to control" prong. Id. Califor-
nia, for example, deems an act to be within the scope of employment if it benefits the
employer's business and is sufficiently connected with the enterprise, i.e., whether the
act of the employee is not so unusual or startling that it would be unfair to include
the loss resulting from it in the employer's expenses of doing business. Id.
A second basis for invoking vicarious liability is the "joint enterprise" doctrine,
which makes passengers liable for the tortious conduct of the driver. See PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 72, at 517. This doctrine has been said to consist of
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ris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 30 6 an employer held a Christmas party at the com-
pany's plant during working hours, paying the employees' salaries as though
they were working. 30 7 Afterwards, an intoxicated employee caused an auto-
mobile accident on his way home that resulted in the death of one person
and injuries to two others. 308 The defendant employer's argument was two-
fold: (1) that California's "anti-dramshop" act precluded a cause of action
against nonvendors for the negligent serving of alcohol, 30 9 and (2) that re-
spondeat superior was inappropriate because the accident occurred while the
employee was on his way home. 310 The California Court of Appeals held
four elements: "(1) contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a community of interest,
(4) equal right to a voice, accompanied by an equal right of control." Id. § 72, at 518
(quoting Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash. 2d 347, 95 P.2d 1043 (1939)). Under this
theory, the central focus is whether there existed equality in the control of the vehicle.
In this respect, the jury may consider such factors as a common property interest in
the vehicle, the sharing of expenses of a trip, or alternating in the driving to deter-
mine whether the parties have agreed to share the management of the vehicle
equally. See id. § 72, at 521.
A third basis for the application of vicarious liability in the drunken driving
situation stems from statutes imposing liability upon owners for the negligence of
persons operating the owners' vehicles with the owners' permission. See 7A AM. JUR.
21) Automobi/es and Highway Traffic §§ 665-84 (1980). These statutes are a supplement
to the common law respondeat superior doctrine, and may be said to make one who
drives a vehicle with the owner's permission the latter's "agent" for purposes of vica-
rious liability despite the absence of an employer/employee or other relationship. Id.
§ 665. For a discussion of who is an "owner" under these statutes, see Annot., 74
A.L.R. 3D 739 (1976).
The fourth situation in which vicarious liability can be imposed exists when the
owner is present in the automobile and is deemed by the court to retain control over
the driver, and thus constitutes the principal or master while the driver is considered
his agent or servant. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 73, at 523. In order
to apply this theory, some courts require only the owner's presence in the vehicle,
while others require that the plaintiff show that the owner in fact retained some
control over his vehicle. Id. In the latter situation, the owner is really being held
liable for his own negligence in failing to exercise such control to prevent the driver's
negligence, and this view is analogous to a negligent entrustment theory.
Finally, the fifth basis for the imposition of vicarious liability is the so-called
"family purpose" or "family car" doctrine, whereby liability can be imposed upon
the owner of an automobile who makes it available to members of his household for
normal family activities. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 73, at 524-27.
"Normal family activities" can include driving for pleasure, but the scope of the
owner's consent is analyzed in a manner similar to the scope of employment under
respondeat superior. Id. The theory underlying this doctrine is that the owner has
made family purposes his "business" and accordingly the permitted driver is his "ser-
vant." Id. § 73, at 524. It should be noted, however, that in states that have statutes
imposing liability upon the owner of an automobile when it is used with his consent,
the family purpose doctrine is inappropriate. d. § 73, at 527.
306. 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1981).
307. Id. at 164, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
308. Id. at 159, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 453. The trial judge dismissed the case by
sustaining the defendant's demurrer. Id. at 158, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
309. Id. at 160, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 453. See CAl.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602
(West Supp. 1984). For the text and a discussion of this statute, see note 71 and
accompanying text supra.
310. 120 Cal. App. 3d at 160, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54. The defendant argued
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that even if the employer did not commit a tortious act in supplying the
employee with liquor, a jury could find that the employee had become intox-
icated during and within the scope of his employment if it found that the
party was a benefit to the employer 31 and that a foreseeable injury resulted
from this activity.3 12 In the event the jury made this finding, the court de-
termined that the employee's negligent operation of his automobile would be
imputed to the employer. 3 13
The Harris court justified its holding by pointing out that one goal of
vicarious liability was to hold liable the party who could best afford the cost
of liability either by raising prices or by obtaining liability insurance.3 1 4
Also, the court emphasized that it would be unjust to allow a company to
disavow responsibility for injuries resulting from risks incident to its doing
business. 3 15
that the "going and coming" rule, which exempts an employer from vicarious liabil-
ity for accidents occurring while his employee is commuting both to and from work,
should operate to bar the plaintiff's claim. Id at 160-61, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55.
311. Id. at 164, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456. The court said that a jury could infer that
the purpose of the party was to improve employer/employee relations, or to increase
employee morale and length of employment by the granting of a fringe benefit in the
form of a party, or to foster good relations among the employees by giving them the
chance to socialize. d But cf Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412,
199 N.E.2d 300 (1964) (to say that employer received pecuniary benefit from party of
employee association held on its premises is "far-fetched").
312. 120 Cal. App. 3d at 163, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456. The court defined "foresee-
able" to mean that "the employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it
would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among the other costs of the
employer's business." Id. (citing Rogers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608,
619, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (1975)). The court decided that a jury could find that
the employee's intoxication at the party was foreseeable since it could be inferred
that the employer intended that his employee attend the party because it was held
during work hours and the employee was paid to attend, and that the employer
intended that the employee consume alcoholic beverages since it furnished them to
him and allegedly encouraged him to drink large amounts. Id at 164, 174 Cal. Rptr.
at 456. As a result, the court further concluded that it would be foreseeable that the
employee would try to drive home and could get into an accident. Id at 165, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 457.
313. Id at 163, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456. In a footnote, the court stressed that any
liability imposed upon the employer in this case would not be based upon its own
negligence in furnishing liquor to its employee. Id at 165 n.7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 457
n.7. Rather, the Harris court said that the furnishing of alcohol by the employer
should be considered only in deciding whether the employee became intoxicated in
the scope of his employment for purposes of vicarious liability. Id.
314. Id at 163, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
315. Id at 163-64, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. See also Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694
F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983). In Chastain, an employer
held a Christmas party for its employees at its place of business during normal work-
ing hours. Id. at 959. An employee became intoxicated, left the party in his van, and
had an accident which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 959.
Applying North Carolina law but relying on Harris, the Fourth Circuit held that a
jury should determine whether the employee became intoxicated within the scope of
his employment by deciding whether the party was sufficiently related to the em-
ployer's business, i.e., whether the employer was promoting a commercial interest by
bettering its employees' working relationships. Id. at 960, 962. If it was determined
1983-84] 1179
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C. Common Law Duty to Control Conduct of Others
The third category of nonsuppliers of alcoholic beverages who have
been held liable for the injuries resulting from the drunken driving of an-
other consists of persons upon whom the common law imposes a duty to act.
The Second Restatement of Torts states that the law will impose such a duty
(1) upon a person who has a "special relation" with another that requires
him to control the other's conduct for the other's own protection or the pro-
tection of third persons, or (2) upon a person who has a "special relation"
with another that requires him to protect that person from the actions of a
third party.3t 6 This special relationship may have its source in an affirma-
tive act performed by the person charged with a duty to act further, in an
existing relationship between the parties, or in some combination of the two.
In the drunken driving context, most courts considering the issue have re-
fused to impose a duty upon a nonsupplier to control the conduct of the
intoxicated person, 3 17 or to impose a duty upon a supplier to control the
intoxicated person's conduct absent some unique relationship between the
parties.3 1
8
that the employee became intoxicated within the scope of his employment, the court
stated that the jury should then decide whether the employee was negligent in con-
suming so much liquor at the party, and whether this negligent intoxication contin-
ued until the time of the accident and was its proximate cause. Id. at 962. See also
Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal. App. 2d 777, 294 P.2d 733 (1956).
Despite Hars and Chastain, other courts may be unwilling to extend respondeat
superior liability to drunken driving cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co., 48 Il. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964). The Miller court's statement that it
is "at best, far-fetched" to say that an employer has a pecuniary interest in a party of
an employee association held on it premises is probably the more typical reaction. Id.
at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306. However, the plaintiffs in Miller were arguing that the
employer, the employees' association and various employee defendants were sellers
under the Illinois dramshop act. 48 11. App. 2d at 414, 199 N.E.2d at 302. Also, the
party in M/'ller was sponsored by the employees' association, and the employer did
not furnish anything served at the party. Id. at 414, 199 N.E.2d at 302.
For a discussion of the relationships justifying the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity, see note 305 supra. For a discussion of a proposed cause of action based on hold-
ing an employer vicariously liable when a party is held away from ordinary business
premises, see Comment, supra note 305, at 136-39.
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). While the general rule
is that no one has a duty to control the conduct of others, it is subject to exception.
The Restatement provides as follows:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to pre-
vent him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct,
or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
317. See, e.g., Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert,_ Ind. App. -, 431 N.E.2d 534 (1982)
(private citizen owes no duty to motoring public to detain intoxicated motorist who
enters premises, when that citizen has not served any alcohol to the motorist even
though he knows motorist will drive away while intoxicated).
318. See, e.g., Dwan v. Dixon, 216 Cal. App. 2d 260, 30 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963)
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However, some courts have found a duty to control the conduct of an-
other under certain circumstances. For example, responsibility for another's
drunken driving was imposed where an employer served large amounts of
alcoholic beverages to an underage employee at a Christmas party and then
induced him to drive home. 3 19  Similarly, in Leppke v. Segura,3 20 where
tavernkeepers refused to serve an intoxicated man but nevertheless "jump-
started" the man's car enabling him to drive, the Colorado Court of Appeals
ruled that the tavernkeepers were liable for injuries caused by the drunken
driver. 32 1 The court stated that a person "who does an affirmative act is
under a duty to others to exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect
them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act."
322
Further, the court said that a jury could find that the tavernkeepers gave the
drunken driver a mobility he otherwise lacked and then "set into motion a
force involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others."'323 In describing the
duty it was imposing, the court stressed that liability would be based on
performing an affirmative act-"jump-starting" the car of a person clearly
incompetent to operate it-as distinguished from cases where liability was
imposed for failing to stop a dangerous person from causing harm.
324
On the other hand, in Otis Engineertng Corp. v. Clark,325 the Supreme
Court of Texas analogized the duty to control a drunken driver to the duty
(social host not liable even though he allegedly put intoxicated person into car and
helped him drive away); Vale v. Yawarski, 78 Misc. 2d 522, 357 N.W.S.2d 791 (Sup.
Ct. 1974) (vendor not negligent in permitting patron from leaving even though she
knew or should have known he was not fit to drive safely).
319. See Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1968) (company held Christmas party, served minor to point of gross in-
toxication, placed him in automobile, and directed him to drive home; although no
liability for mere serving of liquor, extra facts justifying liability here are relationship
between parties and affirmative acts of employer).
Cf Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983) (employer could be
held liable when, after requiring employee to work twenty-seven hours, he sent him
out to drive home rather than providing rest or transportation for him; liability
would be imposed if jury found that this action created foreseeable unreasonable risk
of harm to others).
320. - Colo. App. __, 632 P.2d 1057 (1981).
321. Id. at __, 632 P.2d at 1058. The trial court had granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating that it was "unaware of any doc-
trine imposing a legal duty upon defendants . . . to plaintiffs merely by virtue of
having used their battery jumper cables to get [the] defendant [driver's] automobile
started." Id at __ 632 P.2d at 1059.
322. Id. at __ 632 P.2d at 1059 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 320 comment a (1965)). Prosser and Keeton note that liability is imposed in this
"misfeasance" situation because the defendant has created a new risk of harm and
consequently may be liable to "any person to whom harm may reasonably be antici-
pated as a result of the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond .... "PROS-
SER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 56, at 374 (footnote omitted).
323. - Colo. App. at __, 632 P.2d at 1059.
324. Id at __, 632 P.2d at 1059.
325. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
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to prevent a dangerous person from doing harm to others. 326 In Ots, an
employee of the defendant corporation became intoxicated by drinking dur-
ing his shift. 327 Despite his having knowledge of the employee's inability to
drive in his inebriated condition, the employer sent the employee home. 328
On his way, the employee was involved in an accident in which he and his
two passengers were killed.329
In remanding the case to the trial court, the Supreme Court of Texas
established a new duty for employers, ruling that "when, because of an em-
ployee's incapacity, an employer exercises control over the employee, the em-
ployer has a duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer
under the same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the employee
from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others. ' ' 33°1 The majority in
Otis cited "changing social standards and increasing complexities of human
relationships in today's society" as policy justification for establishing this
new duty. 33 1
326. Id. at 311. This duty to exercise control over a dangerous person is de-
scribed by the Restatement as follows:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him
from doing such harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
327. 668 S.W.2d at 308.
328. Id. The Otis court stated that, as a result, the supervisor knew that the
employee was not fit to drive safely when he left the plant. Id.
329. Id. The passengers' husbands sued Otis Engineering Corp. for negligently
sending the employee home while knowing that he was incapable of driving. Id The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that, as a
matter of law, they had no duty to restrain the employee nor to control his conduct
while he was off duty and off the premises. Clark v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 633 S.W.2d
538, 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), affd, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
330. 668 S.W.2d at 311. The Otis court relied upon other cases imposing a duty
to act. See id. at 310-11 (citing Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d
69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968) (when person having special relationship with drunken
minor employee induces the improper operation of automobile by voluntary action,
there exists duty to exercise ordinary care for protection of minor and general pub-
lic); Leppke v. Segura, - Colo. App. -, 632 P.2d 1057 (1981) (person doing affirma-
tive act under duty to others to exercise care of reasonable person to protect them
against unreasonable risk of harm to them coming out of act); Robertson v.
LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983) (jury could find that employer had duty to
guard against unreasonable harm that was the foreseeable result of employer's re-
quiring employee to work long hours and then sending him home in an exhausted
state)). For a discussion of the Leppke case, see notes 320-24 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the Brockett and Robertson cases, see note 319 supra.
331. 668 S.W.2d at 310. The Otis majority quoted from Dean Prosser, who has
urged the creation of new duties when changing social conditions call for it. Id.
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 327 (4th ed.
1971)).
In deciding whether to adopt a new duty, the Otis court stated that the "risk,
foreseeability, and likelihood of injury" should be weighed against the "social utility
of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury
and consequences of placing that burden on the employer." Id. at 309. However,
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Thus, despite traditional notions and case law that nonsuppliers owe no
having articulated these factors, the court never discussed how much weight should
be assigned to each of them, nor how they would balance.
The Ots court said that it should be up to the jury to decide whether the defend-
ant employer had breached his duty, and set forth certain factors for them to con-
sider in making the determination: the availability of a bed where the employee
could have rested; the possibility of calling the employee's wife; the possibility of
having another employee drive the inebriated employee home; the possibility of ter-
minating his employment rather than sending the employee home early; and the
foreseeable consequences of the employee's driving an automobile when he was so
extremely intoxicated. Id. at 311.
In a vehement dissent, Justice McGee criticized the imposition of a duty upon
the employer as being unsupported either by judicial precedent or public policy. Id.
at 319 (McGee, J., dissenting). Justice McGee distinguished the cases relied upon by
the majority. He argued that Leppke was inappropriate because it was not an em-
ployer-employee case, and because the affirmative acts taken by the defendants were
so significant as to be an indisputable assumption of duty, whereas the employer's act
in the Otis case was relatively insignificant. Id. at 314-15 (McGee, J., dissenting)
(citing Leppke v. Segura, - Colo. App. -, 632 P.2d 1057 (1981)). Justice McGee
urged that the Brockett case did not apply since, unlike Otis, it involved a minor, the
employer had served the alcoholic beverage to his employee, and the employer had
placed the drunken driver in his car and directed him onto the highway. Id. at 315
(McGee, J., dissenting) (citing Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App.
2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968)). Finally, Justice McGee distinguished Robertson by
noting that an affirmative act by the employer in that case had caused the incapacity
of the exhausted employee. Id. (citing Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W.
Va. 1983)).
Furthermore, the dissent argued that four cases where courts refused to impose
liability upon employers for negligent social serving of alcoholic beverages were more
applicable to the Otis facts. Id. at 316-17 (McGee, J., dissenting). See Wienke v.
Champaign County Grain Ass'n, 113 Il1. App. 3d 1005, 447 N.E.2d 1388 (1983);
Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aj'd, 55 A.D.2d
597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 312 Pa. Super. 461,
458 A.2d 1384 (1983), rev'd, - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 515 (1983); Halvorson v. Birchfield
Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) (en banc).
The Congini case was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and no
longer supports Justice McGee's position, since that court held that liability could be
imposed upon the employer. See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., __ Pa. __, 470
A.2d 515 (1983). For a discussion of the Congin" case and social host liability, see
notes 172-78 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, Washington courts have been limiting Halvorson by permitting a
cause of action against a supplier who negligently serves alcohol to a person who is
obviously intoxicated. See Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030
(1982)).
Justice McGee next criticized the majority opinion as being contrary to public
policy. He argued that to say that the employer "took control" of his employee in
this case by failing to take control of him will obliterate the concept of an omission,
nonfeasance, or inaction. 668 S.W.2d at 317 (McGee, J., dissenting). He maintained
that, since the employer as a nonsupplier of alcohol was less culpable than a vendor
or social host, but was nevertheless held liable in this case, lower courts will interpret
the decision as a mandate to hold all vendors and social hosts liable. Id. at 317-18
(McGee, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice McGee maintained that there were
situations when an employee may be "incapacitated" but when it would not be
proper to impose liability on an employer. d. at 318 (McGee, J., dissenting). Justice
McGee gave as an example of this the case of an employee with a history of heart
trouble who experiences pain and is sent home to rest, but has a heart attack on the
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duty to control intoxicated drivers, cases like Otis and Leppke, where courts
have recognized a duty, could have a broad impact on future decisions, espe-
cially if drunken. driving continues to be the problem that it is today.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Vendor and Social Host Liabih'ty
In order to achieve the ultimate goals of deterring the careless dispens-
ing of alcohol to persons who will be driving and compensating the injured
victims of drunken driving, furnishers of alcohol ought to be held civilly lia-
ble. Because the harm caused by an intoxicated person is the same regard-
less of the source of the intoxicating beverage, vendors and social hosts ought
to be held equally responsible under the law.
332
The urgency of the situation compels the conclusion that the question of
civil liability for furnishers of alcoholic beverages is best addressed through
comprehensive legislation. As part of a well reasoned attempt to control the
drunken driving crisis, a legislative approach will do more to achieve the
deterrent and compensatory goals than will a case-by-case judicial solu-
tion.3 33 Acting by statute, a legislature is better equipped to define the pa-
rameters of vendor and social host liability and, at the same time, to promote
way home and causes an accident. Id. Finally, Justice McGee reproached the major-
ity for placing an unreasonable burden upon employers. Id. He argued that smaller
employers do not have rest facilities for their employees, that an employer has no
right to detain an employee, and that it is in fact common practice to let an indis-
posed employee leave his workplace and seek relief. Id. Justice McGee also asserted
that the deterrence and compensation goals of the majority opinion would be better
served by legislation. Id.
332. For a discussion of vendor liability, see notes 12-103 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of social host liability, see notes 105-200 and accompany-
ing text supra.
It is frequently argued that social hosts ought not to be held to the same stan-
dard of liability as vendors, who presumably possess greater knowledge and expertise
with respect to alcohol and its debilitating effects, and who expect to benefit finan-
cially from serving alcohol. However, like the vendor, "[a social] host has a choice of
serving alcohol to whomsoever he pleases. In making that choice he may decide to
serve the alcohol illegally or under circumstances which create an unreasonable risk
of harm to others." Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,
258 Or. at 640, 485 P.2d at 22. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has pointed out,
the duty of care imposed on both vendors and social hosts arises out of their control
of the liquor supply. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1224. "Whatever
the motive behind making alcohol available to those who will subsequently drive, the
provider has a duty to the public not to create foreseeable, unreasonable risks by this
activity." Id
333. This comment advocates full legislative treatment as preferable to judicial
treatment, but a judicial attempt to solve the problem is preferable to none at all. In
the face of legislative inaction, the courts must step in to fill the void.
It could be argued that the fact that most legislatures have not presented a solu-
tion to the problem of civil liability for suppliers of alcoholic beverages is indicative
of a standoff between the competing interests, and that effective compromise is ap-
parently not possible. If true in the past, this is no longer the case today. The seri-
ousness of drunken driving is being recognized more now than ever before, and the
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continuity and uniformity in holding furnishers of alcohol civilly responsible
for the harms of drunken driving.
Initially, the vendor and social host liability statute ought to grant a
cause of action to any person who is injured as a result of the drunken driv-
ing of an unlawfully served person. 334 In order to effectuate fully the goals
of deterring the negligent serving of alcoholic beverages and compensating
injured persons, the act should not exclude the drunk driver from the class of
potential plaintiffs. 335 However, the vendor or host should be permitted to
raise as a defense any fault attributable to the intoxicated patron or guest.
336
The liability statute should then require that a plaintiff prove the fol-
lowing four elements in an action against the vendor or social host: (1) the
defendant served alcoholic beverages to a member of a defined prohibited
class; (2) the defendant's furnishing of alcohol contributed in some part to
the consumer's intoxication at the time of the incident; (3) the plaintiff's
injury was proximately caused by the consumer's negligent operation of a
motor vehicle; and (4) the plaintiff was in fact injured. Proof of these ele-
ments would merely establish a plaintiff's prima facie case; the statute, un-
like traditional dramshop acts, should not be intended to impose strict
same forces stimulating the proliferation of tougher criminal laws for drunken driv-
ing will no doubt have an influence in the realm of civil liability.
The passage of legislation does not have to wait for every factual permutation to
present itself before a court. Problems can be anticipated through legislative fact
finding, hearings and debates, and the statutes can embody solutions found through
this process. The North Carolina Dramshop Act is an example of a liability statute
currently in effect that presents a comprehensive and carefully drafted approach to
vendor liability. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1983). For a description
and discussion of the provisions of this act, see notes 46-63 and accompanying text
supra. For the text of an "Alcoholic Beverage Suppliers' Civil Liability Act" proposed
by the authors, see Appendix btfra.
334. For a proposed definition of "unlawfully served person," see note 339 and
accompanying text ihfra.
The class of plaintiffs granted a cause of action under the act should include not
only those third parties directly injured by the negligence of the drunk driver, but
also the survivors of a drunken driver, on the principle that persons harmed through
no fault of their own should not be denied a right to recover for their injuries.
335. Some existing dramshop acts exclude the patron by their express terms.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-
120(1) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983). Other acts have been judi-
cially interpreted to exclude the patron. See, e.g., Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores, 109 I11.
App. 3d 109, 440 N.E.2d 279 (1982) (recovery under Illinois dramshop act restricted
to third parties); Ciemierek v. Jim's Garage, 90 Mich. App. 565, 282 N.W.2d 396
(1979) (intoxicated person has no claim for relief against bar under Michigan dram-
shop act); Matalavage v. Sadler, 77 A.D.2d 39, 432 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1980) (New York
dramshop act does not grant cause of action to intoxicated person, and no cause of
action is transmitted to his estate if he does not survive). With this exclusion, the
deterrent effect of a liability statute is at least partially thwarted, since certain fur-
nishers of alcohol may be willing to take the chance that third parties will not be
injured. Allowing the patron or guest to sue, however, does not necessarily mean that
the vendor-host will be held fully liable since he may offer in his defense the contrib-
uting fault of the plaintiff.
336. For a discussion of contributory negligence as a defense to vendor and so-
cial host liability generally, see notes 207-10 & 253-67 and accompanying text supra.
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liability upon the furnisher of liquor.337 Rather, it ought to be designed to
encourage reasonably careful conduct in the service of intoxicating bever-
ages without being unduly oppressive upon business and social relations.
338
Accordingly, as the first element of a plaintiff's claim, the injured party
must show that the vendor or social host engaged in specific unreasonable
conduct. In its vendor and social host liability act, the legislature should
therefore indicate the classes of patrons it views as presenting the greatest
risk of danger. Specifically, the statute should grant a cause of action for
sales of alcohol to minors, intoxicated persons and habitual drunkards when
it is likely that the member of the proscribed class will drive.339 It is axio-
337. For a discussion of the strict liability impact of existing dramshop acts, see
note 22 and accompanying text supra.
If a vendor or social host may protect himself from liability by acting responsibly
in furnishing alcohol to others, then perhaps he or she will be encouraged to do so. If,
on the other hand, the vendor-host is subject to strict liability, then the incentive to
act prudently may be substantially diminished since liability would be imposed re-
gardless of the vendor-host's precautions. Furthermore, the threat of strict liability is
an unjustified burden on business and social relations, failing to accommodate the
legitimate interests of furnishers of alcoholic beverages.
338. In this sense, the liability statute would resemble the negligence-based ap-
proach of the common law. For a discussion of the liability of vendors and social
hosts under modern common law, see notes 96-103 & 185-200 and accompanying text
supra.
339. The three groups are those traditionally mentioned in dramshop acts and
alcoholic beverage control laws. Some acts encompass all three groups. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 340.73, .95 (West Supp. 1984) (prohibiting serving of persons
under 19, obviously intoxicated persons, or habitual drunkards, as well as spend-
thrifts and improvident persons); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976) (granting
cause of action for serving minors, visibly intoxicated persons or habitual drunkards);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983) (granting cause of action for serving mi-
nors, visibly intoxicated persons and habitual drunkards). Most acts, however, in-
clude only one or two groups in their prohibited class. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (intoxicated persons); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-18 (1982)
(minors); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1983) (minors and persons visibly
intoxicated); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22(5) (Supp. 1983) (minors and persons
visibly intoxicated).
Each legislature makes a determination of the legal drinking age in its state for
the various categories of intoxicating beverages. This decision is typically reflected in
the state's alcoholic beverage control act. For a listing of the alcoholic beverage con-
trol acts, see note 84 supra. The legal drinking age embodies a legislative determina-
tion that those who fall below that age are not capable of handling the effects of
alcohol and so should be prevented from using it, both for their own protection and
that of the general public. Serving a minor therefore runs counter to this legislative
determination, and the server should be held liable for the harm that results.
Similarly, when one serves a person whom one perceives to be intoxicated, it
should be foreseeable that the person served becomes more of a danger to himself and
the public at large. Common tavernkeeper practice is therefore to "cut off" such a
person, and one who does not do so should expect to be held liable for the results.
Finally, the large number of alcoholics is of great concern in the United States
today. Commonly recognized as a disease, alcoholism is not going to be cured by a
particular vendor's refusal to serve an alcoholic. However, when a vendor does sell
intoxicating beverages to a person whom he knows to be incapable of controlling his
consumption of them, that vendor should foresee that the person is very likely to
become intoxicated and present a danger to himself and to the general public.
[Vol. 29: p. 11191186
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matic that the foreseeability of the risk of harm increases dramatically when
the vendor or social host serves liquor to any one of these persons. 340 There-
fore, a victim of drunken driving ought to be afforded the opportunity to
prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the furnishing of alcohol
to a member of one of these groups.
The second and third proposed elements necessary to support a prima
facie cause of action relate to the issue of causation. 34' The second element,
that the defendant's service of alcohol contributed to the consumer's intoxi-
cation at the time of the accident, may itself be further divided into two
requirements. First, the plaintiff must show that the drunken driver who
was responsible for the plaintiff's injuries was in fact intoxicated when the
accident occurred. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that this intoxica-
tion was a result of the consumption of alcohol unlawfully furnished by the
defendant. Proof of this causal nexus is necessary to ensure that the conduct
of the vendor or social host was culpable.
The third element of the plaintiff's case, requiring proof that the intoxi-
cated person's negligent driving was the proximate cause of the injury, is the
final link between the unlawful furnishing of alcohol and the plaintiffs in-
jury. This requirement is necessary to demonstrate that the accident was not
caused by something other than the driver's intoxication.
342
Finally, a plaintiff under the proposed liability statute must offer evi-
Therefore, the vendor should be responsible for any harm that has been caused by his
negligent serving of such a person.
340. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (serving intoxi-
cated adult); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258
Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (serving minor).
341. It has been noted throughout that the traditional common law view main-
tained that it is the consumption of the alcohol and not its service which causes any
subsequent injury. See text accompanying note 8 supra. As observed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, however, the liability imposed upon furnishers of alcohol may
be analogized to that "traditionally imposed on owners of vehicles who lend their
cars to persons they know to be intoxicated." Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 549, 476
A.2d at 1224 (citing Knight v. Gosselin, 124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932); Har-
ris v. Smith, 119 Ga. App. 306, 167 S.E.2d 198 (1969); Pennington v. Davis-Child
Motor Co., 143 Kan. 753, 57 P.2d 428 (1936); Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 75
N.W.2d 99 (1956); Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922)). The Kelly
court continued: "If, by lending a car to a drunk, a host becomes liable to third
parties injured by the drunken driver's negligence, the same liability should extend to
a host who furnishes liquor to a visibly drunken guest who he knows will thereafter
drive away." Id. In the negligent entrustment context, the injury is caused by the
furnishing of the vehicle in conjunction with the driver's negligence; similarly, in the
vendor-social host context, the injury is caused by the furnishing of the liquor in
conjunction with the negligence of the consumer.
For a general discussion of the negligent entrustment theory of liability, see notes
295-303 and accompanying text supra.
342. It is a presumption, rebuttable by the defendant, that a driver's inebriated
condition is the cause of his negligent driving. The vendor-social host therefore may
be relieved of liability if he can demonstrate that some superseding cause brought
about the accident or injury. An example of such a superseding cause might be a
defect in the automobile.
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dence that he or she was harmed. The recovery permitted under the act
should compensate for injuries to person, property, and means of support. 343
In addition to setting forth the elements of a plaintiff's cause of action,
the liability statute should specify defenses available to the vendor and social
host. 34 4 Because one of the goals of the act is to encourage prudent conduct
in the serving of intoxicating beverages, the defendant ought to be able to
defend on the grounds that his actions were reasonable under the circum-
stances. 345 For example, under the statute a furnisher of alcohol should be
permitted to offer evidence of the following: that a minor misrepresented his
age;346 that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not
have known that the consumer was intoxicated when served;347 that it was
not reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would subsequently attempt to
operate a motor vehicle; or that alcohol was furnished under duress. By es-
tablishing these defenses, the statute will encourage vendors and social hosts
to make the proper inquiries and to act cautiously when providing alcohol to
their patrons and guests. Additionally, the availability of known defenses
will tend to lessen the constraining impact that a civil liability act might
otherwise have on business and social relations.
Furthermore, specific affirmative defenses and limitations not related to
the defendant's conduct should also be expressly incorporated into the liabil-
343. Recovery should not be unlimited, however. For a discussion of a recom-
mended dollar limitation on recovery, see notes 350-51 and accompanying text itfra.
344. For a general discussion of defenses currently available to vendors and so-
cial hosts, see notes 201-94 and accompanying text supra.
345. Because a vendor's or social host's liability would be premised upon the
violation of a statute, any defense that his conduct was "reasonable under the cir-
cumstances" is similar to the defense of "excuse" permitted by some courts in actions
for violation of alcoholic beverage control laws. For a discussion of excuse as a de-
fense, see notes 285-92 and accompanying text supra.
346. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-122 (1983) (evidence that underaged per-
son misrepresented age is evidence that permittee was not negligent in serving him);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-495(e) (Purdon Supp. 1984) (statement signed by minor
claiming he is of legal age is defense in all civil and criminal prosecutions for serving
minors).
347. By employing a "reasonable person" standard, this defense implicitly al-
lows for a difference between vendor and social host liability. Specifically, a vendor
may be held to a higher standard, as result of his apparent expertise, to recognize
when a particular patron is intoxicated. Therefore a social host may have a defense
in situations where a vendor in a comparable situation would not.
This reasonable person standard, however, imposes more of a duty upon vendors
and social hosts than does the frequently employed alcoholic beverage control act
proscription against serving "visibly intoxicated persons." See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 57-4-203(c) (Supp. 1983) (prohibiting sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages
to anyone "visibly intoxicated"). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982) (prohibit-
ing sale to anyone in a state of "noticeable intoxication"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 66.44.200 (1962) (prohibiting sale to anyone "apparently under the influence of
liquor"). Under the reasonable person criteria, the vendor or social host in certain
situations ought to know that his patron or guest is or might be intoxicated even
though that patron or guest does not exhibit any "visible" signs, for example where
the vendor or host knows that his guest has consumed a number of drinks in a short
time.
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ity statute. These would include such defenses as contributory negligence or
comparative fault. 348 Additionally, the act should set forth the period of
limitation during which a plaintiff may assert a claim. This limitation pe-
riod should be the same as that for other personal or property injury claims
under state law.
349
While a plaintiff should be entitled to recover for any harm to person,
property or means of support, the statute should place some limit on the
amount recoverable in order to regulate the financial exposure of culpable
defendants.3 50 The limitation imposed, however, should be on a "per plain-
tiff" rather than a "per occurrence" basis; 35 1 the dollar figure should be the
result of legislative fact finding, accommodating the competing interests of
injured victims and responsible defendants.
Since the drunken driver, and at times the owner of the vehicle, will also
be liable for the injuries resulting from the drunken driving,352 the liability
statute should specifically provide that the vendor or host and driver or
owner are liable to the plaintiff as joint tortfeasors. 353 Such a provision will
discourage improvident consumption of alcohol by those intending to drive
by reminding them that they too are civilly accountable to the injured
348. For a discussion of contributory negligence as a defense under currently
available theories of liability, see notes 207-10 & 253-67 and accompanying text supra.
The availability of these defenses is less severe than the traditional dramshop act
interpretation denying altogether a cause of action to the patron. For a discussion of
this exclusion, see note 26 supra. The traditional limitation is inconsistent with mod-
ern tort principles, and a liability statute ought not to exclude any injured plaintiff as
long as it accords the defendant an opportunity to raise appropriate issues of the
plaintiff's own responsibility for his injuries.
349. Currently a number of dramshop acts have statutes of limitation shorter
than the period for other personal injury claims. For a discussion of such dramshop
acts, see note 43 and accompanying text supra. However, the interests of a plaintiff in
a dramshop case are no less than those of any other plaintiff in this respect, and the
concerns of the defendant are no greater than those of a defendant in a typical tort
claim. A shorter limitation period is unjustified and works an unfair penalty on the
injured plaintiff.
350. See, e.g., Ii.i.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135-6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983)
(maximum recoverable is $15,000 for injury to person or property and $20,000 for
loss of support); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984) ($500,000 is maxi-
mum recoverable for all damages arising out of single illegal sale); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-123 (1983) (limitation of $500,000 per occurrence).
351. Some existing dramshop acts limit recovery on a "per occurrence" basis.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984) ($500,000 is maximum recov-
erable for all damages arising out of single illegal sale); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-123
(1983) (limitation of $500,000 per occurrence). However, society's interest in com-
pensating victims demands that an injured party's recovery not be contingent upon
the number of other persons injured in an accident.
352. For a brief discussion of the liability of the drunken driver, see note 3 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the automobile owner's liability, see
notes 295-303 and accompanying text supra.
353. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-124 (1983) (vendor and driver jointly and
severally liable, with right of contribution but not indemnification). See also Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 96 NJ. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230 (expressly holding that social host and
guest are liable to injured third party as joint tortfeasors).
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B. Nonsuppliers of Alcohol Beverages
In a number of circumstances, nonsuppliers of alcohol should also be
held accountable for the injuries caused by another's drunken driving. The
imposition of liability on certain nonsuppliers because of their relationship to
the drunk driver or because of their own negligent conduct is justified as
furthering the goals of deterring drunken driving and compensating its in-
jured victims. As discussed above, nonsupplier liability has been premised
upon one of three theories: (1) negligent entrustment;3 5 5 (2) respondeat su-
perior;356 or (3) common law duty to control another's conduct. 35 7
Under a negligent entrustment theory, the owner of an automobile
would be held liable for the drunken driver's conduct on the basis that the
owner himself was negligent in entrusting the car to such a driver. This
theory follows general negligence concepts, which dictate that entrusting a
vehicle to someone who is intoxicated or likely to become so with the knowl-
edge that such person will soon drive creates a foreseeable risk of harm to
others. The threat of liability here may deter owners from allowing the
drunken driver to get behind the wheel. Like vendor and social host liabil-
ity, this approach seeks to curtail drunken driving by focusing on the source
of the risk. The former aims at the supplier of the alcohol, the latter aims at
the supplier of the automobile.
Under certain circumstances, the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior ought to be available to a plaintiff injured by a drunken driver.
This doctrine is frequently said to emanate from a desire to find a defendant
with "deep pocket[s]." 358 Accordingly, the imposition of liability under this
theory is consistent with the goal of compensating injured persons. It has
also been noted that respondeat superior liability derives from the relation-
ship between principal and agent and the ability of the principal to exercise
some degree of control over his agent who is acting on his behalf.359 Since
the principal reaps the benefit of the relationship, he should also bear the
cost.
Because of the elements necessary to support a claim pursuant to the
354. An alternative provision to creating joint liability between the vendor or
host and guest would be to make the vendor or host secondarily liable, requiring
judgment against the drunken driver as a prerequisite to suit against the furnisher of
the alcohol. See Kelly v. Gwinneli, 96 N.J. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
355. For a discussion of the theory of negligent entrustment, see notes 295-303
and accompanying text supra.
356. For a discussion of respondeat superior in the drunken driving context, see
notes 304-15 and accompanying text supra.
357. For a discussion of the common law duty to control another's conduct, see
notes 316-31 and accompanying text supra.
358. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 69, at 500 (citing BATY, VICA-
RIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916)).
359. See id.
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doctrine of respondeat superior, this theory of liability may not benefit a
large number of plaintiffs. 360 Nevertheless, this cause of action is important
since it serves at least indirectly to deter drunken driving and it serves di-
rectly to compensate those harmed.
Finally, nonsuppliers ought to be held liable where the common law
imposes upon them a duty to control the conduct of the drunk driver. Such
a duty arises in three situations. First, a duty to control should be imposed
upon a person who commits an affirmative act that is in itself so significant
that the person ought to be deemed to have voluntarily assumed such a duty,




Second, a duty to act should be imposed upon a person when the rela-
tionship between the parties is "of such a character that social policy justifies
the imposition of a duty to act."'362 Such a relationship exists, for example,
between parent and child.
Third, a duty to act may arise out of a combination of some affirmative
act and the existence of a fiduciary relationship, although neither one alone
necessarily would be sufficient. An example of this is where an employer
seeing that his employee is too intoxicated to perform his work properly,
sends him out to drive home. 363 Here, in light of the relationship between
the parties, the act assumes a significance it would otherwise lack, and the
person acting is properly vested with a duty to control the conduct of the
other for the other's own protection or the protection of the general public.
In each of these cases, the imposition of a duty to act and subsequent
liability for failing to do so aids in deterring drunken driving by encouraging
others to take reasonable steps in preventing an intoxicated person from
driving.
V. CONCLUSION
Each year the statistics for injuries from drunken driving become more
and more alarming. As the crisis takes on epidemic proportions, it becomes
apparent that legislative and judicial action is needed. In spite of a history
360. For a discussion of the elements necessary to sustain a defendant's vicarious
liability for another's drunken driving, see notes 304-15 and accompanying text supra.
361. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). The Restatement
provides as follows:
(1) If an actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that
it has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking
effect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of
the act the actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk.
Id. See, e.g., Leppke v. Segura, - Colo. App. -, 632 P.2d 1057 (1981). For a discus-
sion of Leppke, see notes 320-24 and accompanying text supra.
362. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 56, at 374 (footnote omitted).
363. See, e.g., Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983). For a
discussion of the Otis case, see notes 325-31 and accompanying text supra.
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of holding the drunken driver criminally and civilly liable, the senseless loss
of life and property continues. It is therefore strongly encouraged that legal
efforts be aimed at those who are able in part to control drunken driving-
the suppliers of alcohol and those nonsuppliers whose negligent conduct or
relationship with a drunken driver justifies the imposition of liability.
Drunken driving is a detriment to all society. By spreading the burden of
liability beyond the drunken driver, society can begin to eliminate one of its
greatest problems.
Juhius F Lang, Jr.
John J McGrath
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ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE SUPPLIERS' CIVIL LIABILITY
ACT
1. Any person suffering bodily or property harm or loss of means of
support, as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle [as defined
by *] by a person in an intoxicated condition [as defined by *], shall have a
cause of action for damages against any person or other legal entity that
shall have supplied, directly or indirectly, any alcoholic beverage [as defined
by*] to the intoxicated person if:
(a) the alcoholic beverage was supplied unreasonably under the
circumstances;
(b) at the time the alcoholic beverage was supplied, the intoxi-
cated person was [**] and a person who the supplier of the
alcohol knew or should have known was likely to operate a
motor vehicle;
(c) the alcohol supplied contributed in whole or in part to the
intoxicated person's intoxication; and
(d) the negligent operation of the motor vehicle was the proxi-
mate result of the intoxication of the intoxicated person.
2. Liability under this section may be imposed against any supplier of
alcohol, whether or not that supplier is a licensee under [*], subject to the
limitations outlined in section 1.
3. Recovery under this section is subject to the terms of [***].
4. Liability under the section is limited to [$ ****] per person per
occurrence.
5. An action under this section must be commenced within [****]
years of the date of the accident.
6. The supplier of alcohol liable under section 1 and the intoxicated
person shall be jointly and severally liable to the injured party.
* Reference to applicable state law provision.
** Legislature to decide the limits, if any, to place on the class of intoxicated
persons whose intoxication may be the proximate cause of injuries for which the stat-
ute allows recovery.
*** Reference to state statute or judicial decision adopting comparative fault
principles, if any.
**** Legislature to decide damages and time limitations.
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